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Abstract 
 
A central theme in the current terrorism phenomenon has been al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative and its ability to inspire home-grown terrorism.  In the minds of generally young, 
unexceptional Muslim males and some Western converts to Islam, this narrative is 
recreated in the context of their own personal circumstances and networks.  The 
predominant strategic models of terrorism are inadequate for critically analysing a 
phenomenon that is adaptable, dynamic, evolving and regenerative.  Through the 
application of Colonel John Boyd’s Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act Loop (OODA Loop) as an 
adaptable, alternative strategic model of terrorism and case study research methodology, 
this thesis tested the theory that Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is a tactic of 
asymmetric warfare.  According to Boyd, defeating an opponent requires penetrating its 
OODA Loop.  The case studies demonstrated al Qaeda’s strategy that transformed from the 
use of: i) unexceptional individuals from western countries, to avoid detection; ii) western 
domestic-planned attacks to overcome tactical challenges and to adapt to OODA Loop 
penetration; and iii) western domestic individuals with no known links to al Qaeda, inspired 
by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  These case studies also provided examples of al Qaeda’s 
evolution into a regenerative brand, in a conflict where the whole world has become the 
battlefield, including within people’s minds.  This includes securing the mindset of a 
borderless, interconnected community while Governments and their citizens fear the 
unpredictable, irreconcilable nature of home-grown terrorism emanating from within their 
society.  Significantly, al Qaeda determined that inspiring home-grown terrorism, 
synthesising its Salafi-Jihadi narrative with the use of the internet to broadcast graphic and 
brutal acts of violence, and shifting from spectacular terrorism to ‘do-it-yourself’ attacks 
against soft targets in a Western urban environment, penetrates Western moral principles 
and its conventional view of warfare within a democratic construct.  Penetrating the West’s 
moral principles is an important aspect of al Qaeda’s broad strategy.  This research 
described the concept of al Qaeda manoeuvring within and exploiting Western moral and 
mental boundaries while simultaneously inspiring more a new generation of followers, as 
moral manoeuvrability.  Further research could use this concept to understand how to 
exploit the Salafi-Jihadi narrative to force terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda and now 
the so-called Islamic State to fold back inside themselves and self-immolate. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 The OODA Loop and Salafi-Jihadi Inspired Home-Grown Terrorism 
 
The dynamic and adaptable nature of al Qaeda’s (AQ) Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism and its ability to penetrate technologically advanced security and intelligence 
efforts continues to present a major strategic challenge for governments around the world.  
This challenge is significantly increased given that home-grown terrorists are predominantly 
unexceptional, Muslim males and Western converts to Islam, who for the most part blend 
into the very society they intend to attack.   
 
This thesis employed Colonel (COL.) John Boyd’s conceptual framework – the Observe-
Orientate-Decide-Act Loop - to test the theory that Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare used by AQ and other Salafi-Jihadi terrorist 
organisations.  This was achieved through the application of case study research 
methodology, using three cases of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.  United 
States Air Force (USAF) pilot, COL. John Boyd (1927 – 1997), developed the conceptual 
framework or strategic loop of Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act - the OODA Loop.  This was 
the result of lessons learned from Boyd’s aerial combat experiences during the Korean War 
(1950 -1953), combined with his epistemological analysis of military history, as well as an 
examination and reconstruction theoretical principles contained within disciplines such as 
engineering, mathematics and science.  Boyd developed this strategic framework to 
provide an understanding of how to survive against an adversary in combat.  However, 
what was most important to Boyd was educating people on how to think differently; to 
analyse and synthesise the multi-faceted aspects of the world around them to create 
novelty that would enable them to succeed in war, business, sport, science, engineering or 
other endeavours. 
 
According to Boyd (1986), in a contest for survival, decision-making occurs in a recurring 
cycle of Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act.  In fact, Boyd’s conceptual spiral could be described 
as a paradigm for survival.  An entity that can rapidly process through this cycle, observing 
and reacting to unfolding events faster than an opponent, can thereby "get inside" the 
opponent's decision-making cycle and gain the advantage.  However, it is not simply a 
matter of making decisions faster than one’s opponent.  The speed relates to the ability to 
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analyse and synthesise new information, systems, patterns and processes and to create 
novelty and adapt more quickly to changes in the environment.  Boyd’s theoretical model 
suggests that decisions are based on observations of the evolving situation as a 
consequence of our actions.  These observations include the social and moral construct of 
ourselves and our opponent, as well as the raw information on which actions are based.  
The ability to manoeuvre within the moral, mental and physical boundaries of an opponent, 
to create novelty that is disorientating, is more likely to result in one’s survival. 
 
The OODA Loop is an applicable conceptual framework from which to explore, describe and 
analyse how AQ created a prophetic Salafi-Jihadi brand and adapted to Western 
counterterrorism responses by inspiring impressionable, young, Western-based Muslims to 
become home-grown terrorists.  For Western governments, media and the general public, 
home-grown terrorism is disorientating and creates a high state of internal entropy.  This 
entropy frustrates Western governments in their efforts to determine the most effective 
policy, military, community and policing response.  Care must be taken to avoid an 
overreaction that feeds into the narrative AQ has constructed.  Inciting an overreaction by 
an opponent that further exacerbates conflict is a common objective of those who use the 
tactics of asymmetric warfare.  In the case of AQ, an overreaction by Western governments 
can simultaneously divide policy makers attempting to develop a strategy to defeat AQ, and 
inspire more followers to AQ.   
 
The objective of this thesis is to use the OODA Loop as a strategic model to explore how AQ 
manoeuvred within Western society through their Salafi-Jihadi narrative that inspired small 
sections of the Muslim community to carry out acts of terrorism in the Western country in 
which they were born or raised.  Significantly, this thesis argues that the ability to inspire 
and shape the use of home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare.  This 
research will describe how AQ achieved this by shaping the conflict environment, through 
disorientating, novel and adaptable forms of home-grown terrorism.  For AQ and its 
network of followers the battlefield of this war is located as much in the minds of followers 
and opponents as it is in any physical location.  The current terrorism phenomenon has 
witnessed the emergence of new brands of Salafi-Jihadi organisations, such as the so-called 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Boko Haram and al Shabbab.  ISIS in particular has been 
prolific in the use of graphic violence, framed with a prophetic Salafi-Jihadi narrative to 
inspire impressionable, unexceptional, Western-based Muslims or converts to Islam to 
conduct acts of home-grown terrorism.  While an important inspirational driver of many 
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home-grown terrorists and foreign fighters is the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, this research did 
not focus on the foreign fighter phenomenon.  Nevertheless, the issue of foreign fighters is 
an area of inquiry that could benefit from using the OODA loop to explore and critically 
analyse in order to develop countering strategies. 
 
A key focus of this research is how Western moral and humanistic values, are seen as 
asymmetric weaknesses to be exploited by AQ and now other Salafi-Jihadi groups.  This 
notion is significant to the development of the concept of moral manoeuvrability that is 
proposed as one of the major contributions from this research.  Further, while pursuing a 
theoretical examination of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is a worthy 
academic exercise, this is a dynamic and evolving field of inquiry.  As such, academic 
research should also aim to make an applicable contribution to neutralising this threat to 
society.  This novel application of the OODA Loop may provide an additional frame of 
reference from which to develop counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism 
strategies to manipulate the Salafi-Jihadi movement into self-immolation.  
 
The following sections of this introduction set out the definitions and conceptualisation of 
the fundamental themes used, before detailing the structure and organisation of this 
research.  
 
1.2 Definitions and Conceptualisation of Key Themes 
 
1.2.1 Terrorism 
 
While describing the predominant definitions of terrorism remains a compulsory aspect of 
research within this field of inquiry, this thesis does not intend to add to the tautological 
academic debate by attempting to create a new definition.  There appear to be as many 
definitions of terrorism as there are people researching this topic, even though it is not a 
new phenomenon.  As Crenshaw (1981) explains, the term terrorism has been used to 
describe the inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population.  In 
some cases, the phenomenon of terrorism was a challenge to the authority of the state and 
grew from the difficulties revolutionaries experienced in trying to recreate the mass 
uprisings of the French Revolution.  Other important contributions to the definition of 
terrorism have been made by Thornton (1964), Schelling (1966), Thackrah (1987), as well as 
Schmid & Jongman (1988).   
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There are also varying definitions held by governments, law enforcement agencies, such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and international multilateral organisations, such 
as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).  For example, in a declaration on 
measures to eliminate terrorism, the UN describes terrorism as "a criminal act intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes, which are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other 
nature that may be invoked to justify them”  (UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60, 
December 9, 1994).  Irrespective of which definition is applied, terrorism is used as a tool of 
conflict or war by numerous organisations and individuals seeking to influence 
governments or other opponents.  As this thesis will argue, AQ frames the use of terrorism 
as part of a war to defend Islam.   
 
As with war, terrorism is a human phenomenon driven by a range of motivations and 
contexts that attempt to describe how and why terrorism is used.  One of most cited 
authors who has described the challenge of defining “terrorism” is Thackrah (1987).  In his 
examination of the historical discourse on defining terrorism, Thackrah (1987) said: 
  
No definition in principle can be reached because the very process of definition 
is in itself part of a wider conflict between ideologies or political objectives […] 
the problem is not one of the comprehensiveness or degree of detail of 
definition, but is one of the framework of that definition. (Thackrah, R. 1987, 
p.25) 
 
In this regard the definition to be used in this thesis is framed in the context of how AQ 
perceives its conflict with the dominant Western hegemony as a war and not merely a 
violent form of social or political protest.  This notion of not only a war but an 
unconventional, fourth generation concept of war as described by Lind (1984), is strongly 
argued and explored in Chapter Two and Chapter Five and is important for the theoretical 
context of this research.  
 
The concept of terrorism as a weapon used by a political organisation was explored by 
Thornton (1964), who described terrorism as a “symbolic act” and said: 
 
Insurgents use terror because they lack political support.  They attempt to 
provoke the incumbents into repressive measures, which create a justification 
for their violent tactics.  Because terrorists cannot tactically eliminate their 
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opponents, they rely on methods, which simply make an opponent’s withdrawal 
less costly than continued fighting.  Terrorist acts also serve to build morale 
within the insurgent organisation, to disorient the lives of the target population 
and to advertise the insurgency. (Thornton, T.P. 1964, p.1) 
 
Western governments are presented with a conundrum when dealing with Salafi-Jihadi 
inspired home-grown terrorism, as they cannot physically withdraw, as if on a conventional 
battlefield or in the contest for independent territory within a sovereign state.   
 
Incredibly, Schmid and Jongman (1988) noted that in their first Research Gazette, published 
in 1985, they analysed twenty-two word categories contained within 109 definitions of 
terrorism in an attempt to establish a common theme or a number of common elements to 
describe terrorism.  However, this thesis accepts the definition of terrorism offered by 
Schmid and Jongman (1988) who describe it as an “indirect method of combat in which 
random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence” (Schmid & 
Jongman, 1988, p.2).  Their definition continues by stating: 
 
The purpose of this indirect method of combat is to either immobilise the 
target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to 
mobilise secondary targets of demands (e.g. a government) or targets of 
attention (e.g. public opinion) to changes of attitude or behaviour favouring 
the short or long-term interests of the users of this method of combat. 
(Schmid & Jongman 1988, p.2). 
 
The Schmid and Jongman (1988) definition of terrorism is applicable in the context of this 
research for two reasons.  Firstly, it supports the argument in this research that home-
grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare employed by AQ.  Secondly, it adopts the 
language used by Boyd, who emphasised the need to produce mismatches, fast-transients 
and disorientation in the mind of an adversary by penetrating their OODA loop.  This has 
been achieved through the use of what AQ describes in its 2004 publication, Management 
of Savagery, as graphic and unvarnished violence.  When synthesised with the use of the 
internet and replayed incessantly by the 24-hour mainstream media cycle, the effect is 
morally and mentally traumatising for Western society and frustrates domestic public 
opinion (Lynch 2006; Frias, Samuel & White 2012; Farwell 2015). 
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1.2.2 Home-Grown Terrorism 
 
The term “home-grown terrorism” appeared in academic literature following the 7 July 
2005 terrorist attacks on the London Metropolitan Transport system (7/7 London attack).  
This was because the four terrorists were individuals who had been either born or raised in 
the United Kingdom.  While the use of the term “home-grown terrorism” may be new, the 
act itself is not.  For example, the Anarchists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries were at the time feared to be a potential global terrorist phenomenon.  In her 
work on French anarchists exiled in London, Bantman (2013) explores what was then 
described as a transnational threat from anarchist-inspired terrorism.  These anarchists 
often carried out terrorist attacks against the Government of the country in which they 
were citizens.  In other words, they were home-grown terrorists. 
 
In a detailed epistemological account of terrorism, O’Kane (2014) describes how following 
the invention of gelignite in 1875, the 1890s in Europe become known as the decade of the 
bomb.  In a comparative analysis of lone wolf terrorism, Feldman (2013) describes a 150-
year history of the anarchist-terrorism phenomenon where the majority of the terrorist 
attacks were perpetrated by individuals against institutions, representatives or economic 
targets of their own country of origin or birth.  As Feldman (2013) outlines, the 1894 
bombing of the Café Terminus in France, the assassination of King Umberto of Italy in 1900 
and the 1920 bombing of Wall Street, which killed 33 people, are examples of terrorist 
attacks carried out by individuals against their home country.   
 
Even Australia at that time did not escape the impact of anarchist terrorism.  Feldman 
(2013) also provides other examples, including the bomb exploded at the front of Daniel 
Maloney’s house in the Melbourne suburb of Fitzroy on 28 May 1898, described at the time 
as another example of the global violence being spread by anarchists.  The Italian Red 
Brigade, the West German Red Army Faction as well as a range of right-wing groups and 
individuals in the United States (US), all interviewed by Jessica Stern (2003), could fall under 
the umbrella of being defined as home-grown terrorists.  Before the 11 September 2001 
(9/11) attack on the United States, the largest bombing on American soil by a US citizen 
occurred on 19 April 1995, when Timothy McVeigh destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people (Michel and Herbeck, 2001).  The term “home-
grown” appears to have been applied retrospectively to the Oklahoma bombing as a 
consequence of events and changes in the paradigmatic perspectives on terrorism since the 
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terrorist attacks of 9/11.  Terrorist attacks by citizens against their own countries in the 
West, inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, are a relatively recent occurrence.   
 
In their examination of the major academic works on home-grown terrorism, Crone and 
Harrow (2011) attempt to differentiate between individuals born or raised in the West who 
autonomously become a terrorist and those who have external support from AQ.  For 
Crone and Harrow (2011), the two important identifiers of home-grown terrorism are 
“belonging” and the level of “autonomy.”  The identifier of “belonging” refers to whether 
the individual or members of the group were born in a Western country or spent more than 
half their life living in the West.  This could include individuals who migrated to a Western 
country with their parents.  The identifier of “autonomy” refers to the extent to which the 
individual or members of the group had an association or links with a Salafi-Jihadi terrorist 
organisation such as AQ.  As Crone and Harrow (2011) explain, when it was discovered that 
perpetrators of the 7/7 London terrorist attack had travelled to Pakistan and received 
terrorism training, the strength of the home-grown label was reduced.  The level of 
“autonomy” is not a disqualification factor for identifying an individual or group as home-
grown for this research.  The level of AQ involvement in home-grown terrorism may 
depend on a range of strategic and tactical factors, but it does not reduce or remove the 
nature of the terrorist attack as being home-grown. 
 
Perhaps the simplest description of home-grown terrorism is provided by Precht (2007), 
who described it as “acts of violence targeting Western countries in which the terrorists 
themselves have been born or raised” (Precht, 2007, p15).  For the purposes of this 
research, there is no intention to create a new definition of home-grown terrorism.    
Instead, it is irrelevant if those who were born and/or raised in a Western country, who 
planned to carry out a terrorist attack on that country, received external support or not; 
they are still described as home-grown terrorists.   
 
1.2.3 Asymmetric Warfare 
 
An important concept for this research is asymmetric warfare because this research 
considers home-grown terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare by AQ and other Salafi-
Jihadi terrorist organisations.  Asymmetric warfare is a term used to describe how one 
opponent can identify and exploit the weakness of another in conflict.  The military 
strategist Sun Tzu, who in 500BC wrote The Art of War, said: “if the enemy is superior in 
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strength, evade him.  If his forces are united, separate them.  Attack him where he is 
unprepared. Appear where you are not expected.”  Identifying and exploiting an 
adversary’s weaknesses, while utilising one's own strengths against those weaknesses, is at 
the heart of asymmetric warfare, as explained by Metz and Johnson (2001) and Arreguin-
Toft (2001).  In the context of this research, asymmetric warfare is how AQ is applying its 
brand of terrorism and violence against Western targets, as opposed to fighting them on a 
conventional battlefield.   
 
In a historical examination of asymmetric warfare and lessons for the US military, Franklin 
Miles (1999) explained that the United States Department of Defence identified the 
following common threads in their historical interpretation of asymmetric warfare 
including:  
 
 Pitting one's strengths against selected enemy weaknesses. 
 Using unexpected, unconventional, or innovative methods of attack or defence. 
 A disproportionate effect of the military or financial investment and oucome. 
 Asymmetric threats can be either technologically or culturally based. 
(Miles, B. Franklin, 1999, Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective, p. 3) 
 
One of the most cited modern works on asymmetric warfare is Mac (1975), who described 
how, since World War Two (WWII), “technological superiority may be a highly unreliable 
guide to the outcome of wars” (Mac, 1975, p.1).  An example of AQ’s use of a tactic of 
asymmetric warfare is the failed bombing attempt by Richard Reid, a.k.a the “Shoe–
Bomber”.  On 22 December 2001, Richard Reid, a British-born citizen, attempted to blow up 
American Airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami, with a bomb inside his sneakers.  Even 
though the attempt failed, this unsophisticated attack penetrated multiple layers of 
advanced security and forced Governments and airports around the world to respond.   
 
This research frames home-grown terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare.  Tactics of 
asymmetric warfare can also involve exploiting an opponent’s perceived moral weaknesses.  
In this regard, what the West believes to be the strengths of a democratic society, human 
rights and secular rules of law are seen by AQ as weakness to be exploited.  In his book, 
Why I am Not a Muslim, Ibn Warraq (1995), explained: 
Americans tend to think that deep down we all have the same values.  
Americans believe that all these terrorists, if you scratch beneath the surface, 
are looking for religious equality and justice.  That's complete and utter 
nonsense.  Americans can't face the reality that different people have different 
values.  (Ibn Warraq, 1995, p.95)   
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As Barnett (2003) argues, Western political leaders, policy makers and even military 
commanders have lost sight of the fact that people and ideas are the essence of not only 
why wars are fought, but also how.  In terms of the US and its allies, such as Australia, the 
perceived weakness is our moral rejection of certain methods of retaliation and our 
propensity to uphold international rules of war and principles of human rights.  Identifying 
these weaknesses, whether moral, mental or physical, is fundamental to asymmetric 
warfare and one of the most important themes in this thesis.  
 
1.2.4 Structure and Organisation of the Research 
 
This thesis is presented as seven chapters comprising an introduction, a review of the 
literature, analysis and conclusion.  
 
Chapter Two critiques, explores and describes Boyd’s OODA Loop and the available 
academic literature on his conceptual framework.  The simplicity of the OODA Loop can be 
deceiving and many authors and students of management, law, military strategy and even 
healthcare, who have applied the OODA Loop to their field of expertise often neglect to 
deconstruct the principles, theories and intellectual discourse that sits behind this concept 
for survival.  While there are a number of papers published in military journals contesting 
and exploring Boyd’s theoretical framework as applied to aerial combat or military strategy, 
no academic, peer-reviewed papers using the OODA Loop to analyse and explore Salafi-
Jihadi-inspired home-grown terrorism exist.  Chapter Two extends the concept of 
asymmetric warfare to the notion of manoeuvre warfare and fourth generation warfare.  
Finally, Chapter Two analyses each component of the OODA Loop in relation to Salafi-
Jihadi-inspired home-grown terrorism.   
 
Chapter Three explores the strategic model of terrorism as a working concept underpinning 
this study.  As such it also offers a critique of established strategic models or typologies of 
terrorism.  For example, Thomas Thornton (1964), who proposed five strategic constructs; 
Crenshaw’s (1981) strategic model of control and outbidding; and Pape (2006) who argues 
that political ends are the overriding strategic objective of terrorist organisations.  Other 
contributions analysed include Kydd and Walter (2006), Abrahms (2008), Sageman (2008) 
and Bakker (2006).  Further, Chapter Three seeks to evaluate the predominant approaches 
in the literature to describe the implementation of home-grown terrorism.  For example, 
whether it is applied through a leaderless network or one that continues to be directed by a 
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command structure where the AQ leadership remains in direct control of planning terrorist 
attacks.  Chapter Three also explores the religious, social, moral and political symbolism 
implicit within the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  The cultural context of this research sits within 
Islamic fundamentalism and several insightful and accessible theological explanations of the 
core strands of Islam has been provided by the likes of Majid (1984), Mousalli (2009), HRH 
Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad Professor Ibrahim Kalin Professor Mohammad Hashim Kamali 
(2013) in their work on the War and Peace in Islam: the uses and abuses of Jihad, as well as 
the work by Mohamed Abdel Dayem and Fatima Ayubt (2008) in their interpretations of 
Jihad and modern challenges and Lauziere (2016), in his examination of the Islamic reform 
and Salafism.  In Chapter Three, these works form the primary and secondary sources used 
to explore key concepts such as jihad, takfir, Wahhabism and Salafism, as they form an 
important element of the narrative.  Understanding the narrative and the symbolic 
language used to inspire, such as jihad and takfir, is an important aspect of this research.  In 
this context, all Salafi-Jihadi movements, such as AQ, ISIS, Boko Haram and al Shabbab, are 
defined as terrorist movements.   
 
Chapter Four presents the methodological approach to this study and establishes the 
foundation for the case study research methodology that is applied in this thesis.  This 
involves examining the important academic work of Yin (1981, 1984 and 2003), Gillham 
(2000) and Thomas (2011).  The multiple case study research design is descriptive, 
evaluative and used to test the theory that home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric 
warfare used by AQ.  Case study research methodology is a well-established research 
discipline within social science and qualitative research practices, used to conduct 
exploratory analysis using real-life examples within a conceptual framework.  Research of 
the Salafi-Jihadi movement is essentially a sociological enquiry into people, events, 
decisions, periods of time and institutions, as well as a belief system that requires a 
theoretical focus.  Three case studies are used to test this theory, through descriptive and 
evaluative critical inquiry against John Boyd’s OODA Loop, the conceptual framework and 
strategic model of terrorism employed for this research.  The three case studies selected for 
this research are: 
 
1. The Australian case of Jack Roche 
2. 7 July 2005 London transport network attack 
3. 15 April 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing 
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Each case selected for this research represents a unit of human activity embedded in the 
real world, which can only be studied in context and cannot be manipulated or contrived to 
suit the objectives of the research.   
 
The case studies are presented descriptively in the Chapter Five.  Leading academic experts 
on case study methodology, such as Yin (1981, 1984) and George and Bennett (2005), state 
that case study research is a particularly useful research tool where the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the set of circumstances are not clearly defined.  As a 
phenomenon, Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism involves a complex set of 
occurrences, without concrete boundaries or borders.  Part of the challenge for 
counterterrorism strategies is that while Salafi-Jihadi terrorism lacks concrete boundaries, it 
is powerfully connected through a mindset where the battlefield includes mental, moral 
and social concepts.   
 
Following from this, Chapter Six offers an analysis of the case studies through the 
application of the OODA Loop in order to illuminate the evolving nature of the current 
terrorism phenomenon.  Significantly, Chapter Six synthesises the elements of terrorism, 
AQ’s use of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, warfare and Western humanistic morality to present 
and describe the concept of moral manoeuvrability; a contribution to this field of inquiry 
developed from this research.  Moral manoeuvrability is a dynamic, theoretical concept to 
describe the ability of AQ to exploit Western democratic principles and engineer an over-
reaction or a compromise by governments or members of the community.  The reaction by 
Western governments, or public action taken by elements within the community, 
contradict that Western government’s very own moral principles.  Simultaneously, the 
Western government’s policy decision or a community’s negative reaction, such as anti-
Muslim protests, feeds back into AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative, legitimising the use of violence 
and further inspiring more followers to their cause.  Those who already felt marginalised 
within the Muslim population now have that perception confirmed.  It is also the case that 
open, considerate and responsible debate by the public or indeed the government, to 
explore and understand the phenomenon of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, is 
stifled, out of a concern that this will be misinterpreted as “Islamophobic”.  Freedom of 
expression, speech and debate are fundamental to Western democracy.  This forms the 
definition of moral manoeuvrability. 
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Moral manoeuvrability cultivates disharmony and paralysis within governments and the 
public, unsure if they should compromise, while simultaneously building a stronger and 
wider connection, or an esprit de corps, among the Salafi-Jihadi movement.  The 
overreaction (e.g. security and surveillance laws) or the accommodation by the government 
through a change of social policy (a hypothetical example would be allowing communities 
in Australia with a majority of Muslim residents to apply sharia law) causes the Western 
government to compromise its own principles.  This is about the transformation of morality 
or principles between two opposing sides.  Chapter Six explains how AQ and ISIS have been 
applying moral manoeuvrability in order to penetrate deep inside the OODA Loop of 
Western countries.   
 
Finally, the Conclusion draws together the theoretical constructs described, evaluated and 
tested in this research.  Potential weaknesses in the research are also highlighted, along 
with suggested applications and areas for further work. 
 
1.2.5 Significance and Contribution of the Research 
 
In summary, the aim of this thesis is to make a significant contribution to the understanding 
of how AQ has created its own Salafi-Jihadi narrative to inspire home-grown terrorism, as a 
tactic of asymmetric warfare.  This current terrorism phenomenon has created and 
continues to create tremendous suffering and social dislocation within many countries.  It is 
therefore important to make a contribution through a rigorous process of analysis and 
synthesis to better understand how this threat to our society can be neutralised.  The 
application of the OODA Loop as a strategic model of terrorism to test the theory that 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare used by AQ 
against Western countries has not been presented previously in academic research.   
 
In addition, this research develops the concept of moral manoeuvrability as an important 
contribution to this field of inquiry.  Moral manoeuvrability is being used by AQ, ISIS and 
other Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations in a war directed against Western society.  It is a 
concept that can also be used to understand how AQ and ISIS connect with and exploit the 
minds of two kinds of individuals:   
 
i) Those who have a perverse, almost pornographic attraction to violence where 
the AQ or ISIS narrative releases their inner psychopath.  It is as if this attraction 
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to and the graphic demonstration of violence is a priori to their belief in Islam, 
but gives their violence a kind of theological justification; and  
 
ii) Those who are susceptible to the narrative that Islam is under attack and the 
only way to defend against this is through violence.  They personally regenerate 
this narrative cultivated and shaped by AQ as a fight for a sense of justice.   
 
Those who believe Islam is under attack anchor their use of violence in the defence of 
Islam, and in fighting side-by-side with their Muslim brothers, their family and the wider 
Muslim community. 
 
The research also uses the OODA loop to explore what it labels “do-it-yourself” (DIY), 
home-grown terrorism.  That is, simple acts of brutality with basic, unsophisticated tools 
targeting ordinary urban or city locations.  This is an emerging, evolving and adaptable 
asymmetric threat, as opposed to complicated mass attacks against Western targets or 
attacks aimed at highly guarded symbolic buildings such as Parliament, international 
airports or government building.  These DIY-style, home-grown terrorist attacks require 
little planning, few resources and no training at a terrorist camp. Despite the cacophony 
and scale of many global political, economic, environmental or business issues that may 
affect tens of thousands of people, one act of simple brutality can captivate a global 
audience.  For example, while they are not cases of home-grown terrorism, the beheadings 
of international journalists and humanitarian workers by one man, with a knife, standing in 
the desert can terrorise the nation of that victim.  To a certain extent it feels like home-
grown terrorism, especially when the terrorist who beheads the Western hostages is 
himself a Westerner.   
 
This tactic is highly disorientating for Western audiences.  It is as if the simplicity of the 
attack combined with the fact that the perpetrator is one of ‘us’ generates a mental and 
moral mismatch that penetrates our OODA loop. The way this intimate and traumatising 
act of brutality is broadcast across the internet and replayed through the 24-hour news-
cycle, severely enhances the fear we have of this enemy.  Boyd would have recognised this 
as a tactic of asymmetric warfare - to distort the image in our minds, resulting in an under- 
or over-shooting in our domestic and foreign policy and our law enforcement approaches 
that can result in second and third tier consequences. 
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Chapter 2 - The Boyd Cycle - Observe Orientate Decide Act Loop 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter will critically analyse the components of the OODA Loop and the theoretical 
constructs that sit behind Boyd’s conceptual framework.  This provides a grounded 
foundation from which to employ the OODA Loop as the analytical lens for the case study 
research methodology used in this thesis.  The critical analysis is conducted in the context 
of AQ and its own prophetic Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  Importantly, regardless of how 
terrorism and home-grown terrorism is defined, Salafi-Jihadi organisations that inspire 
home-grown terrorism operate within a competitive environment.  Not only does AQ face 
competition from counterterrorism strategies and tactics but also from other competing 
Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups, such as the so-called ISIS.   
 
Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations frame themselves as being at war with Western cultural, 
social and political constructs.  The conflict is not confined to a conventional battlefield but 
extends into our own domestic, civilian environment that includes our moral principles and 
values.  Home-grown terrorism attacks against everyday venues such as cafés, train stations 
and buses in Western cities are examples of tactics used in what Lind et al (1989) called 
fourth generational warfare.  If one accepts the notion of Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups 
operating within a competitive environment, then the OODA Loop is an applicable 
conceptual model to explore the strategy of Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations, framed as 
a war with the West.  The OODA Loop could be described as Boyd’s contribution to 
strategy, just as The Origin of Species was Charles Darwin’s contribution to evolution.  
Darwin’s concept of survival of the fittest is analogous to Boyd’s emphasis on the ability to 
adapt in war in order to survive.  In the context of terrorism, if neither the terrorist nor the 
counterterrorist learns to adapt then neither will remain a viable force into the future.  
Through the OODA Loop this thesis argues that Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism 
is not only a tactic of asymmetric warfare but also an example of AQ’s capacity to adapt to 
a range of counter-measures that enable it to pursue a global strategy and to regenerate.   
 
While this Chapter does not intend to be a biography on the life of COL. John Boyd, it is 
fundamental to the application of the OODA Loop to peel back the influences and complex 
layers of his discourse.  This provides a deeper understanding of the OODA Loop and 
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illustrates its relevance as a lens through which to analyse Salafi-Jihadi terrorist 
organisations such as AQ and their use of home-grown terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric 
warfare.  The simplicity of the OODA Loop is often a distraction - as Colin Gray (1999) 
warns, the humble appearance of the OODA Loop can be misleading.  For example, the 
OODA Loop is often used by disciplines such as healthcare, (Enck, 2012), business (Richards, 
2004) and even in the area of litigation (Dreier, 2012) and software development (Amsden 
& Shashidhar, 2012) with little or no acknowledgement of Boyd and no analysis of the 
concepts behind the OODA Loop.   
 
In fact, Boyd’s conceptual spiral was developed following the analysis and synthesis of 
many systems, concepts, theoretical constructs, principles and consequences of strategies, 
tactics and actions.  For example, the second law of thermodynamics, Heisenberg’s theory 
of relativity (uncertainty principle) and Gödel’s concept of the incompleteness of closed 
systems could be described as the DNA of the OODA Loop.  Boyd’s detailed study of military 
history from Sun Tzu, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Carl von Clausewitz and Mao Tse 
Tung heavily influenced the design of the OODA Loop.  Boyd studied the Greek and Roman 
wars, such the Spartan battle of Leuctra, as well as the Vicksburg battle of the American 
Civil War and he was particularly fascinated by the guerrilla style warfare of TE Lawrence in 
World War I and the German Blitzkrieg of World War II (Patterns of Conflict, 1986).  Boyd 
was determined to reveal the common strategic threads that flowed through these 
historical case studies of warfare.   
 
Boyd studied the laws of physics, engineering, inventions and scientific discoveries that 
created novelty or were born from adaptation and broke closed systems of analysis.  One of 
Boyd’s most important developments was how he quantified and measured energy 
manoeuvrability, or EM Theory.  Boyd’s quantification of EM Theory revolutionised the 
design of future fighter aircraft.  In the context of this thesis EM theory is applicable and 
relevant.  Firstly, because its development is an important example of Boyd’s analysis and 
synthesis of components of different systems and theories; secondly, because AQ’s ability 
to manoeuvre along the mental and moral continuum of war requires it to be an agile, 
adaptable and regenerative movement, similar to the aircraft Boyd designed.  Each of these 
areas needs to be disentangled so that the application of the OODA Loop to Salafi-Jihadi 
inspired home-grown terrorism can be critically analysed with an open mind.   
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Even with many top AQ leaders now dead or in custody, following military and counter 
terrorism actions since 9/11, the transnational Salafi-Jihadi network is continually 
transforming, adapting and regenerating in response.  In The Lesser Jihad, Mastors and 
Deffenbaugh (2007) provides an analysis of how AQ inspires followers to continue to devise 
and implement acts of terror in response to the West’s counterterrorism measures.  The 
post-9/11 responses, such as the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 that destroyed AQ’s 
training bases, also penetrated al-Qaeda’s own Observe Orientate Decide Act Loop.  This 
forced AQ to evolve and adapt into a more decentralised and network-based organisation. 
In fact, with the super-conductive ability of the internet, it did not matter whether leaders 
such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri continued to exert full control.  
Independent cells of radicalising Salafi-Jihadists could begin to act and regenerate on their 
own or with minimal or even no direction and support from the global AQ structure.  The 
2013 conviction of Irfan Naseer, Irfan Khalid and Ashik Ali in Birmingham, UK (Laville, 2013, 
February 23) demonstrated that even after the death of bin Laden, home-grown terrorism 
remains a real threat and is a core tactic of choice to penetrate the West’s OODA Loop.  
Each counter-terrorism adaptation by Western governments becomes a catalyst for Salafi-
Jihadi terrorist organisations and those inspired by them to also adapt in order to survive.   
 
As mentioned, this thesis argues that home-grown terrorism is an example of how AQ 
penetrated the West’s OODA Loop and how it was forced to shift its own structure and 
strategic and tactical capability in order to survive.  Once AQ’s own OODA Loop was 
penetrated, home-grown terrorism implicitly evolved and became part of its broader 
strategy and tactical application of that strategy.  As Western governments reacted and 
sought to reduce the ability for AQ to train home-grown terrorists in the tribal areas of 
Pakistan, it evolved again.  It no longer needed to train the aspirational and impressionable 
members of the young Muslim community living in countries such as Australia, the UK, the 
US, Canada, France and the Netherlands.  Instead AQ sought to develop a globally-dispersed 
network, through the dissemination of its inspiring mixture of violence and a prophetic 
narrative, via the internet and Western-based self-appointed Salafi-Jihadi preachers.  These 
elements combined to become powerfully alluring to impressionable young Muslims and 
converts who were encouraged to develop their own novel ways of becoming home-grown 
terrorists.  Each adaptation is an example of AQ regenerating by revolving through its own 
OODA loop, allowing them to penetrate the West’s OODA loop. 
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This Chapter begins with a brief overview of Boyd, as it is almost impossible to separate his 
work from his life.  The chapter will then set out the essence of the OODA Loop through a 
discussion of Boyd’s main bodies of work, such as Destruction and Creation and Patterns of 
Conflict, and the composition of all his work contained within A Discourse on Winning and 
Losing.  Throughout the chapter, the inter-weaving layers of science, logic, mathematics, 
physics and biology, as well as Boyd’s unprecedented study of the history of warfare, are 
explored to explain how the OODA Loop was developed.  This enables a better 
understanding of the OODA Loop and its application as a lens through which to analyse 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.   
 
2.2 An Overview of COL. John Boyd (1927 – 1997)  
 
COL. John Boyd was a United States Air Force (USAF) pilot who flew the F-86 Sabre during 
the Korean War; he was considered one of the best fighter pilots of his time.  As Hammond 
(2001), Coram (2004) and Osinga (2005) explain, the experiences from the Korean War 
formed the foundations of his contribution to the development of air-to-air combat, aircraft 
design, manoeuvre warfare and, ultimately, the theories that are embedded within the 
OODA Loop.  Following his air-to-air combat experiences against enemy aircraft and from 
listening to other USAF pilots who survived their own aerial duals, Boyd sought to 
understand how even though the Russian built MiG-15 was faster, could operate at a higher 
altitude and turn tighter than the USAF F-86, the kill ratio was 10:1 in favour of the F-86 
(Hammond, 2001; Coram, 2004).  Boyd determined that while speed and altitude were 
important, the difference was a combination of the superior visibility provided by the F-86 
canopy, the ability to transition from one manoeuvre to the next and the training of US 
pilots that taught them to use the manoeuvrability of the aircraft. 
 
Following the Korean War, in the 1950s and 1960s Boyd developed air combat tactics and 
trained pilots at the US Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas, 
Nevada.  Along the way Boyd acquired a number of nicknames - such as ‘the Mad Major’ or 
‘Genghis Boyd’ - many of which reflected his intense and often overwhelming personality.  
He was also referred to as ‘Forty-Second Boyd’.  This was the result of a bet he made with 
US fighter pilots from the Air Force, Navy or Marines who attended the Miramar Naval Air 
Station in California.  As Hammond (2001) and Coram (2004) describe, Boyd would bet 
other pilots that if he could not out-manoeuvre them in an aerial dog-fight and get on their 
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tail in forty seconds, he would pay them forty dollars.  In six years he never lost a bet.  
During this period, and as a result of his examination of the F-86 and MiG 15 air-to-air 
combat encounters, Boyd wrote what became known as the Aerial Attack Study, which was 
declassified in 1964 by the USAF.  It was the first time that anyone had documented how 
air-to-air combat worked and it became the official tactics manual for fighter aircraft 
(Hammond, 2001; Coram, 2004).  At the time, the Aerial Attack Study was the most sought 
after document in the USAF. 
 
In 1960, Boyd sent himself to study industrial engineering at Georgia Tech, Atlanta.  It was 
during this period that he began to learn about thermodynamics, or the science of energy.  
Thermodynamics also describes how energy is transferred.  It was the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, or the study of entropy, that caught Boyd’s attention, in relation to the 
manoeuvrability of jet fighters in aerial combat.  As explained by Dugdale (1996), the 
second law of thermodynamics describes how heat transfers from hot to cold and never 
the other way around.  According to one of the ‘founding fathers’ of thermodynamics, 
Nicolas Carnot (1796-1832), whenever a difference in temperature exists between two 
systems (when there is not thermodynamic equilibrium) work can be produced from it 
(cited in Dugdale, 1996).  The second law of thermodynamics was one of the three theories 
of physics, mathematics and logic that Boyd (1976) combined to reveal the beginning of his 
strategic concepts in Destruction and Creation.   
 
Boyd’s paper, Destruction and Creation, is an early example of how he synthesised various 
components of seemingly unconnected concepts and disciplines.  This is key to 
understanding both Boyd and how the OODA Loop can be applied as a strategic model in 
this field of inquiry on home-grown terrorism.  While the Aerial Attack Study placed great 
emphasis on situational awareness, it was not simply a matter of being physically aware of 
enemies; it included an awareness of how they thought, how they were trained and how 
they responded.  One needed to pull all these factors apart to understand an opponent.  As 
with the second law of thermodynamics and the effects of entropy, if pressure is placed on 
any closed system - in this case a pilot with poor situational awareness outside their own 
system - then internal disorder will increase and the capacity to function accurately will 
decrease.  
 
Following his graduation from Georgia Tech, Boyd went on to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 
and continued to develop his energy manoeuvrability theory up until 1965.  From Eglin, 
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Boyd was assigned to the Pentagon to work on the F-X (Fighter Experimental) project.  The 
F-X became the F-15 and from there the lightweight fighter, or F-16, was born.  The F-16 
was championed by Boyd and a group of like-minded mavericks known as the ‘fighter-
mafia’, which comprised Boyd, Pierre Sprey and COL. Rich Riccioni (Burton, 1993; 
Hammond, 2001; Coram, 2002).  The application of Boyd’s theories also appealed to the US 
Marine Corp (USMC).  The USMC were first introduced to Boyd when he was invited by 
COL. Michael Wyly to present Patterns of Conflict at the US Marine Corp Command and 
Staff College, Quantico.  During the five-hour lecture, Boyd explained his time competitive 
OODA Loop (Hayden 1995).  By working with COL. Michael Wyly and William Lind, Boyd’s 
influence on the USMC culminated in the Fleet Marine Force Manual-1 (FMFM-1 
Warfighting Manual) and engineered a paradigm shift in how the USMC conducted warfare 
in the future (Hooker, 1993; Hayden, 1995; Coram, 2002). 
 
Following his work with the USMC, Boyd became more than a fighter pilot and designer of 
aircraft.  His theories on military strategy were to have the most profound impact on the 
United States military doctrine on warfare.  In the lead up to the first Gulf War following 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Boyd was engaged by then United States 
Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney as an advisor. (Cheney later became U.S Vice 
President under George W. Bush, 2000 – 2008.)  In this capacity, Boyd has been attributed 
with heavily influencing the strategy employed by the US military during what was labelled 
Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991 – 28 February 1991).  Boyd’s concept of 
manoeuvre warfare culminated in what became known as the ‘left-hook’ design of the 
plan, resulting in the US military disorientating and overwhelming Saddam Hussein’s forces 
(Coram, 2002; Wheeler and Korb, 2007).  It has been suggested this was the first real-world 
use of Boyd’s OODA Loop by the US military (Ford 2010).  The ground attack by the Marines 
was said to have got inside the ‘Boyd Cycle’ or OODA Loop of the Iraqi forces (Hayden 
1995).  Two years after the end of the Gulf War, Boyd was diagnosed with cancer. 
 
After Boyd’s death, General C.C. Krulak, the then 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
described Boyd as: 
a towering intellect who made unsurpassed contributions to the American 
art of war. Indeed, he was one of the central architects in the reform of 
military thought which swept the services, and in particular the Marine 
Corps, in the 1980’s. From John Boyd we learned about the competitive 
decision-making on the battlefield - compressing time, using time as an ally. 
Thousands of officers in all or services knew John Boyd by his work on what 
was to be known as the Boyd Cycle or OODA loop. His writings and his 
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lectures had a fundamental impact on the curriculum of virtually every 
professional military education program in the United States-and many 
abroad [..] he was the quintessential soldier-scholar - a man whose jovial 
outgoing exterior belied the vastness of his knowledge and the power of his 
intellect. (GEN. Krulak, cited 13 March 2007, inside the Pentagon,) 
 
While Presidents and their Generals tend to be those remembered for great military 
defeats or indeed victories, those who had a hand in the design of strategy and execution 
tend to remain in the shadows.  This was the case with Boyd, who died on 9 March 1997 
almost unnoticed by academia, military scholars and the popularising practitioners of his 
strategy. 
 
2.3 Lessons from Others on Boyd 
 
One of the challenges with unpacking Boyd’s conceptual framework - the Observe Orientate 
Decide Act Loop - in the context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, is the 
limited number of academic peer-reviewed publications applying Boyd’s ideas to the 
current terrorist phenomenon.  Further, there are no primary source publications in the 
academic literature written by Boyd.  An aspect of Boyd’s nature was that he never 
believed any of this theoretical concepts were ever finished.  For example, despite 
completing Patterns of Conflict in 1977, Boyd continued to revise the presentation up until 
1995.  The version used as a primary source for this research was completed in 1986.  The 
only book published specifically on Boyd and AQ was written by Ford in 2010.  This was 
completed by Ford (2010) for his online Master’s dissertation through King’s College, 
London and published as “A Vision so Noble: John Boyd, the OODA Loop and America’s War 
on Terror.”  There are no available academic papers published that focus specifically on 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism using Boyd’s OODA Loop. 
   
One of the rare, in-depth, peer-reviewed academic works on Boyd was completed by 
Osinga (2006), who explains that if one wants to read Boyd’s mind and study his work, all 
that is left are a loose collection of slides.  They have not been officially published and are 
photocopies of old acetate slides used for overhead projectors.  Nor are they in themselves 
self-explanatory, as one set of slides or presentation often refers to the context of a 
previous set of slides.  While there are numerous essays and papers on the OODA Loop in 
relation to manoeuvre warfare, many do not critically deconstruct the theories that sit 
behind Boyd’s conceptual framework (Bolger, 1993; Polk, 2010; Ford, 2010).  The majority 
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of literature published on Boyd continues to explore and critique the relevance of his 
theories to the US army (such Polk, 2010) or are monographs completed by US armed 
services personnel completing their dissertations, at one of the US Advanced Military 
Warfare Schools, such a Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  For example, Major Richard Fournier 
(2013) examined the utility of how Boyd used the study of ancient history to develop 
modern theories of warfare.  The importance of understanding history as a guide to 
improving the future of any social system would appear obvious - as Winston Churchill said, 
“those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” 
 
United States military advisor and strategist, William Lind, recognised the application of 
Boyd’s theories for the USMC.  However, the work by Lind (1985) is not a peer-reviewed, 
critical examination of Boyd or an academic exploration to test his theories against a 
hypothesis.  Instead, Lind (1985) recast Boyd’s theories for the USMC and argued that 
future ground combat would be dominated by those who could decentralise their actions 
and accept confusion and disorder, while avoiding predictive behaviour.  This culminated in 
the USMC Doctrinal Publication-1 (MCDP), Warfighting 1989, which integrated Boyd’s 
theories, initiating a paradigm shift from the attrition warfare of the late Napoleon era and 
World War I to “manoeuvre warfare”.  The MCPD-1 Warfighting 1989 describes manoeuvre 
warfare as a “warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a 
variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly 
deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope” (MCPD-1 Warfighting 1989; 
p.73).  This doctrine of manoeuvre warfare is as appropriate for nation-on-nation conflict as 
it is for organisations that use terrorism against a dominant, hegemonic power with 
opposing belief systems.    
 
Many works on Boyd provide descriptions of the applicability of his theories to other 
disciplines.  For example, the Introduction noted the use of Boyd’s theories in the fields of 
business, health and litigation.  While these are secondary sources, they demonstrate the 
applicability of the OODA Loop as a general, strategic model that will be important for the 
context of Chapter Three.  How Boyd thought and how he applied intellectual rigour to his 
analysis and synthesis of science, biology, mathematics and history provide lessons for 
academic research into almost any field of inquiry.  Effectively, a mature application of the 
OODA Loop is inseparable from how Boyd evaluated competitive systems.  For example, 
one of Boyd’s associates and colleagues, Richards (2004), published an overview of Boyd’s 
ideas as they apply to business.  The majority of Richards’ (2004) presentation is spent 
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explaining Boyd’s concepts and is predominantly centred on the OODA Loop.  However, 
one of the most important lessons from Richards (2004) is the requirement to have a 
mindset open to adaptation and novelty creation.  For a detailed investigation into the 
politics of weapons design and procurement within the US military, Fallows (1982) offers a 
sound analysis of this highly competitive environment.  In National Defense, Fallows (1982) 
uses not only Boyd’s theories but also his “fighter mafia” acolytes as examples of those who 
personified how to challenge an establishment locked into design paradigms on how to 
fight wars. 
 
There are only three comprehensive attempts in the literature to describe the intellectual 
calculus Boyd pursued in the construction of the OODA Loop.  The first is by Robert Coram 
(2002), Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War.  In his book, Coram provides a 
detailed account of Boyd’s life but only offers a summary of Boyd’s OODA Loop in Chapters 
23 and 24.  This is not a criticism, as Coram’s work is a biography on Boyd and not an 
academic analysis solely focused on the OODA loop.  Coram has continued to present and 
produce articles and commentary on Boyd to explain how Boyd merged Sun Tzu, 
Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart and others into a comprehensive appreciation of a mind-time-
space continuum within which wars are fought.  The second attempt to detail COL. John 
Boyd’s theoretical constructs is by Grant Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and 
American Security, published in 2001.  Here Hammond (2001) presents a more thorough 
explanation of the development of Boyd’s ideas.  Importantly, Hammond (2001) dissects 
the physics, logic, philosophy and history of warfare Boyd analysed and synthesised to 
develop the OODA Loop.  However, Hammond’s (2001) is not an academic peer-reviewed 
study of the OODA loop and only briefly relates the OODA Loop to terrorism.  There is no 
reference in Hammond (2001) to Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations or home-grown 
terrorism.   
 
Finally, Osinga (2006) - Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd -
provides one of the only academic attempts to describe the modern strategic analysis and 
implementation of Boyd’s work focused on the concepts behind the OODA Loop.  Osinga 
(2006) offers a contextual analysis of A Discourse on Winning and Losing and a detailed 
exploration on how Boyd developed his strategic framework.  The work by Osinga (2006) is 
the most thorough analysis of Boyd’s theories on strategy, logic, science and military 
historians and practitioners.  Importantly, Osinga (2006) recognises Boyd as the first 
strategist to introduce epistemological debates of the sixties and seventies into strategic 
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thought, leaving a multilayered and multidimensional legacy.  One of the implications from 
Osinga (2006) is the idea that Boyd’s theories can be applied to many competitive 
environments.  As Osinga (2006) explains, many authors and practitioners of other fields of 
inquiry or disciplines who adopt Boyd’s work are not aware of the origin of the conceptual 
framework they are using.  For example, when business and corporate strategist Peters 
(1987) wrote Thriving on Chaos, he had been indirectly influenced by Boyd’s theories 
through the work of James Fallow (1982), but without recognising Boyd as the original 
creator of this conceptual framework.  While Osinga (2006) encourages further research 
applying the OODA Loop to other fields of inquiry such as the study of terrorism by Islamic 
extremists, there is no direct or indirect reference to the use of the OODA Loop to critically 
analyse Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare. 
 
As mentioned Boyd acquired a dedicated team of like-minded acolytes such as Franklin 
Chuck Spinney, Ray Leopold and Chet Richards.  A number of them continued presenting 
Boyd’s strategic framework and demonstrating their applicability to conflict and strategic 
thinking in general.  For example, Spinney (2014) offers a presentation on the evolution of 
epistemology and focuses on Boyd’s Destruction and Creation paper written in 1976.  
Similarly, Chet Richards (2006) provides an illustrative description of Boyd’s theories and 
compares them to other strategic theorists on warfare, such as William Lind, Martin van 
Creveld, COL. T.X. Hammes, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Michael Scheuer and Antulio Echevarria.  
In addition, Richards (2008) offers another presentation on the application of Boyd’s OODA 
Loop to crisis management.  While these presentations are not academically peer-reviewed 
papers or even published, they are informative secondary source documents for anyone 
attempting to understand and apply Boyd’s theoretical constructs.  
 
A limited number of published works question the originality of Boyd’s theories and are 
critical of the fact that Boyd never published his work so it could be reviewed academically.  
One of the better, published papers that questions Boyd’s work is by Hasik (2013), who 
argues that comparative analysis suggests Boyd’s strategic theory, the OODA Loop, is highly 
ambiguous.  The suggestion made by Hasik (2013) is that many of Boyd’s assumptions made 
from scientific or mathematical theories, such as Gödel’s incompleteness theory and 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, are questionable.  Hasik (2013) also questions Boyd’s 
interpretations of Clausewitz and suggests that perhaps Boyd viewed Clausewitz too 
narrowly.  There is also a question about how Boyd could make generalisations at the grand 
strategic level of warfare from the tactical requirements of aerial combat.  However, when 
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analysing Boyd’s presentations, there is no inference or implied suggestion that he is 
claiming to have discovered the Holy Grail of strategy for warfare.  If anything, Boyd spent 
his whole life demonstrating the need to challenge closed systems, processes and doctrine.  
The very nature of Boyd’s theoretical design requires it also to be pulled apart, critically 
analysed and tested.  Further, it would be anathema to constrain research from the 
freedom to explore theories and principles from other disciplines and determine how they 
may be reassembled to form a novel approach for an entirely different field of inquiry. This 
is the point of Destruction and Creation and Boyd’s use of the works of Gödel and 
Heisenberg and the second law of thermodynamics.  Finally, Boyd never claimed or 
pretended in any of his presentations and papers to have invented anything original.  
Instead, his contribution to social science and strategy, and indeed to anyone undertaking 
research, was his ability to recast old ideas or forgotten constructs and demonstrate how 
their various components could be synthesised.  As Osinga (2006) explains, Boyd did not 
aim to be novel per se; in fact, Boyd recognised that there are essential threads of 
continuity in strategic experiences.   
 
One of the more direct criticisms of the OODA Loop was written by Storr (2001), who 
attempted to explore whether the discipline of military warfare was an art or a science.  In 
his analysis, Storr (2001) argues there is no such thing as an OODA loop and that the idea of 
getting inside an opponent’s OODA loop is deeply flawed.  The first observation about the 
Storr (2001) paper is that the author describes the OODA loop as the Lind OODA loop, as in 
William Lind.  This is so factually incorrect that it is hard to understand why Storr (2001) 
would make such an assertion.  The second observation is that Storr (2001) demonstrates 
the kind of linear, mechanical thinking that is opposite to Boyd’s theory of a dynamic, 
adaptive and evolving approach to strategy in a competitive environment such as warfare.  
The third observation is that Storr (2001) describes war as “adversarial, dynamic, 
dangerous, complex, uncertain and, critically, human” (p.40).  In his conclusion, Storr (2001) 
goes as far as to say the conduct of warfare should be founded on pragmatism, empiricism, 
dynamism and a robust belief in the exercise of free will.  This is exactly how Boyd 
described war and some of the characteristics required to succeed in it.  Not that this 
means that Storr (2001) should agree with Boyd on the strategy of warfare; however, 
Boyd’s theories are directly relevant and applicable to surviving the kind of war Storr (2001) 
describes. 
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Given the available literature on Boyd’s theories, in the context of this thesis the 
application of the OODA Loop to the analysis and synthesis of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-
grown terrorism is a novel contribution to this field of inquiry.  However, before explaining 
the OODA Loop it is important to understand the concept of “manoeuvre warfare”.  As a 
description of how people or organisations can dynamically shift and manipulate their 
position in a competitive environment, this will assist in morally, mentally and physically 
applying one’s mind as to how to explore the OODA Loop. 
 
2.4 Energy Manoeuvrability, Manoeuvre Warfare and the OODA Loop 
 
One of the most profound contributions Boyd made to the understanding of jet fighters in 
combat was his quantification of energy manoeuvrability (Hammond 2001; Coram 2002; 
Osinga 2006).  As Hammond (2001) explains, the term “energy manoeuvrability” had been 
used for years but without being defined.  Boyd managed to quantify and plot an aircraft’s 
ability to change altitude, airspeed and direction for every airplane in the USAF against its 
Soviet competitors.  Fundamentally, Boyd established the measure for manoeuvrability, or 
the transfer of energy and the trade-offs or compromises required when designing a 
system.  No one had done this before Boyd.  An appreciation of energy manoeuvrability is 
fundamental to understanding the OODA Loop and demonstrating its applicability to any 
field of inquiry.  An important contribution made by this research is the extension of this 
concept of manoeuvrability into the ability of an opponent to simultaneously exploit the 
moral principles of both its followers and its adversary in the contemporary application of 
asymmetric warfare. 
 
In summarising his energy manoeuvrability theory (EM theory), Boyd (1986) argued a 
fighter pilot needed to be capable of both “losing and gaining energy more quickly while 
out turning an adversary,” (Boyd, 1986, slide 4).  Despite the sections on energy 
manoeuvrability found in Hammond (2001), Coram (2004) and even in Osinga (2006), none 
performs a “Boydian”, paradigmatic shift and turns EM theory into the mental and moral 
aspect of warfare being inspired by AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative in the form of home-grown 
terrorism.  Boyd said that, “a fighter who can pick and choose engagement opportunities, 
yet has fast-transient characteristics that can be used to either force an overshoot by an 
attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender is more likely to win.” (Boyd, 1986, slide 
two).  An important contribution by Boyd was his capacity to deconstruct the theorists, 
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wars and principles of human endeavour and to identify the particles that were common to 
each, from which to reconstruct a theory of strategy.   
 
Manoeuvrability and the speed at which it can be accomplished in conflict is critical - 
whether in the air, on the ground or in business.  The same could be said for many sports, 
such as rugby, basketball, martial arts and football, as well as ice hockey and motor sports 
like Formula One.  These are activities that require the ability to transfer energy rather than 
only having to display a linear application of speed.  Manoeuvrability combined with 
unconventional or irregular warfare on the battlefield is a formidable tactical application of 
a war strategy for opponents attempting to morally, mentally and physically defeat a much 
larger adversary.  As will being continually explored and described throughout this thesis, 
the moral and mental levels of warfare are fundamental aspects of how AQ operates.  The 
use of home-grown terrorism by AQ and the ability to continually regenerate its formation 
and implementation is one example of energy manoeuvrability in the context of the current 
terrorism phenomenon.  In other words, it is the ability of AQ to shift its approach and 
implicitly inspire followers of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative to devise novel approaches to 
home-grown terrorist attacks. 
 
The strategy and tactics of manoeuvre warfare appropriately describe how the Salafi-Jihadi 
organisations, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, embark on their campaigns in Western countries.  
Home-grown terrorism is an unpredictable, disorientating tactic and a means of manoeuvre 
warfare along a moral-mental-physical continuum.  Other terms often used in conjunction, 
or even interchangeably, with manoeuvre warfare are the concepts of irregular or guerrilla 
warfare.  Irregular warfare or guerilla warfare include the struggle between state and non-
state organisations or revolutionary movements for legitimacy and influence over relevant 
populations.  Irregular warfare, as described by Jones (2012), includes groups or individuals 
who employ methods such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion and 
criminal activities.  Irregular warfare favours indirect and asymmetric approaches that 
involve acting, organising and thinking differently than one’s opponent, in order to 
circumvent or undermine their strengths while exploiting their weaknesses.  The use of 
home-grown terrorism could be an example of a tactic used in irregular warfare. 
 
Another term used to describe the tactics and grand strategy of manoeuvre warfare in 
these unstructured, irregular conflicts is the indirect approach to war or conflict.  The term 
“indirect” is commonly found to describe soldiers, revolutionary fighters and theorists such 
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as T.E. Lawrence, Liddell Hart, Genghis Khan, Che Guevara and Sun Tzu, or conflicts such as 
the French in Algeria (1954 – 1962), the Portuguese wars in Africa (1961 – 1974) and the 
Selous Scouts in former British Colony of Rhodesia.  One of Boyd’s most important and 
influential military theorists, Liddell Hart, developed the concept of the indirect approach in 
Strategy: The Indirect Approach (first published in 1929).  Liddell Hart had witnessed first-
hand the high human cost of attrition warfare employed along the Western front during the 
First World War.  As with Boyd in his study of military history to discern the common 
attributes of strategy, Liddell Hart offers lessons from many wars to describe and develop 
his theory on the indirect approach.  For example, Liddell Hart explains how Epaminondas 
led the Thebus army against the Spartans in the Greek Wars (370 – 490BC).  Hart (1929) 
recognised that the Spartans would not be drawn out into the open and Epaminondas did 
not want to enter into a prolonged war.  Instead, Hart (1929) describes, Epaminondas chose 
an indirect approach.  This involved establishing a new base at Mt Ithome and building 
insurgent support among the local population.  Epaminondas’s indirect approach also 
included systematically destroying the economic and political ability of the rulers of Sparta 
to maintain their military supremacy.  Also, in summarising the campaigns of Caesar, Hart 
(1929) concluded, “Caesar met failure each time he relied on the direct, and retrieved it 
each time he resorted to the indirect” (Hart, 1929, p. 40). 
 
Attacking an opponent’s mind during war was also recognised by Liddell Hart (1929) as an 
integral component of the indirect approach.  In a London Times interview with military 
historian Sir Lawrence Friedman, Liddell Hart explained, “the profoundest truth of war is 
that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in 
the bodies of their men”. (Hart, 1928, p.20)  From his examination of the Napoleonic 
conflicts, Hart stated that, “soldiers universally concede the general truth of Napoleon’s 
much-quoted dictum that in war the moral is to the physical as three to one”. (Hart 1929, p. 
13)  Further, Hart determined that the indirect approach to war was one of the surest ways 
to dislocate the minds of an opponent.  This indirect approach is well practiced by the 
Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations such as AQ and, more recently, the so-called ISIS, as well 
as those who follow their direction.  For example, the Atlantic Monthly columnist Wood 
(2015) conducted an interview on ISIS with the former leader of the banned British group Al 
Muhajiroun, Anjem Choudary.  While he may or may not have studied Liddell Hart or COL. 
John Boyd, Choudary explained to Wood the ISIS approach to war.  As Wood (2005) 
reported, “he told me the State has an obligation to terrorise its enemies—a holy order to 
scare the shit out of them with beheadings and crucifixions and enslavement of women and 
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children, because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict” (Wood, March 
2015, p1.).  Choudary understood the concept of warfare being contested in the minds of 
opposing forces. 
 
The term “unconventional” is also used and often interchanged with guerrilla warfare or 
irregular warfare.  Most recently, the US Department of Defence defined unconventional 
warfare as: “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, 
disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area, also called Unconventional 
Warfare“ (JP 3-05).  Terms used today to describe the type of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
like “irregular warfare” and “unconventional warfighting”, would be typical of how Boyd 
would have described these combat environments. One of the combined objectives 
throughout unconventional wars is for the irregular and often weaker opponent to both 
demoralise, drain and mentally disorientate the conventional army and to inflict political 
pressure on the conventional army’s government through its population.  This is 
particularly relevant to Western democracies whose military is directed by policy from 
elected governments.  These unconventional conflicts are not about force-against-force or 
the physical and material destruction of the enemy.  As inferred by Sun Tzu, at all costs a 
conventional army must avoid a protracted war.  This not only drains a government of 
material and funds to fight the war but also erodes the support of the population, as 
witnessed during the US-led Coalition campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.  For Sun Tzu the 
first priority was to attack an opponent’s strategy and plans, then its alliances and finally its 
army.  As Liddell Hart (1929) argues, success in conflict has rarely been brought about by 
direct clashes of forces, but instead usually involves prior psychological and physical 
dislocation of the enemy.  The Salafi-Jihadi organisations do not require absolute material 
defeat of its enemy, as they understand that fostering and exploiting the clash of public 
opinion within Western democratic nations is an important consequence from their form of 
asymmetric warfare.  
 
The strategic and historical exploration of manoeuvre warfare by Boyd was further 
developed through his examination of the German infiltration tactics of WWI, employed by 
German Generals such as Ludendorff, Andre Laffargue and Hutier.  Infiltration involved 
sending small, irregular units of lightly armed, highly mobile troops into the weakest areas 
of the enemy following a disorientating bombardment of gas and artillery (Hammond 2001; 
Osinga 2006).  Boyd then studied how infiltration tactics evolved into the Blitzkrieg 
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approach during WWII, as the result of the German military’s ability to synthesise 
technological advances such as the combustion engine that allowed motorised infantry, 
advances in aircraft and the advent of radio that advanced communications.  It was the 
coordination and speed provided by these technological advances which enabled the 
German military to deploy multiple points of disorientation and seemingly unstructured 
combinations of forces that confused and disintegrated the enemy.  As Hammond (2001) 
explains, this tactical dispersion was exploited for strategic impact.  A similar case could be 
made for how AQ and now ISIS inspire home-grown terrorism as a tactic to be cultivated, 
regenerated and adapted for strategic impact. 
 
The ongoing synthesis of historical examples of manoeuvre warfare saw Boyd explore Paul 
von Lettow-Vorbeck and T.E. Lawrence for their application of guerrilla warfare.  German 
General, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, was described by Hoyt (1981) as having implemented 
one of the greatest guerrilla campaigns in history when he confounded the British during 
WWI in British East Africa.  Using the local population within British East Africa in his 
guerrilla campaign, Lettow-Vorbeck occupied the time of thousands of British troops, 
enticing them into an endless and costly pursuit of Lettow-Vorbeck’s units.  This diverted 
the British high command from its ability to concentrate these forces back onto the 
Western front in Europe.  In T.E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom, the focus on 
manoeuvrability and unconventional tactics were key factors in how Lawrence led the Arab 
revolt against the Turkish army across the deserts of Jordan and Syria during WWI.  There is 
an interesting analogy here between how Lawrence viewed using the openness of the 
desert where it was impossible for the Turkish to protect every asset and how the Salafi-
Jihadist terrorist organisations viewed the world as its battlefield.  In other words, the vast 
openness is almost impossible to secure and any attempt consumes enormous resources.  
The unpredictable, unexceptional and sporadic nature of home-grown terrorism that can 
take place in any Western city is equally difficult for law enforcement and intelligence 
services to detect and defeat. 
 
In the vast expanse of the desert, Lawrence determined that Arabs would be an idea, an 
influence, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas 
vapour.  Lawrence’s use of speed, as well as unsystematic movements and tip-and-run 
tactics, appealed to Boyd’s view on what was required to disrupt and confuse an opponent.  
Further, both Lawrence and Boyd believed that no technical solutions could remove the 
responsibility of the person on the ground directly engaged with the enemy.  This is an 
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important point as this section sets out Boyd’s framework that began as a theory for 
humans controlling machines.  Boyd thought technology could never change the true 
nature of warfare, with its uniquely human qualities that made warfare ultimately a 
human-only event.  Lawrence also believed in “arranging the mind” of the local population, 
who could become troops or supporters of his troops, and the minds of the enemy.  These 
descriptions are applicable to Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations such as AQ and their 
ability to implicitly recognise the impact of home-grown terrorism.  For example, these 
theories of T.E. Lawrence, Hart and Boyd reinforce the significance of the 2003 statement 
by al-Alyiri when he said, “the war is based on a strategy to widen the battlefield. The entire 
world has become a battlefield and not in theory”. (al-Alyiri, September 2003, p. 18) 
 
Boyd also studied the theories of Mao Tse Tung as well as the revolutionary principles of 
the philosopher and economist Karl Marx and of communist Vladamir Lenin.  It must be 
stressed that to conceive of how to apply the OODA Loop to multiple competitive 
environments it is critical not to see actions, tactics and approaches to conflict as being 
locked into any one paradigm or doctrine.  In this regard, for Mao Tse Tung, Marx and Lenin 
the term “infiltration” could be used to describe their emphasis on the moral and 
psychological approach to disorientating and exploiting a State from within.  Marx and 
Lenin advocated fuelling and exploiting alienation within the population while causing the 
ruling class to weaken itself and thus become entangled and internally unsure of how to 
counter the internal movement.  As described by Hammond (2001), this combination of 
political, social and military components could be interpreted as a new kind total war- in 
other words, a war that attacks and invades all facets of an opponent’s society and not only 
a “Clausewitzian” version of war where the focus is on the physical defeat of an opponent’s 
military.  The notion of manoeuvre warfare that combines technology, infiltration, 
disorientating attacks and a continual attempt to engineer and exploit disharmony has 
many similarities with the tactics being used by AQ and ISIS.  Paradoxically, AQ does not 
require home-grown terrorist attacks to be successful or spectacular for there to be further 
strategic opportunities to exploit.  For instance, an overreaction by the police, intelligence 
or Government policy, or indeed certain sections of the population rallying against all 
Muslims, feeds back into the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  It is an example of what Boyd 
described as the moral-mental-physical continuum of war.  This is the kind of manoeuvre 
warfare being used by AQ through tactics such as home-grown terrorism. 
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As mentioned earlier, Boyd’s theories on manoeuvre warfare were synthesised from 
history, and further expanded and reconstituted by other military theorists.  William S. Lind 
and his co-authors described the notion of fourth-generational warfare, which in the 
context of this thesis is revealing.  Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton and Wilson (1989) 
present the concept of fourth-generational warfare and even the potential for “Islamic or 
non-Western traditions” and of terrorists living amongst the American population.  Lind et 
al (1989) also describe how the distinction between military and civilian will disappear.  At 
the time of the Lind et al (1989) publication, there had never been a single instance of 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism in the US, Australia, Canada or the United 
Kingdom.  It is what retired British Commander, General Sir Rupert Smith (2005) meant 
when he described the new age of “war amongst the people” (Smith, 2005).  Whether 
referred to as manoeuvre warfare, irregular warfare or fourth-generational warfare, these 
terms accurately describe how AQ and other terrorist organisations exploiting a Salafi-
Jihadi narrative approach conflict against the West.  It is the kind of warfare that Boyd 
recognised for its capacity to confuse, disorientate and ultimately defeat an opponent who 
may be economically, technologically and numerically superior.   
 
Boyd insisted that large, modern, conventional armed forces could also adopt and apply the 
lessons of manoeuvre warfare.  The use of General Epaminondas’ indirect approach used at 
the battle of Leuctra (371 BC) and Lettow-Vorbeck’s guerrilla war tactics are good 
examples.  In April 1991, Boyd outlined his basic ideas on warfare in a testimony he gave 
before the House Armed Services Committee to discuss the U.S. victory in the first Gulf War 
following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait:   
 
There are three basic elements [to win wars] and in order of importance they 
are: People because wars are fought by people not weapons. Strategy and tactics 
because wars fought without innovative ideas become … blood baths winnable 
or not. Hardware, because weapons that don't work or can't be bought in 
quantity will bring down even the best people and best ideas … Next our military 
needs to be trained in innovative tactics and strategies that will lead to quick 
decisive victories at minimum cost to American lives … This requires, first, an 
understanding of conflict. Conflict can be viewed as repeated cycles of observing-
orienting-deciding-acting by both sides (and at all levels). The adversary that can 
move through these cycles faster gains an inestimable advantage by disrupting 
his enemy's ability to respond effectively … These create continuous and 
unpredictable change. Therefore our tactics and strategy need to be based on 
the idea of adapting to and shaping this change faster than the enemy. Why? 
Because confusion and disorder generated permits us to win quickly at minimum 
cost in American lives … New hardware needs to be evaluated in terms of its 
effects on our people and our tactics. Effective hardware helps our people adapt 
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to change and permits them to act, react and move faster than the enemy. Any 
hardware that makes our military slow and predictable is unsuitable. (Boyd, 30 
April 1991, cited in Cowan, 2000, p.14). 
 
As Nevah (1997) remarked, the significance of Boyd’s contribution was that for the first time 
a conceptual tool had been designed to explain manoeuvre warfare that could 
operationalise initiative, agility, depth and synchronisation.  The strategy of AQ cannot 
endure without adaptable tactics to implement home-grown terrorism in Western 
countries.  However, with respect to AQ it may be that the novelty comes from the 
regeneration of ideas.  The regeneration takes place in the minds of their target audience in 
ways that are perceived to be relevant to their personal situations and immediate 
environment.  Most significantly, AQ (and its Salafi-Jihadi narrative) has transformed from a 
physical and tactical force to an ephemeral brand with vastly broader impact and appeal. 
 
While the weapons used by home-grown terrorists may be simple, when their effects are 
synthesised with internet, social media and the demands of the 24/7 news cycle, AQ’s 
capacity to shape the conflict environment is magnified.  This is part of the essence of 
manoeuvrability in any conflict.  These concepts will now be further developed through 
analysing Boyd’s formative lectures and presentations that sit behind OODA Loop.  These 
are important primary source references for how to use the OODA Loop as the analytical 
lens of the three cases studies selected for this thesis. 
 
2.5 A Discourse on Winning and Losing 
 
Accurately applying Boyd’s OODA Loop to any field of inquiry requires an examination of his 
lectures and presentations, not just of each component of the OODA Loop.  The OODA Loop 
could be described as the diagrammatic summary or synthesis of all Boyd’s theoretical 
discourse contained in his presentations.  The centrepiece is A Discourse on Winning and 
Losing (1992) that includes five lectures, otherwise known as The Green Book.  On the first 
page of A Discourse on Winning and Losing, Boyd (1992) sets out the five lectures: 
 
1. Patterns of Conflict represents a compendium of ideas and actions for winning and 
losing in a highly competitive world; 
 
2. Organise Design for Command and Control discusses the implicit arrangements 
that permit cooperation in complex, competitive, fast moving situations; 
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3. The Strategic Game of ? and ? emphasises the mental twists and turns we 
undertake to conduct appropriate schemes or designs for realising our aims and 
purposes; 
 
4. Destruction and Creation lays out in abstract but graphic fashion the ways by which 
we evolve mental concepts to comprehend and cope with our environment. 
 
5. Revelations makes visible the metaphorical message that flows from this Discourse. 
 
(Boyd 1992, p.1) 
 
As with EM theory, in A Discourse on Winning and Losing, Boyd (1992) never claimed to 
have invented anything new.  Instead, his genius was his unique ability to weave together 
components from seemingly unrelated theories and approaches and synthesise them into a 
novel conceptual framework.  Boyd (1992) recognised particles of similarities from which to 
create novelty by marrying different concepts.  The key passage in A Discourse on Winning 
and Losing, which should be the disclaimer for anyone studying or applying Boyd’s theories, 
is: 
 
The theme that weaves its way through this Discourse on Winning and Losing is 
not so much contained within each of the five sections, per se, that make up the 
Discourse; rather, it is the kind of thinking that both lies behind and makes-up its 
very essence.  For the interested, a careful examination will reveal that the 
increasingly abstract discussion surfaces a process of reaching across many 
perspectives; pulling each and every one apart (analysis), all the while intuitively 
looking for those parts of disassembled perspectives which naturally interconnect 
with one another to form a higher order, more general elaboration (synthesis) of 
what is taking place.  As a result, the process not only creates the Discourse but it 
also represents the key to evolve the tactics, strategies, goals, unifying themes, 
etc, that permit us to actively shape and adapt to the unfolding world we are part 
of, live-in, and feed-upon. (Boyd, 1992, p.4) 
 
Boyd indicated this passage opened the way for the development of a conceptual spiral for 
understanding, adapting and surviving in the world. 
 
This research will not systematically investigate each presentation in the order Boyd sets 
out in A Discourse on Wining and Losing.  Nor is there scope in this research to investigate 
and diagnose the concepts contained in each presentation; that is an opportunity for 
further research.  Instead, this research will begin with Destruction & Creation because its 
core theme is to avoid being locked into a closed system of analysis and thinking.  Written 
in 1976, Destruction and Creation is a synthesis of the second law of thermodynamics and 
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entropy, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.  It could 
be said that these form the physics, logic and mathematical basis of his conceptual 
framework.  In his abstract of Destruction and Creation, Boyd (1976) states: 
 
To comprehend and cope with our environment we develop mental patterns or 
concepts of meaning. The purpose of this paper is to sketch out how we 
destroy and create these patterns to permit us to both shape and be shaped by 
a changing environment. In this sense, the discussion also literally shows why 
we cannot avoid this kind of activity if we intend to survive on our own terms. 
(Boyd 1976, p.1) 
 
Boyd was demonstrating the limits of using closed-systems to understand and form mental 
images of reality.  As Polk (2010) argues, Boyd used these theories to propose that the 
uncertainty and related disorder associated within a closed system can only be overcome 
by creating a higher and broader, more general concept to represent reality through the 
dialectic cycle of destruction and creation.  This offers a guide for analysing and critiquing 
the dominant strategic models of terrorism and the adaptability of how AQ implements its 
asymmetric warfare against the West.  It could be said that the notion of looking beyond 
closed systems is essential to applying the OODA Loop to any field of inquiry.   
 
Boyd’s second presentation, Patterns of Conflict, was produced in 1977 and is an extensive, 
historical analysis of warfare.  The next section will focus more on Patterns of Conflict to 
unveil the essence of the OODA Loop.  Effectively, in Patterns of Conflict Boyd went in 
search of the common strategic thread through the history of warfare, revolutions, conflicts 
and military theorists.  Boyd’s reading list and exploration of those he believed had made 
innovative contributions to these fields is exhaustively impressive, even if Fournier (2013) 
criticises Boyd for using secondary sources in some instances.  Organic Design for Command 
and Control, otherwise known as C2, completed in 1982, summarises Boyd’s ideas on the 
importance of recognising that human decision-making remains at the forefront of warfare.  
In Organic Design for Command and Control, Boyd argued that despite advancing 
technology it was the implicit nature or substance of “what” was being communicated 
rather than “how” (Coram 2002; Polk 2010).  Boyd proposed that command and control 
requires leadership that is not based on strict, rigid instructions that prevent innovation and 
creative adaptation; it also requires appreciation via a clear perception, discernment and 
understanding that inspires others.  When taken together, Hammond (2001) explains, the 
secret of command and control is what is not stated explicitly.  As will be explained, Boyd 
recognised the Orientate phase as integral to implicit command and control. 
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One the most eclectic of all of Boyd’s works produced in 1986 is the presentation called The 
Strategic Game of ? and ?  This is where Boyd attempted to demonstrate the dividend from 
combining both analysis and synthesis to create novelty and adaption.  This presentation 
holds lessons for academic research with a focus on critically evaluating the range theories 
and constructs to describe Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.  In other words, 
there should be no limits placed on how to frame academic inquiry or how to create novel 
constructs and arguments; that is, how unique contributions are made to almost any field 
of inquiry.  The final piece of work outside of The Green Book is The Essence of Winning and 
Losing completed in 1995.  This is a condensed version of all Boyd’s ideas and contains a 
drawing of his OODA Loop.  Effectively, Boyd squeezed his thirteen-hour presentation of A 
Discourse into four slides; this is described as the penultimate synthesis of all Boyd’s work 
(Hammond 2001; Coram 2002; Osinga 2006).  Critically analysing the theories and ideas 
contained within each of the five pieces of work is fundamental to understanding the OODA 
Loop and its application to Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.  The final 
presentation, Revelations, is perhaps the least well-known and almost never referred to by 
those who use Boyd’s theories, or even in more in-depth studies of Boyd such as in 
Hammond (2001), Coram (2002) and Richards (2006); even Osinga (2006) only mentions 
Revelations in passing.  This research will not use Revelations as a source. 
 
The following sections will examine each component of the OODA Loop and the theoretical 
principles and influences on its design.  They will begin with a thorough description of 
Destruction and Creation because this is where the DNA of the OODA Loop begin.  It is 
important to explore the principles of the OODA Loop as this contextual analysis will give 
rise to a deeper understanding of the applicability of this framework to the subject of this 
research and case study methodology.  It is important to understand that Boyd was a 
disruptive thinker.  His ideas on warfare and strategy require a mindset open to complete 
flexibility and an awareness of the dangers in attempting to understand external events and 
phenomenon while confined within a closed system of analysis.  Therefore, any study of 
Boyd and his conceptual framework must be prepared to accept the least expected rather 
than the most likely conclusions when applying the OODA Loop to Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
home-grown terrorism.  
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2.6 Deconstructing the OODA Loop  
 
To provide a rigorous introduction to the OODA Loop, it is important that we attempt to 
understand how Boyd developed his most influential conceptual framework.  A 
deconstruction of his OODA Loop has at its foundations Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem 
(developed in 1931), Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (devised in 1927) and the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics.  Through this analytical process the applicability of the principles 
behind the OODA Loop to Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism will become evident.  
From there an exploratory breakdown of the OODA Loop will be presented.  
 
As mentioned, Destruction and Creation was the beginning of Boyd’s epistemological 
exploration and is what Spinney (2014) argues is central to the OODA Loop.  Kurt Gödel 
(1906 – 1978) was an Austrian mathematician, logician and philosopher, best known for his 
Incompleteness Theorem published in 1931.  As explained by Dawson (1996) in Logical 
Dilemmas: The Life and Work of Kurt Gödel, Gödel proposed that any logical model of 
reality is incomplete and must be constantly changed because of fresh observations.  This is 
one of the most important disciplines in warfare, sport, corporate competitiveness and 
human adaptation, as the world around us is constantly changing.  One cannot remain so 
fixed to a plan and fail to accept the changes in environment, new information, the reaction 
of an opponent or unpredictable anomalies in nature.  Boyd understood that according to 
Gödel we cannot determine the consistency, hence the character or nature, of an abstract 
system within itself.  In the context of this research, the shift by AQ from importing 
individuals to Western countries to conduct terrorism to inspiring them from within 
challenged fixed notions as to where Islamic fundamentalist-inspired terrorist acts may 
come from and the means to prevent such attacks.  The Australian Federal Government 
understood this incompleteness theory as described in its 2004 White Paper Transnational 
Terrorism: The Threat to Australia: 
 
AQ’s domain is not exclusive. It is better studied as part of an evolutionary 
process. It has built links among Muslim extremist groups, spreading its influence 
and radicalising other loosely connected affiliates. Many act alone, inspired only 
by example. This is a movement that is amorphous, widely dispersed and 
constantly regenerating and evolving. And it is succeeding in embracing more 
localised groups into its fold. As Al Qaida loses its Afghanistan-veteran leaders, its 
influence may cede to other lesser-known forces. (Transnational Terrorism: The 
Threat to Australia 2004, ix; Commonwealth of Australia White Paper) 
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The second influential construct in Destruction and Creation was Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle.  Physicist Werner Heisenberg (1901 – 1976) published his theory in a 1927 paper 
while working on the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics.  Heisenberg 
asserted that any two variables that do not commute cannot be measured simultaneously 
— the more precisely one is known, the less precisely the other can be known.   In his most 
cited work, Heisenberg wrote: 
 
It can be expressed in its simplest form as follows: One can never know with 
perfect accuracy both of those two important factors which determine the 
movement of one of the smallest particles—its position and its velocity. It is 
impossible to determine accurately both the position and the direction and 
speed of a particle at the same instant. (Heisenberg, W., Die Physik der 
Atomkerne, Taylor & Francis, 1952, p. 30) 
 
Essentially this means there is a finite capacity to observe and understand more than one 
object at a time, particularly when those objects are in direct competition.  In Destruction 
and Creation, Boyd (1976) explained that the Heisenberg Principle implicitly depends upon 
the indeterminate presence and influence of an observer. Significantly, the magnitude of 
the uncertainty represents the degree of intrusion by the observer upon the observed.  In 
other words, those observing a community will affect members of that community who will 
respond by changing their behaviour.  This principle helps to explain the challenges and 
limits of external people placing suspected supporters of AQ within the Muslim community 
under surveillance.   
 
The third most significant theory to influence Boyd in the development of the OODA Loop 
was his study of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  In Destruction and Creation, Boyd 
(1976) explained that confusion and disorder are related to the notion of entropy and the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics.  Entropy is a concept that represents the potential for 
doing work, the capacity for taking action, or the degree of confusion and disorder 
associated with any physical or information-generating activity.  A high degree of entropy 
implies a low potential for doing work and a low capacity for taking action.  It is a state of 
confusion and disorder.  Low entropy implies just the opposite.  Viewed in this context, the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics states that all observed natural processes generate 
entropy.  From this law it follows that entropy must increase in any closed system, or, for 
that matter, in any system that cannot communicate in an ordered fashion with other 
systems or environments external to itself.  Boyd (1976) explained that the entropy of any 
closed system always tends to increase and thus the nature of any given system is 
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continuously changing, even as efforts are directed toward maintaining it in its original 
form.  Essentially, Boyd (1976) argued any attempt to do so in the real world will expose 
uncertainty and generate disorder.    
 
However, Boyd (1976) proposed that there is a way to adapt and avoid states of high 
entropy.  First, he determined one must identify common qualities, attributes or operations 
to link isolated facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions and observations 
together as possible concepts to represent the real world.  Second, Boyd (1976) argued we 
must repeat this un-structuring and restructuring until a concept is developed that begins 
to match-up with reality.  By doing this, in accordance with Gödel, Heisenberg and the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, the uncertainty and disorder generated by an inward-
oriented system talking to itself can be offset by going outside and creating a new system.  
Simply stated, uncertainty and related disorder can be diminished by the direct artifice of 
creating a higher and broader more general concept to represent reality.  This can describe 
the process of change that any organisation or species of individual must go through in 
order to adapt and survive.   
 
Terrorist organisations and networks are the same.  The shift from an inward-focused or 
“near enemy” attack to one that focused on the “far enemy” was arguably one of the most 
important changes in the mental model of the global Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations.  In 
Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman (2004) explains that while headquartered in 
Sudan, al-Qaeda debated the shift from attacking the near enemy.  According to Sageman 
(2004), internationally-astute members of AQ, such as Mamdoush Mahmud Salim, argued 
that their priority had to be switched from the “near enemy” to the “far enemy”, including 
the United States and its allies.  Sageman (2004) argues that two terrorist attacks in the 
mid-1990s carried out in Saudi Arabia illustrated this shift.  On 13 November 1995 the 
National Guard training centre in Riyadh was bombed and on 25 June 1996 an explosion at 
the Khober Towers in Dhahran killed 19 U.S personnel.  As Sageman (2004) explains, these 
attacks coincided with the change of target from the “near enemy” to the “far enemy”.   
 
Given the scientific and mechanical dimensions to these theories, they may seem at odds 
with this field of inquiry, which is a study in the social and cultural dimensions.   To be fair, 
at the time of writing Destruction and Creation, Boyd was developing a new theory for 
fighter pilots attempting to perfect conflict in the air involving highly sophisticated 
mechanical structures.  However, it was humans who controlled the machines and it was 
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human behaviour and adaptation under extreme circumstances that Boyd was most 
interested in.  Boyd deduced that to have a sense of reality and to be able to effectively 
respond one must accept change as a constant, omnipresent feature of the environment.   
This is by no means a unique conclusion.  However, one must consider the cultural context 
that Boyd was attempting to change.  The military culture is an incredibly disciplined and 
closed system; it is a hierarchical and conservative institution where - at the time of Boyd’s 
work - conventional military engagement was constructed through national armed forces 
underpinned by tightly controlled and defined strategic and tactical engagements.  Nations 
tend to operate in the same fixed structure as opposed to non-state actors as mentioned 
earlier.    
 
Charles Darwin's (1809-1882) theory of evolution, based on natural selection, could be said 
to explain how a species, an organisation, a company or even a nation can survive when it 
adapts to the ever-changing world.  One of the most important lessons from Darwin and 
Boyd is that an organism does not need to perfect adaptation in order to survive.  Boyd 
believed that radical uncertainty is a necessary precondition of physical and mental vitality: 
all new opportunities and ideas spring from some mismatch between reality and ideas 
about it.  In a ‘dog-fight’ between two humans controlling a mechanical object, the one who 
remains predictable will find it difficult to defeat the unpredictable opponent.  In regards to 
countering radical extremism, the Australian Government’s White Paper on Transnational 
Terrorism captured the essence of adapting to an unpredictable social construct when it 
stated: 
Australia must also now face the threats of ambiguity and the unknown. This is 
part of the ‘asymmetric’ nature of terror. This transnational terrorism works 
through loose networks rather than through hierarchy or within borders. It is 
neither dependent on nation-state sponsors, nor responsive to conventional 
deterrents. To defeat one is not to defeat all. It is constantly evolving, with a 
capacity to regenerate and adapt where its forces are degraded. There will be 
new individuals, groups and networks that we simply do not know about. 
(Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004, p. vii) 
 
While there is no reference to Boyd’s theories in this White Paper, a closer examination 
reveals themes and terms in the Australian Government’s attempt to articulate the 
challenge it faces in its own efforts to adapt and evolve to the asymmetric nature of Salafi-
Jihadi inspired terrorism that are consistent with Boyd’s thinking.  The recognition of threats 
that are ambiguous and unknown demonstrates the central themes of Destruction and 
Creation.  The important aspect of this passage is that the Australian Government 
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appreciates it cannot meet this uncertain, incomplete and entropy-inducing challenge 
through a closed system of analysis. 
 
 
2.7 The Origins of the OODA Loop  
 
The origins of the OODA Loop are contained within Boyd’s most in-depth piece of work, 
Patterns of Conflict, which is the longest of his presentations with 193 slides.  On Slide Two 
of Patterns of Conflict, Boyd explains that his objective was to: 
 Make manifest the nature of moral-mental-physical conflict 
 Discern a pattern for successful operations 
 Help generalise tactics and strategy 
 Find a basis for grand strategy 
 
The intent was to unveil the character of conflict, survival and conquests.  Boyd (1986) 
explains: “as with the duel predator and prey in nature, wars are at the sharp end of 
conflict and survival and make for ideal case study analysis”. (Boyd, 1986, slide 2) 
 
In Patterns of Conflict, Boyd (1986) offers an intense study of classic military theory and 
strategy such as that of Sun Tzu, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Karl von Clausewitz.  As 
explained by Hammond (2001 and 2012), Coram (2002), Osinga (2006) and Fournier (2013), 
Boyd travels in time to Genghis Khan, Tamerlan, Hannibal and the Spartans while studying 
Stonewall Jackson and Maurice de Saxe; he was particularly drawn to German Commanders 
such as Eric von Mainstein, Hermann Balck and Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck.  Patterns of 
Conflict dissects the theories of significant leaders in the field of strategy (such as Basil 
Liddell Hart and MAJGEN John Fredrick Charles Fuller) providing a breakdown of great 
military battles fought throughout history.  It even includes drawings of the Spartan battle 
of Leuctra (371BC), Alexander the Great against Darius (331BC), the Napoleonic wars and 
the Mongols.  The German Blitzkrieg and Russian revolutionary wars feature prominently in 
his analysis.  Lessons learned are then synthesised with science, biology, engineering, 
physics and logic, as well as Chinese notions of Cheng and Ch’i’ to identify those common 
elements across all these seemingly different systems and paradigms.   
 
On slide 14 of Patterns of Conflict, Boyd (1986) explains that Cheng manoeuvres were 
employed by early Chinese commanders to expose an adversary’s vulnerabilities and 
weakness, while the exploitation and decisive strokes against those weaknesses were the 
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Ch’i’.  It was irrelevant to Boyd whether the war was fought in the desert, like T.E. 
Lawrence, in the air (as in his role as a fighter pilot in the Korean War) or at sea, as detailed 
in his study of British Naval strategist Julian Corbett (1911; reprinted 1988).  Boyd 
understood how Corbett recognised manoeuvrability for tactical advantage being the key 
to defeating an enemy at sea.  In a 2012 lecture on Boyd, Hammond explained that not only 
was it the depth and breadth of research into military history, strategy, biology and science 
that was unique to Boyd’s approach, it was the way Boyd worked backwards through 
history.  Hammond (2012) believed this technique was effective in isolating the common 
strategic elements that result in victory and culminated in Boyd’s conceptual framework.   
 
Importantly, Patterns of Conflict describes the conceptual model for which Boyd is most 
famous: the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop (OODA Loop).  While Destruction and 
Creation could be considered the genome of his conceptual spiral, Patterns of Conflict 
reveals the combined lessons of winning that form the historical bedrock of the OODA Loop 
and Boyd’s grand strategy for manoeuvre warfare.   
 
Boyd’s concept is set out on slide 7 in Patterns of Conflict: 
Action Idea 
Exploit operations and weapons that: 
 
- Generate a rapidly changing 
environment (quick/clear 
observations, orientation and 
decisions, fast-tempo, fast transient 
manoeuvre, quick kill) 
 
- Inhibit an adversary’s capacity to 
adapt to such an environment (cloud 
or distort his observations, 
orientation and decision and impede 
his actions) 
 
 
 
Simultaneously compress time and stretch 
out adversary time to generate a favourable 
mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt 
to change. 
Goal 
Collapse adversary’s system into confusion and disorder by causing him to over- and under- 
react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing and ambiguous, chaotic or 
misleading. 
Table 2.1. Boyd’s Combined Lessons on Winning, re-drawn from slide 7 of Patterns of 
Conflict 
 
While Patterns of Conflict begins with air-to-air combat through the use of machinery (in 
this case supersonic jet fighters with air-to-air missiles, radar and other technological 
advances), Boyd slowly builds up the case for the moral-mental-physical continuum of war 
50 
 
and conflict.  The use of terrorism by Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations, in all its forms no 
matter how it is defined, is as much about the moral and psychological exploitation of their 
enemy as it is the physical.  The Management of Savagery, translated into English by 
McCants (2006), specifically describes the social and psychological power of using violence 
against AQ’s enemies.  This idea is at the very core of this research and fundamental to one 
of the contributions made in this thesis that will be known as “moral manoeuvrability”.  The 
evolving nature of this phenomenon will also be explored further in Chapter Five. 
 
One of the underlying premises of this thesis is that AQ, and its various networks and 
affiliates, determined how to exploit what it observed to be the West’s moral weaknesses.  
This research contends that the tactics of asymmetric warfare applied by AQ are about 
penetrating our moral weaknesses to incite responses that conflict with the West’s stance 
on human rights and freedoms while simultaneously inspiring more followers.  The physical 
destruction caused by the use of home-grown terrorism is a secondary consequence, unless 
the physical target is of symbolic significance - such as Britain’s House of Commons or the 
Houses of Parliament in Canberra, Australia.  Boyd would have considered this approach to 
be part of the mental, moral and physical continuum of conflict.  What this means is that al-
Qaeda and ISIS penetrate the West’s OODA loop by breaking the moral boundaries that 
underpin Western concepts of justice, human rights and the rule of law.  Western 
governments are torn between their duty to protect their citizens and the principles upon 
which Western democratic governments are based.  Boyd understood this dilemma as set 
out in Patterns of Conflict where Boyd (1986) established what he believed were the three 
components of war: 
 
1. Moral Warfare: the destruction of the enemy's will to win, disruption of alliances 
(or potential allies) and induction of internal fragmentation. Ideally resulting in the 
"dissolution of the moral bonds that permit an organic whole [organization] to exist. 
 
2. Mental Warfare: the distortion of the enemy's perception of reality through 
disinformation, ambiguous posturing, and/or severing of the 
communication/information infrastructure. 
 
3. Physical Warfare: the abilities of physical resources such as weapons, people, and 
logistical assets. 
 
These components are key features of AQ and ISIS in their strategic approach to warfare 
and communicated through their Salafi-Jihadi narrative.   
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As discussed earlier, Boyd’s reflections on revolutions in Patterns of Conflict led him to 
comment on conflict within social systems with the explosive expansion of capitalism in the 
19th century and the Marxist revolutionary movement in Russia.  As with the personal 
circumstances of impressionable, young, aspiring followers of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative 
within the Muslim community, Marx and Lenin identified a growing sense of frustration, 
anger, isolation and deprivation, as well as a disdain of the very system within which they 
were living.  A conflict arose through low paid wage-earners exhibiting discontent and 
hatred for a system that permitted others to live in comfort, while they had to live a life 
subject to strict and harsh factory conditions.  For the likes of Marx, the only way out was 
via a revolution of the workers in order to smash the capitalistic system.  According to Boyd, 
Lenin and Joseph Stalin exploited the idea of crisis and vanguards arising out of Marxist 
contradictions within capitalism to lay out a Soviet revolutionary strategy.  The result was a 
scheme that emphasised moral and psychological factors as a basis to destroy a regime 
from within; in other words, the “near enemy”.  It is also similar to how AQ uses its Salafi-
Jihadi narrative to reach and exploit frustrated young Muslim men already living in Western 
countries (and many Western converts to Islam) and inspires them to conduct home-grown 
terrorism. 
 
In Boyd (1986) there is an attempt to describe the necessary conditions for success in this 
era of revolution.  The central element is an exploitation of a crisis generated by misery of 
the masses and vacillation by authorities who indicated an unwillingness or inability to 
come to grips with the existing instability.  The second factor is the existence and rise of a 
vangaurd, or disciplined hard core, that offers leadership, provides a way out and has 
support of the masses.  The hard core vanguard are focused on shaping and guiding the 
followers as well as participating in action to exploit and expand the confusion, disorder and 
fear.  Boyd’s key insight is that crisis and vanguards are the “golden keys” that permit us to 
penetrate the core of insurrection, revolution and modern guerilla warfare.  In Patterns of 
Conflict Boyd (1986) describes a conceptual analysis based on interaction between the 
physical, moral and mental elements of revolutionary movements that could explain 
communist insurrection following WWI or the Islamic extremism of today that has 
embarked on global conflict through the use of  terrorism against Western society.  On Slide 
71 of Patterns of Conflict Boyd (1986) explains: 
Blitz and guerillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the 
moral fiber of the political, economic and social structure.  Simultaneuously, via 
diplomatic, psychological, and various sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away 
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potential allies thereby isolate the intended victim(s) for forthcoming blows.  To 
carry out this program, à la Sun Tzu, Blitz and Guerillas: 
 
 Probe and test adversery [sic], and any allies that may rally to this side, in order 
to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers and intentions. 
 
  Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, 
obsessions, etc., in order to foment [sic] mistrust, sow discord and shape both 
adversery’s [sic] and allies’ perceptions of the world, thereby: 
 
- Create atmosphere of “mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, 
indecisiveness, panic,”… 
- Manipulate or undermine adversary’s plans and actions. 
- Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary during his time 
of trial.   
(Boyd, 1986, slide 71). 
 
This is a concise explanation of how to get inside an opponent’s OODA loop from a moral, 
psychological, social, economic and political perspective.  Boyd would have identified AQ’s 
terrorist attack on the United States on 9/11 with this theoretical construct, particularly  
with the reaction by the United States.  For example, the resulting consequences of the war 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the straining of relations between allies, and the international 
contradictions between the West’s position on human rights juxtaposed with the the Abu 
Graib Prison in Iraq and Guantanomo Bay in Cuba, the internal tensions generated within 
Western countries population and media, as well as how it changed the way the United 
States and many of its allies and viewed the world.   Broadly, Boyd would have seen the 
internal contradictions, frictions and divisions within Western society that these reactions 
caused.  It is not the place of this research to judge those actions, but to use them to 
illustrate the theorectical and epistimological discourse within Patterns of Conflict.    
 
Critical to this thesis, is how AQ’s exploitation of its Salafi-Jihadi narrative and brand evolved 
from attacking its enemy from without to attacking it from within via the inspiration of 
isolated members of the Islamic community resident in Western countries.  What made this 
inspiration even more pervasive was the global connectivity through the internet and other 
forms of social media communication. (Aly 2009; Stern & Berger 2015)  It is similar to the 
synthesis Boyd deduced had occurred when the German military developed and deployed 
blitzkrieg as a form of maneouvre warfare in an age of advancing technology.  In a paper to 
the Australian Counterterrorism Conference in 2010, Dr Anne Aly explains: 
 
A simple Google search on the internet using the term ‘mujahideen’ yields well 
over 1 million returns. Sifting through the various conservative think tanks, 
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blogs and policy documents takes only minutes and the discerning user is 
quickly and easily able to access a plethora of extremist content: terrorist 
propaganda videos; graphic videos of beheadings and other terrorist 
operations; and how to manuals such as ―The preparatory manual of 
explosives; ―Illustrated Manual of Sniper Skills; and the ―Organic Chemistry of 
Explosives‖ all of which are freely available through the Unjustmedia website. 
(Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Edith Cowan 
University, Perth, Western Australia, 30 November 2010.) 
 
An illustrative and revealing anecdote in the use of the internet to infiltrate the West’s 
OODA loop is that of Younis Tsouli, also known as Irhaby 007, one of the most notorious 
terrorist coordinators for al-Qaeda.  Kohlmann (2008) describes an incident involving British 
police breaking down Tsouli’s West London bedroom door in late 2005, finding a long-
haired 22-year-old student.  He was still hunched over his computer working on a website 
called “YouBombit”.  His father was staggered at how his son could be involved with 
international terrorism, since he never left his bedroom.  As Kohlmann (2008) sets out: 
 
the realities of a globalized society now allow international terrorist 
organizations like AQ to dramatically expand their potential reach by courting 
sympathizers in dark corners around the world and teaching them how they can 
best serve AQ’s interests—without necessarily visiting an actual military training 
camp or even speaking directly with AQ. (Kohlmann, 2008, p.95) 
 
This is an illustrative example of al-Qaeda getting inside the West’s OODA loop and a good 
place from which to explore each phase of the OODA loop cycle. 
 
2.8 The Essence of the OODA Loop 
 
It was only in his final presentation, The Essence of Winning and Losing, produced in 1996, 
that Boyd actually sketched the OODA Loop.  In Hammond (2001), The Essence of Winning 
and Losing is referred to as the “big squeeze” because the presentation condenses all 
Boyd’s arguments into four slides.  Hammond (2001) explains how The Essence of Winning 
and Losing is the “synthesis of all of Boyd’s work, from Aerial Attack Study and OODA loops 
to his most recent interests in coevolution, socio-biology, genetic engineering, chaos 
theory, complexity, and non-linearity.” (Hammond 2001, p. 188)  
 
After critically examining and interpreting Boyd’s work, culminating in the OODA Loop, The 
Essence of Winning and Losing contains the following five key statements that summarise 
the essential themes in his theoretical inquiry: 
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1. Without our genetic heritage, cultural traditions, and previous experiences, we do 
not possess an implicit repertoire of psychophysical skills shaped by environments 
and changes that have been previously experienced. 
 
2. Without analysis and synthesis across a variety of domains or across a variety of 
competing/independent channels of information, we cannot evolve new 
repertoires to deal with unfamiliar phenomena or unforeseen change. 
 
3. Without a many-sided, implicit cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, 
correlation, and rejection (across these many different domains or channels of 
information), we cannot even do analysis and synthesis. 
 
4. Without OODA loops, we can neither sense, hence observe, thereby collect a 
variety of information for the above processes, nor decide as well as implement 
actions in accord with these processes. 
 
Or put another way: 
 
Without OODA loops embracing all of the above and without the ability to get inside other 
OODA loops (or other environments), we will find it impossible to comprehend, shape, 
adapt to and in turn be shaped by an unfolding evolving reality that is uncertain, ever-
changing, and unpredictable.   
(Boyd 196, The Essence of Winning and Losing, slide 1; reproduced by Chet Richards and 
Chuck Spinney, September 2012) 
 
Boyd then suggests on slide 2 that these statements can be clarified in a figure: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Boyd’s Drawing of the OODA Loop from The Essence of Winning and Losing 
One potential criticism of Boyd’s entire work, including the OODA Loop, is that it can be 
summarised into one word, adaptation; and that is not a novel concept in the context of 
survival.  As Osinga (2006) argues, Boyd “deliberately adopts a neo-Darwinist/CAS 
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perspective, hence the centrality of the theme of adaptation”. (Osinga 2006, p. 274)  
However, it has been emphasised in this chapter that simple illustrations or summaries 
often mask the underlying complexity of a model or theoretical construct that is also the 
case for concepts of adaptation.   
 
According to Boyd (1986), decision-making occurs in a recurring cycle of Observe-Orient-
Decide-Act (OODA).   Decisions are based on observations of the evolving situation or raw 
information on which actions are based. (Hammond (2001), Osinga (2006), Greene (2007) 
and Polk (2010)).  An entity (whether an individual or organisation) that can process this 
cycle of observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than an opponent can 
thereby "get inside" the opponent's decision-making cycle and gain the advantage.  Boyd 
emphasized that "the loop" is actually a set of interacting loops that are to be kept in 
continuous operation during combat.  Osinga (2006) described the usual interpretation of 
the OODA Loop as a tool for strategy: 
 
In the popularized interpretation, the OODA loop suggests that success in 
war depends on the ability to out-pace and out-think the opponent, or put 
differently, on the ability to go through the OODA cycle more rapidly than 
the opponent. Boyd’s name will probably always remain associated with the 
OODA loop and this popular interpretation. (Osinga, 2006, p. 6) 
 
Thus the study of conflict is reduced to duelling OODA loops, with the side that can go 
through its loop more quickly building an insurmountable competitive advantage.  One of 
the interesting descriptions used by Boyd, but not explored more deeply by Hammond 
(2001 and 2012), Coram (2002) or Osinga (2006), is the notion that the ability to operate at 
a faster tempo or rhythm than an adversary enables one to fold the adversary back inside 
himself.  The affect is that the opponent can neither appreciate nor keep up with what is 
going on.  This description of “folding an adversary back inside himself” appears to be 
Boyd’s way of describing the second law of thermodynamics and the high entropy inflicted 
on a closed system.  It could also be analogous to the Marx and Lenin revolutionary 
condition during a social revolution where hostile forces tangled themselves in conflicting 
ways to respond and where the political leadership mistakenly exposed themselves to be 
morally and socially bankrupt, (Hammond, 2001).   
 
This idea of social manipulation through folding an opponent back into itself is a powerful, 
albeit intangible, notion contained within the moral-mental-physical continuum of warfare 
being inspired by Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations such as AQ and ISIS. This idea should 
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be retained for interpretive analysis during the following section as it seeks to explain each 
of the Observe-Orientation-Decide-Act components in the context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
home-grown terrorism. 
 
2.8.1 Observe  
 
Before a fighter pilot, basketball player, entrepreneur or terrorist can orientate, decide and 
then act, they need to have observed the world around them, in particular their opponents.  
For example, in the absence of observation, it is difficult to detect mismatches before your 
opponent and then correct your orientation, enabling you to take action and exploit the 
new and unfolding situation.  Observations within the OODA Loop are not merely about the 
physical terrain or having good situational awareness.  These could be described as explicit 
requirements of Observation.  In the context of Boyd’s strategic framework, Observe is also 
about identifying those elements in the human domain, not only the physical reactions or 
consequences.  For example, hypothetically Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations could 
observe how a Western country reacted to an act of home-grown terrorism, irrespective of 
whether AQ or ISIS had any direct link.  If it causes social unrest between the Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities, this can confirm for those who are inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi 
message that the West is against Muslims.  Did it cause Western communities to question 
their own systems?  Perhaps important sections of the population will demand that the 
Government allow sharia law, believing this acquiescence will stop terrorism.  In this 
hypothetical example, these social and political reactions will be closely observed by AQ and 
other Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations.  Boyd determined that, “Genghis Khan closely 
observed the reaction of fear, anxiety and dislocation his clever and calculated use of 
propaganda and terror had on his adversaries in order to undermine their resolve and 
destroy their will to resist” (Boyd 1986, slide 25).   
 
Linking back to Boyd’s analysis of the German military’s blitzkrieg during the second World 
War was the synthesis of the tactics of infiltration from WWI with the superior advances in 
technology, that when combined were devastating for their opponents.  Modern day 
Generals have also synthesised manoeuvre warfare with advances in technology to increase 
their ability to observe what is happening in their dynamic and unfolding environment.  
During the second US-led war in Iraq (2003 – 2010), GEN Stanley McChrystal, at the time 
Commander of Joint Special Operations Taskforce, combined all available modes of 
observation, from internal reporting, field observations and telecommunications to 
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unmanned aerial observations, signals and human intelligence that began to have a 
dramatic impact on al-Zarqawi’s AQ network in Iraq.  In his autobiography, McChrystal 
(2013) explains the faster his team could collect and assess the information, the more 
precisely he could orientate the allocation of his kinetic and non-kinetic resources on the 
battlefield to defeat his opponents. 
 
This was explicitly applied through the United States Special Operations Forces’ targeting 
cycle that came to be known as Find – Fix – Finish – Exploit – Analyse (F3EA).  According to 
McChrystal (2013), a target was first identified and located (Find), then kept under constant 
surveillance (Observe) to ensure it had not moved and to understand its habits (Fix or 
Orientate), while a raid force moved to capture or kill the targets (Finish, or Decide and Act).  
Material of intelligence value was deliberately secured and mined (further observation), 
while detainees were interrogated to find follow-up targets (Exploit); the information this 
exploitation yielded was then studied to better know the enemy and identify opportunities 
to further attack its network (Analyse).  While never referred to in McChrystal’s description 
of F3EA, it has all the hallmarks of Boyd’s OODA Loop.  This becomes immediately obvious 
when McChrystal states the, “military had used targeting cycles like this for a generation.  
But the task in Iraq – finding and stopping insurgents, not Soviet tank columns – demanded 
radically faster and often very precise execution” (McChrystal, 2013, p.153). 
 
AQ and ISIS understand the impact graphic visual images have on followers and opponents. 
The simultaneous dividend is hyper-powered by the internet, social media and Western 
media’s obsession with the 24-hour news cycle that replays the brutality.   In Patterns of 
Conflict, Boyd explains the idea is to “create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening 
events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts 
adversary observes or images and those he must react to”. (Boyd 1986, slide 175)  The 
graphic use by ISIS of the internet to film and publish beheadings of kidnapped Westerners 
or members of the Muslim community who they have judged to be Kafir (or unbeliever), 
feeds into and exploits the fear caused by the reaction to what we observe, thereby 
generating a high level of entropy.  Simultaneously, it inspires followers and creates new 
converts, building an esprit de corps between physically isolated and dispersed groups or 
individuals.  That said, as a result of the calculated use of information technology by ISIS to 
mould what its audience observes, the West may be viewing ISIS as merely AQ 2.0.  This 
further clouds our mental image and our understanding of how to respond.  In an 
assessment of ISIS, Graeme Wood (2015) explains: 
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There is a temptation to rehearse this observation—that jihadists are modern 
secular people, with modern political concerns, wearing medieval religious 
disguise—and make it fit the Islamic State. In fact, much of what the group does 
looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment 
to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately 
to bringing about the apocalypse. (Wood, 2015, p.1) 
 
Observations are also an important part of inspiring followers and supporters.  There is a 
paradigmatic connection between the OODA Loop and the trajectory towards becoming a 
home-grown terrorist.  In Radicalization in the West: The Home-grown Threat Silber and 
Bhatt (2007) set out four stages of radicalisation.  While acknowledging that there may be 
criticisms of their model, the point for the purposes of this section is how Observation is 
necessary for what Silber and Bhatt (2007) describe as the “Indoctrination” phase.  This 
occurs when individuals begin to adopt this virulent ideology, interpreting the world from 
this newly formed context provided by the ability to observe images, language and actions 
propagated by the likes of AQ.   
 
Cloaked with a veil of objectivity, the internet allows the aspiring Salafi-Jihadist to view the 
world and global conflicts through this extremist lens, further reinforcing the objectives and 
Koran-laced political arguments of the Salafi-Jihadi agenda.  In the Jihadisation phase, when 
an individual commits to jihad, the internet can serve as an enabler, providing broad access 
to an array of information on targets, their vulnerabilities and the design of their weapons.  
It is another example of what Lind et al (1989) described as Fourth Generational Warfare.  
While not an academic, peer-reviewed work, the observations in Wood (2015) support 
Boyd’s argument on slide 148 of Patterns of Conflict.  On slide 148 Boyd (1986) poses the 
rhetorical question: how do we want to appear to our adversaries or what kind of mental 
image do we want to generate in their minds?  In the context of this thesis, this proposition 
is equally applicable to the kind of impression AQ and ISIS want to shape in the minds of 
Muslims resident in Western countries. 
 
2.8.2 Orientate 
 
The most significant part of Boyd’s OODA loop is Orientate or Orientation.  In Organic 
Design for Command and Control, Boyd (1987) said, “Orientation is the repository of our 
genetic heritage, cultural tradition, and previous experiences – it is the most important part 
of the OODA loop since it shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act”. 
(Boyd, 1987, slide 26)  For Boyd, Orientation was the schwerpunkt within an organisation, or 
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the implicit harmonising and unifying concept.  The schwerpunkt of an organisation is a 
term Boyd adopted from the German military.  Understanding the Orientation of an 
adversary is critical to successfully penetrating its OODA loop, but it cannot be done within 
a closed system.  That is why understanding Destruction and Creation is so important for a 
workable knowledge of the OODA Loop.   
 
Boyd (1976) argued that through the second law of thermodynamics, Gödel and Heisenberg 
demonstrate “one cannot determine the character or nature of a system within itself.”  
Similarly, closed systems will struggle to create the correct mental images of the outside 
world or of other conflicting systems.  An example of Boyd’s attempt to demonstrate the 
importance of Orientation and its significance to strategy for either distorting reality or 
creating new reality is the snowmobile metaphor.  In The Strategic Game of ? and ? Boyd 
(1987) attempted to illustrate this idea through what he described as a mental experiment.  
The Strategic Game of ? and ? is Boyd’s briefing that connects Destruction and Creation 
with the OODA Loop.  While the primary source document is Boyd’s 1987 presentation, 
another useful source is the presentation put together by Richards (1996), one of Boyd’s 
former colleagues, who turned Boyd’s hand written notes into a lecture. 
 
In The Strategic Game of ? and ?, Boyd (1987) would get his audience to imagine they were 
on a ski slope and fix that image in their mind.  He then asks them to imagine they are at a 
sunny beach resort on motorboat.  Now he gets them to think of other ways of moving 
around such as on a bicycle.  Boyd then tells them to imagine they are a parent at a 
department store where their child notices toy tractors with rubber caterpillar wheels.  
Taking all those retained images at once, what could they create?  Boyd’s punch line was: if 
you took the skis, the motor from the boat, the handlebars from the bicycle and the rubber 
from the toy tractor and threw away the rest, you would have designed a snowmobile.  
Boyd (1987) argued that the ability to synthesise all these components was the essence of 
strategy that enabled us to survive on our own terms.  Importantly, The Strategic Game of ? 
and ? was another way of describing how Boyd had analysed and synthesised the key 
components from Gödel’s Incomplete Theorem, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle and the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics.  In other words, this kind of strategic thinking can only be 
accomplished by looking outside our own physical, mental and moral systems.  In The 
Strategic Game of ? and ?, Boyd explained the point of all this is that: 
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We can’t just look at our own personal experiences or use the same mental 
recipes over and over again; we’ve got to look at other disciplines and 
activities and relate or connect them to what we know from our experiences 
and the strategic world we live in. 
 
if we can do this 
We will be able to surface new repertoires and (hopefully) develop a 
Fingerspitzengefühl for folding our adversaries back inside themselves, 
morally-mentally-physically—so that they can neither appreciate nor cope 
with what’s happening—without suffering the same fate ourselves. 
           (Boyd, 1987, slide 45) 
 
In his 2014 presentation, Spinney explains that, “Observations of the external world are 
filtered through the cognitive apparatus of the observer and therefore observations cannot 
be separated from the various interior mental processes of each observer.” (Spinney 2014, 
Evolutionary Epistemology, slide 7).  As the global vanguard of the Salafi-Jihadist narrative 
and brand, AQ demonstrated its capacity for designing the metaphorical snowmobile when 
on 11 September 2001 they turned commercial airplanes, with innocent passengers and 
crew on board, into fuel-filled torpedoes.  This was an example of AQ penetrating the 
OODA loop of the US - morally, mentally and physically - by destroying one of the most 
recognisable symbols of the Western system.  At that moment AQ aligned its tactics of 
asymmetric warfare with its strategic objectives.  This had the effect of generating 
mismatches and discontinuities and of sowing the seed for a reaction that could feed back 
into its plan for a new epoch of conflict.  Effectively, each reaction by the West could then 
be used again by AQ to further inspire and shape the Orientation of others through an 
intangible and existential view of war.  
 
In reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Bobbit (2002), Lynn (2003), Coker (2002) and 
Osinga (2006) make the argument that the West needs to re-conceptualize war for its 
instrumental view of war is severely challenged by the clash with groups who experience 
war as existential.  It is as if the West is constantly playing catch-up every time AQ builds or 
evolves into a new version of the snowmobile or implicitly evolves into an entirely new 
instrument in the application of its strategic objectives.  An applicable example of a new 
Salafi-Jihadi metaphorical snowmobile is ISIS.  The OODA Loop may provide a tool that 
generates more accurate mental images and orientations of the current terrorist 
phenomenon.  As Osinga (2006) determines, 
 
Boyd’s work offers important insights for understanding the threats of the 
“post-9/11” world. So-called asymmetric responses to western modes of 
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warfare too become a natural feature only to be expected from adversaries.  
An adversary is a complex adaptive system attempting to adapt, to survive and 
prosper. The attacks of “9/11” introduced the contours of a new war form, and 
the West has been challenged to understand the nature of this new game of 
survival. In no small measure is it waged in the cognitive and moral domain. 
(Osinga, 2006, p.316) 
 
As the US-led war in Afghanistan escalated and began to target the Federally Administrated 
Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, AQ shifted and adapted its approach.  At a conference in 
Leicester, United Kingdom, organised by the radical Al-Muhajiroun faction in October 2002, 
Abu Hamza al-Masri told followers, “We need to resist, we need to fight, even alone.  And 
you can’t go now to learn in Afghanistan or Eritrea as before.  A lot of skills you need for the 
frontline, you can learn from here [...] Where are you? What can you do in your area?” 
(Kohlmann, 2008, p.99)  In his critical inquiry into the transformation of war, van Crevald 
(1991) describes future wars as being waged by terrorists or criminals embedded in and 
inseparable from the population they are seeking to combat.  In the context of this thesis, 
the way that AQ created its Salafi-Jihadi brand, connecting with impressionable members of 
the Muslim population in Western countries and in combination with the communicative 
power of the internet, is an example of building a new snowmobile.  
 
In the context of this thesis, the relevance and applicability of Orientation cannot be 
overstated in relation to Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations and their need to constantly 
adapt and survive.  Orientation also involves moral codes, symbolism and language as well 
as the mental images already mentioned.  While bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
mastered the ability to use the internet and social media to exploit and shape the moral 
codes, language, symbolism and mental images of both adversary and potential recruits, 
ISIS has super-charged this combination to become one of the most powerful, inspirational 
forces using the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  The combination of social media and the internet 
with graphic and barbaric acts of violence by ISIS, laced with intoxicating language from the 
time of the Prophet Mohammed and replayed endlessly by the West’s 24-hour news cycle is 
a demonstrative example of analysis and synthesis to create and shape orientation. (Seib 
and Janbek, 2010; Archetti, 2012; Stern and Berger, 2015)  For example, Wood (2015) 
describes a declaration by ISIS spokesman, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani who called on 
Muslims in Western countries to find an infidel and “smash his head with a rock, poison 
him, run him over with a car”, or “destroy his crops.”  While there has been some criticism 
of Wood (2015), he makes a few relevant observations.  For example, he notes that to 
audiences in the West the contrast between the medieval style of punishment by poisoning 
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crops and the modern suggestion of vehicular homicide may sound strange.  However, 
Wood (2015) explains: 
 
His speech was laced with theological and legal discussion, and his exhortation 
to attack crops directly echoed orders from Muhammad to leave well water and 
crops alone—unless the armies of Islam were in a defensive position, in which 
case Muslims in the lands of kuffar, or infidels, should be unmerciful, and 
poison away.  (Wood, 2015, p.2) 
 
In the context of Boyd’s OODA Loop, ISIS is using its prophetic methodology to shape the 
Orientation of all its audiences, both supporters and enemies.  The proliferation of these 
powerful Islamic symbols, the prophetic language and the morally and mentally distorting 
violence maintains relevance in the minds of disconnected followers and self-radicalising 
members of the Muslim community resident in Western countries.  As will be discussed in 
Chapter Five, a further revolution or regenerative capacity of the Salafi-Jihadi’s OODA loop 
is its ability to inspire individual home-grown terrorists.  Through the internet where the 
graphic nature of single acts of brutality, such as publishing the beheading of Westerners, 
shapes the Orientation of followers who have had no physical connection to ISIS.  This 
shaping of followers was described in Brachman (2007) as AQ’s ability to transform 
consumers into producers of terrorism.  Turning consumers into producers ensures the 
sustainability of AQ’s form of insurgency within Western countries.  
 
In Patterns of Conflict, Boyd (1986) explains the need to “inhibit an adversary’s capacity to 
adapt to an environment (cloud or distort their observations, orientation and decisions) 
and impede his actions”. (Boyd, 1986, slide 7)  The Orientation of the US and its allies is 
important relative to how the West reacts to the current terrorism phenomenon.  
According to Boyd (1986), the goal is to collapse an adversary’s system into confusion and 
disorder by causing them to over- or under-react to activity that appears simultaneously 
menacing, ambiguous, chaotic or misleading.  The use of multiple passenger jets, already 
within US airspace, piloted by individuals who had been taking flying lessons in the US, 
inspiring home-grown terrorists, and declaring a new Caliphate and publishing graphic 
beheadings of Westerners by ISIS are relevant examples.  Whether through the use of 
home-grown terrorists or foreign fighters who slip back into Western communities, the 
West has its own reality challenged and as a consequence is forced to re-orientate how it 
responds.  As Richards (2008) explains, degrading an enemy’s perception of “reality” is a 
key concept in Boyd’s theory of warfare.  One needs to employ a variety of measures that 
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interweave menace, uncertainty and mistrust with tangles of ambiguity, deception and 
novelty as basis to sever adversary’s moral ties and to disorient.    
 
The distortion of an enemy’s ability to accurately determine the Orientation of the 
adversary increases their entropy and folds them back into themselves.  Any reaction by 
Western governments may be perceived to be targeting the Muslim community.  This 
consequence is to reinforce the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, allowing AQ and ISIS to exploit and 
manipulate the Orientation of their core constituency.  For example, on 23 February 2015 
the then Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, announced that the Australian 
Government would introduce measures making citizenship and immigration laws tougher 
and targeting those who supported and advocated religious and racial hatred.  This was 
interpreted by groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (an Australian based Salafi-Jihadi organisation) 
as evidence of discrimination against the Muslim community in Australia.  In response to 
the proposals by the Australian Prime Minister, on its website Hizb-ut-Tahrir describes how 
“the objective of such talk is to threaten and intimidate Muslims into not accounting the 
Australian government for its foreign policy crimes and to have them accept a localised, 
secular version of Islam that is not the Islam revealed by Allah to Muhammad. This must be 
staunchly rejected.” (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 4 February 2015)  This demonstrates the juxtapositions 
of the Orientation of these two intellectual positions. 
 
2.8.3 Decide 
 
In the context of the OODA Loop, decisions are based on the observations made and 
filtered through an individual’s or group’s orientation.  Osinga (2006) argues that Boyd 
aligns the decision component of the OODA Loop with hypothesis testing.  The theoretical 
discourse on decision-making is a complex and significantly explored field of inquiry in areas 
such as psychology, businesses, economics, medicine, sport and warfare.  For example, 
Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner and Betsch (2014) explored the question: when decision-makers 
are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as 
assumed by single-process models or do they choose adaptively from a set of available 
decision strategies as multiple-strategy models?  It was determined by Söllner et al (2014) 
that the uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information 
intrusion paradigm.  This is said to comprehensively promote the notion of a uniform 
decision-making mechanism as assumed by single-process models.  Boyd would have 
interpreted this as a linear and explicit process. 
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The decision does not necessarily always involve deciding to take action; it can also involve 
deciding not to take action at all.  For example, the social psychological phenomenon 
known as “bystander intervention” was first explored by John Darley and Bibb Latane 
(1968) following the 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese in the United States.  (This incident is 
used in Chapter Four to describe the significance of single case-study research 
methodology.)  In Darley and Latane (1968) it was determined that people are less likely to 
intervene to help another person in an emergency while in the presence of a group than 
when they are alone.  In the context of Boyd’s theory, this would describe decisions being 
made within a closed system that overlooks the possible consequences from a lack of 
synthesis.  In relation to terrorist decision making, McCormack (2003) reviewed the existing 
literature and explained that efforts to answer these questions have centred on three sets 
of theories comprising of: 1) strategic theories, in which the decision to employ terrorism 
and related forms of political violence is considered to be an instrumental choice; 2) 
organisational theories, in which the sources of violence are found in the internal dynamics 
of the terrorist group itself; and 3) psychological theories, in which the decision to employ 
terrorism is explained within the framework of individual psychology.  When applied to the 
OODA Loop, these three general theories could equally describe the Orientation that 
shapes the decision. 
 
Decisions may evolve as more observations are made and filtered through one’s 
Orientation.  In fact, Shapiro (2012) describes how terrorism is a contextual phenomenon 
and that successful analysis of terrorist group decision-making needs to take into account a 
variety of contextual factors.  These contextual factors could be equivalent to those that 
make up Orientation.  In his analysis of the psychology of terrorism from the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Red Army Faction of Alfred Herrhausen and AQ, Horgan 
(2005) refers to a rational choice perspective.  Horgan (2005) argues the decision-making 
process that underpins and arises from terrorist acts is determined by the immediate and 
proximal context to the individual’s involvement.  Further, Horgan (2005) notes the group 
plays a significant role in shaping the behavioural process inherent in deciding to become a 
terrorist.  However, Horgan (2005) does not mention home-grown terrorists or lone, 
individual terrorists who may have no immediate or even proximal engagement with the 
group but for whom the internet overcomes the physical tyranny of distance to allow 
individuals to feel existentially connected.  Irrespective of what decision-making strategy is 
applied, it could be argued that the filter for a decision is contained within the 
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organisation’s Orientation.  For a combatant to make a decision, Ford (2010) explains they 
must filter new information (or unfolding circumstances) through the lens of previous 
experience, genetic heritage, and cultural traditions.   
 
In a competitive environment that requires defeating an opponent, restricting their 
capacity to make decisions is an important tactic.  For Boyd it is the ability to constrict the 
time an opponent has to make decisions that will cause them to misinterpret the situation, 
create inaccurate mental images and begin to experience increasing entropy.  In his 
exploration of air power as the dominant force of military power in the modern world, 
Meilinger (1995) explains the conquest of time as the result of superior air power provides 
surprise, and surprise leads to confusion and disorientation.  To reinforce the importance of 
compressing time in conflict and the pressure it places on the decision-making ability of the 
enemy, Meilinger (1995) states, “John Boyd’s entire theory of the OODA Loop is based on 
the premise that telescoping time – arriving at decisions or locations rapidly – is the 
decisive element in war because of the enormous psychological strain it places on an 
enemy”. (Meilinger, 1995, p.31)  This may seem incongruent to the threat of home-grown 
terrorism, but Western governments are increasingly under pressure to stop the next 
attack and when they do happen governments are forced to respond rapidly to the 
confusing and unfolding situation.  In other words the pressure of time needs to be 
measured through the context of the situation. 
 
While the ability to telescope time to outmanoeuvre an opponent is important, Boyd 
continually emphasised the significance of the implicit over explicit form of decision-making 
for reducing the time taken to analyse the opponent’s Orientation and synthesise the 
potential courses of action.  Explicit decision-making is slower, as one does not have the 
relevant information, trust, communication or other sources of data to allow implicit 
decisions to be made by the group or individual in the field.  Explicit decisions are also those 
which are mechanical (Lindley 1971) or linear and unlikely to lead to free-flowing adaptive 
action, as explained by Coram (2002).  This form of decision-making is not conducive to the 
kind of manoeuvre warfare being used by AQ.  This is in contrast to conclusions reached by 
Pretz (2008) who evaluated intuition over analysis for strategy in decision-making.  Pretz 
(2008) describes how the research on dual processes in cognition has shown that explicit, 
analytical thought is more powerful and less vulnerable to heuristics and biases than 
implicit, intuitive thought.  
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Several other studies have shown that holistic, intuitive processes can outperform analysis, 
documenting the disruptive effects of hypothesis testing, think-aloud protocols, and 
analytical judgments.  In Pretz (2008), the research examined the effects of intuitive versus 
analytical strategy and level of experience in problem solving.  The analysis was found to be 
appropriate for more experienced individuals, while intuition was more effective for those 
less experienced.  However, it could be argued that more experienced or senior individuals 
become locked into a fixed paradigm of decision-making, whereas less experienced 
individuals are not locked into endless analysis.  What would have made the Pretz (2008) 
experiment interesting would have been to establish a head-to-head competition between 
those who make decisions based on analysis and those who make decisions by both 
analysis and intuitive or implicit synthesis.  In his systematic explanation of each component 
of the OODA Loop, Richards (2006) explains explicit decisions are needed when no effective 
action is available via the implicit link, such as when training or experimenting.  However, 
actions will still be influenced by (existing) implicit guidance and controls until these are 
reset by learning.  Explicit decision-making and reorientation (learning) always take time.  
Boyd argued that analysis alone did not lead to adaptive decisions.  The implicit aspect was 
not the analysis but in the intuitive ability to observe connections, or in other words the 
synthesis of what is happening.  As Hammond (2001) explains, this is the theme weaving its 
way through A Discourse on Winning and Losing.  
 
If we consider AQ and Western governments and either their military or counterterrorism 
entities as dueling OODA loops, one of the objectives is for either side to place enough 
pressure on the opponent that they find it difficult to look externally and thus become 
trapped in a suffocating decision cycle.  The theme of suppression, explains Richards (2008), 
is having the tendency to build up explicit internal arrangements that hinder interaction 
with the external world.  This clouds mental visibility and distorts an interpretation of the 
adversary’s Orientation.  This becomes more complicated when it involves social structure 
of command and control.  It is why, Richards (2008) explains, organisations need to arrange 
circumstances so that leaders and subordinates alike are given the opportunity to 
continuously interact with the external world and with each other.  In other words, an 
accurate appreciate of the context of the situation on the ground is critical for determining 
the right course of action.  This will enable them to quickly make many-sided, implicit, 
cross-referenced projections and correlations, hence a similar implicit orientation.   
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As Hammond (2001) explains, the faster tempo at the lower levels of an organisation 
should work within the slower tempo of the higher levels in the organisation.  Successful 
decisions come from implicitly giving the lower levels freedom to be creative and to shape 
and direct their own actions.  In the context of this thesis, the OODA loop of the smaller 
tactical units (or home-grown terrorists) are revolving within the larger OODA loop of the 
strategic, global entity - in this case AQ.  The internet and social media have globally super-
charged this capacity for AQ.  This enables small groups or individuals to make implicit 
decisions and to regenerate even after setbacks, based on a carefully manipulated 
Orientation assisted through the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  This may be where Hoffman (2008) 
and his strict command-and-control view of AQ has overlooked the implicit nature of a 
movement that is a state of mind more than it is a physical, explicitly-designed structure. 
 
In a contest of survival, such as warfare, it is all about distorting an opponent’s ability to 
make the right decision, in a timely manner.  Conversely, it is about increasing the utility of 
our own decision-making.  Even though the Salafi-Jihadi narrative may resonate with some 
residents in Western countries, there has not been a constant barrage of terrorist acts since 
11 September 2001.  However, the reaction of Western governments and the media, 
whether to failed attempts of home-grown terrorism or single acts of graphic brutality 
broadcast by ISIS, is illustrative of a powerful, distorting effect.  As shall be explored in the 
three case studies selected for this research, the distorting, psychological effect is even 
more profound when Western governments find the home-grown terrorists are 
unexceptional and virtually indistinguishable from the rest of a diverse society and the 
planning is ad hoc and crude.  For example, in Talking with the Enemy, Atran (2011) 
describes the almost farcical organisation and planning that resulted in the Madrid train 
bombing on 11 March 2004.  In this case study, Atran (2011) describes an almost chaotic, 
irrational and ad hoc approach to organising what eventuated into one of the worst 
terrorist attacks in European history.  There was nothing mechanical, linear or symmetrical 
about the entire process of the terrorist attack on the Madrid train network. 
 
The level of uncertainty, lack of definitive information on potential home-grown terrorists 
and the pressure from informed and uninformed stakeholders within the Western 
communities place pressure on authorities to make the most effective decisions.  In the 
immediate aftermath of a terrorist’s actions, Western governments need to be wary not to 
be drawn into the distorted mental image that AQ and ISIS is attempting to create.  The 
consequence may be to reduce the utility of counterterrorism decisions.  Western 
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Governments need to determine the right strategy, implemented with a balanced mixture 
of tactics along the moral, mental and physical continuum of war, which forces AQ and ISIS 
to fold back into themselves.   
 
2.8.4 Act 
 
The only academic research to mention the Act component of the OODA Loop is in Osinga 
(2006) and this is only briefly.  As mentioned earlier, while Boyd saw the Decision 
component as being a form of hypothesis formulation, he viewed the Act component as a 
test.  Richards (2008) provides an explanation that returns to Orientate, where he notes 
how orientation shapes observation, decision and action, and in turn is shaped by the 
feedback and other phenomena coming into our sensing or observing window.  In other 
words, the Action is not necessarily final; it may be undertaken to test a theory or a 
hypothesis, or to initiate a reaction that further shapes the opponent’s mental image and 
Orientation.   
 
In the context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, the act can involve 
attempting or planning to carry out a terrorist attack.  Following the Silber and Bhatt (2007) 
definition, the “jihadisation” phase is where “members of the cluster accept their individual 
duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. 
Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the jihad that can involve a 
terrorist attack. These “acts in furtherance” will include planning, preparation and 
execution”. (Silber and Bhatt 2007, p. 7)  When viewed through the lens of the OODA Loop, 
the act itself is a reflection of the individual’s or group’s Orientation, as well as the 
Orientation of the target.  Individuals becoming progressively more inspired associate 
themselves with like-minded others and these networks or friends appear “almost essential 
to progressing to the Jihadisation phase, critical for a terrorist act”. (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 
p.9)  For small groups or individual home-grown terrorists the internet is an enabler in this 
process of deciding to act in support of or conduct a terrorist attack.   
 
In relation to a larger group involved in home-grown terrorism, Silber and Bhatt (2007) 
assert that “group think” is one of the most powerful catalysts for leading a group to 
actually committing a terrorist act.  “Group think” is a force multiplier for radical thought, 
while creating a competitive environment among the group members for being the most 
radical and the most committed.  In the context of the OODA Loop, the terrorist act or 
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planned attack comes back to how it is shaped by the orientation of that individual or 
group.  This insight from Silber and Bhatt (2007) reinforces another argument made in this 
thesis, whereby ISIS has evolved even further in exploiting the inspirational effect of 
increasingly barbaric acts of violence.  Any reaction to those acts are observed and 
evaluated by ISIS in order to analyse the effect of these actions.  For example, despite the 
act of beheading kidnap victims on YouTube being graphic enough, ISIS then moved to burn 
alive a Jordanian fighter pilot, First Lieutenant Muadh al-Kasasbeh, who was captured on 24 
December 2014.  This was an act of brutality that not even AQ had carried out.  It was also 
an act that illustrated ISIS evolving and adapting through its own OODA loop, testing and 
shaping the mental images of its enemies to observe how they would react. 
 
While there is no academic research or empirical evidence to confirm this, it could be 
deduced that AQ launched its 9/11 attack in order to test its hypothesis or to cause actions 
by the US that may have fuelled a spiral of clashing OODA loops.  The 2001 US-NATO 
invasion of the Islamic country of Afghanistan and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, as 
well as a range of anti-terror laws implemented by Western Governments, assisted in 
shaping how AQ was able to adapt its moral, mental and physical Orientation, 
strengthening the legitimacy of its narrative to a global support base.  ISIS has profoundly 
exploited the Orientation of its enemies and the resulting actions.  For example, the act of 
graphically tormenting Japan by parading Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa on YouTube and 
then broadcasting their beheadings across the internet (RT.com, 31 January 2015) terrified 
a nation and fed into the Orientation of Japan.  This action can also be interpreted as a form 
of coercion to force Japan and its allies into some kind of action, which again reinforces the 
ISIS cause.  The Japanese media’s OODA loop was also penetrated as it continually played 
the humiliating images on the enormous television screens in Tokyo and other Japanese 
cities.  Both the Orientation of ISIS and the understanding of their anticipation of how Japan 
and the West would react could be said to have shaped the decision to perform these 
actions.  An interesting question then is: how would ISIS’s own Orientation have been 
shaped if the Japanese and Western media had refused to act?  What if the Western and 
Japanese media decided not to show any of these images and prevented them from 
appearing on their nation’s accessible internet sites?  This may have had a neutralising 
effect on ISIS, or resulted in actions that were even more horrific to force the attention and 
reaction they strive to exploit. 
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As explained earlier, the predominant German military concept that Boyd argued was key 
to his interpretation of the Act component of the OODA Loop, was the schwerpunkt 
contained within the organisation’s Orientation.  It was a concept that resonated 
throughout the German military chain of command.  As Coram (2002) attempts to explain, 
schwerpunkt is the overarching goal, or the glue that holds the various units together and 
the freedom given to those units to carry out the required tactics in pursuit of that goal.  It 
is equally applicable to describing how AQ organically fosters and encourages freedom of 
movement and decision-making that shapes commitment and intent among followers.  It 
may also suggest the regenerative capacity of AQ to shape the schwerpunkt for those who 
are inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, and then to put that into action.  For example, 
even though the Madrid terrorist attack, as described by Atran (2011), illustrates a 
seemingly dysfunctional organisation, when analysed through the OODA Loop this did not 
matter.   
 
What mattered was that those involved in the decision-making and implementation 
displayed schwerpunkt, or freedom to manoeuvre and shape the tactical application of the 
intent.  Those involved in the Madrid bombing went through their own tactical OODA cycle 
within a broader, longer-term strategic OODA loop inspired by AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  
Another important point is that for Boyd the Act, or in this case the terrorist attack, did not 
signal the end of the OODA Loop cycle.  For a suicide bomber, that act may be the end of 
their explicit involvement in the Salafi-Jihadi OODA loop process.  However, the 
consequences may generate further OODA cycles such as inspiring others and shaping the 
reactions of opponents.  It is not as simplistic as a mechanical model of decision-making; it 
can also be used to detect how a new home-grown terrorist attack or application signals 
the regenerative capacity of the AQ.   
 
As explained, it is a mistake to view the OODA Loop as a mechanical process whereby a 
group of variables can be dropped into the Observe repository and out comes action at the 
end.  In his application of the OODA Loop to cybernetic command and control, Brehmer 
(2005) describes the OODA Loop in purely mechanical terms.  If the Act is successful, argues 
Brehmer (2005), then there is simply nothing more to Observe and the OODA Loop stops.  
This analysis misses the significance of tactical actions influencing strategic objectives.  If 
one air force pilot shoots down another, following Boyd’s theory, this does not simply end 
the OODA Loop.  The effect of the elimination of the opponent influences the broader 
OODA Loop of the larger entity that pilot represents.  Similarly, the feedback for the 
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successful pilot shapes how he may or may not engage in future air-to-air combat.  As 
Richards (2006) explains, such a sequential model would be ponderous and does not 
properly describe how successful competitors operate.  Instead, as Richards (2006) argues, 
sometimes it might seem as if competitors are simply observing and acting.  For instance, 
there will be a number of potential courses of action for any situation and a thinking 
opponent does not provide its competitors with a list of tactics so they can work out reflex-
type responses in advance.  The USMC Warfighting manual explains the “essence of 
maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy 
[…] that advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial”. 
(USMC Doctrinal Warfighting Manual, 1997, p.74)  The understanding is that taking action 
to generate an outcome is not the end of the broader strategic objective. 
 
One of Boyd’s favourite tests was to show people three images (see below) and ask them 
what they are.  He used this test to demonstrate how people often have their mental 
images shaped and manipulated by the actions of others.  In other words, individuals act in 
a way that reinforces the mental image they have constructed about events, experiences or 
even the interactions between themselves and other individuals.  This in turn feeds into 
their agenda.  As described by Hammond (2001), Boyd would argue the images below are 
all the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. A Boyd Quiz (Hammond 2001, p.181) 
 
Boyd would state each is a pyramid observed from a different perspective, depending on 
your viewpoint.  As Hammond (2001) explained, it was Boyd’s way of demonstrating how it 
is possible to let others see what they want to see.  How Western governments and society 
respond to acts of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism may actually feed into how 
home-grown terrorists want to be perceived.  For example, a 2006 Dutch Government 
white paper on violent jihad in the Netherlands and the current trends in the Islamist 
terrorist threat, points out that: 
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Extremist Islamists who propagate violence against perceived enemies of Islam 
in order to effect social and political change which accords with their radical 
religious (jihadist) ideals are referred to as jihadists. Jihad4 - in the sense of 
holy war - is their principal focal point. If they truly support or commit acts of 
violence, we label them jihadist terrorists (violence against unarmed citizens) 
or jihadist fighters/mujahedeen (violence against military or paramilitary units 
in war zones). (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2006, p.11) 
 
By describing an act of terrorism as part of a jihad, this description could actually play into 
the hands of AQ.  Labeling them jihadists or violent jihadists may become a badge of 
honour that resonates across a global network of existentially connected peers.  Lakoff 
(2004) explores the power of framing in shaping political debate and explains that even 
“when we negate a frame, we evoke the frame”. (Lakoff, 2004, p.3)  The home-grown 
terrorist may have carried out an act of terrorism but we do not need to reinforce and 
strengthen their own frame of reference by continuing to refer to it.  For example, 
highlighting the jihadist, apocalyptic nature of ISIS simply feeds into the mental image that 
group has generated for followers and opponents alike.  This thesis argues acts of home-
grown terrorism or barbaric brutality, socialised on the internet, have a powerful, distorting 
effect along the moral-mental-physical continuum of war.  Novel strategies need to be 
found to neutralise that power and influence. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
As with T.E. Lawrence, Liddell Hart, JFC Fuller, Sun Tzu, Colin Gray and other military 
strategists, Boyd identified the significance of the moral and mental levels of war.  It is 
irrelevant how one models the terrorist’s decision-making process or indeed how terrorism 
is defined; instead, it is the uncertainty inflicted by the fear of terrorism penetrating the 
minds of a variety of audiences that is important in the context of the OODA Loop.  In other 
words, irrespective of the tautological debate on definitions, terrorism generates 
disorientating moral and mental repulsion in the minds of the enemies of the terrorists.  As 
illustrated and described in the three case studies selected for this thesis, the act is not 
merely a mechanical or linear event; it is wrapped in layers of social, psychological and 
morally-grounded themes.  It is not only the act of home-grown terrorism that is terrifying 
to the population; it is morally and mentally disorientating because - in the case of home-
grown terrorism - it was perpetrated by an individual or group of individuals who live 
among us, and who are protected by and raised on Western moral values, freedoms and 
principles.   
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This kind of exploitation is indicative of a new kind of manoeuvre warfare that forms part of 
the current terrorism phenomenon and is expanded upon throughout this thesis.  Groups 
like AQ and ISIS exploit what they identify as the West’s moral weakness by attacking the 
very system that protects their Western-based followers under the rule of law.  For 
Western Governments they create moral confusion about how to react, in case any 
response is manipulated as being an attack on Muslims or labeled Islamophobic.  As Lind et 
al (1989) asserted in their description of fourth generational warfare, terrorists would be 
able to move freely in our society while actively working to subvert it, by using our 
democratic rights not only to penetrate it but also to defend themselves.  Simultaneously, 
reactions can be used to further inspire others to join the cause.  This is a form of 
manoeuvre warfare that will be described as “moral manoeuvrability” and elaborated upon 
in Chapter Six as a key contribution from this thesis.  It also demonstrates the 
“orientational” power of Salafi-Jihadi inspired acts of home-grown terrorism that will be 
explored in Chapter Five through the three cases selected for this thesis.   
 
The focus of the following chapter is the predominant, strategic models of terrorism and an 
examination of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative that inspires home-grown terrorism.  
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Chapter 3 – The Strategic Model of Terrorism and AQ’s Methodology  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines and critiques the established, strategic models of terrorism in the 
context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.  This phenomenon is analysed 
through the lens of the OODA Loop and the use of case study research methodology.  At the 
core of the model is the notion that violence has a strategic purpose and is not senseless.  
As Kydd and Walter (2006) and Abrahms (2008) point out, effective counterstrategies 
cannot be designed without first understanding the strategic logic that drives terrorist 
violence.  Defeating an opponent, argued Boyd (1986), requires analysing and synthesising 
the components that make up the adversary’s strategic intent along a moral-mental-
physical continuum.  Determining the strategic model of terrorism, in which the OODA Loop 
will be applied to test a theory, is significant for underpinning the theoretical basis of this 
thesis.  A strategic model of terrorism can offer an understanding of how the use of home-
grown terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare has evolved and regenerated.  
 
This chapter also evaluates the predominant approaches in the literature used to describe 
the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism; for example, whether it is a leaderless network 
approach or one directed by a command-and-control structure through Salafi-Jihadi 
terrorist organisations such as AQ and ISIS.  The chapter explores the symbolic, religious, 
social, moral and political imperatives implicit within the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  
Understanding the narrative and the symbolism used to inspire are important aspects of 
this thesis because they make up the Orientation of both the terrorist organisation and 
those who are inspired to join it or carry out acts of terrorism on its behalf.  In addition, 
Chapter Three critically analyses the dominant academic theories on the implementation of 
the strategic model as it relates to the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism.  In other 
words, examining how the intent of the strategy is explicitly or implicitly understood and 
actioned by those prepared to plan and/or carry out home-grown terrorism. 
 
Further, this chapter describes the religious, political, social and moral components behind 
Salafi-Jihadism.  As Moussalli (2009) meticulously describes, it is a complex synthesis of 
neo-Salafism, neo-Wahhabism and radical Islamism.  In other words, Salafi-Jihadism 
represents the transformation of different, and at times contradictory, Islamic thought into 
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radical takfiri jihadists, of which AQ is one of the most notorious manifestations.  Similarly, 
ISIS is a further evolution in that manifestation of takfiri jihadists.  In describing the 
components of Salafi-Jihadism, this chapter focuses on how it employs violence in the form 
of home-grown terrorism as: 1) an asymmetric tactic to exploit the West’s moral principles, 
thereby continually shaping the mental images it wants the West to perceive; 2) an 
inspirational driver that transforms consumers of Salafi-Jihadi terrorism into implicitly 
guided, self-perpetuating producers of home-grown terrorism and; 3) as part of its long-
term strategy.  While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an historical account of 
Islam in its entirety, it is necessary to establish the contextual fundamentals of Salafi-
Jihadism in contrast to other forms of Islam.  As Moussalli (2009) argues, Islamism, Salafism, 
Jihadism, Islamic radicalism and Sunni extremism are often used interchangeably by 
commentators, with little understanding that they are different applications of Islam.  It 
would be like assuming that because the Philippines, China, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam 
are in Asia they can be interpreted as a homogeneous group for social and anthropological 
research.  It could be argued that when viewed through the analytical lens of the OODA 
Loop, this chapter forms the Orientation of this thesis and sets the stage for the use of case 
study research methodology that is described in Chapter Four. 
 
3.2 A Strategic Model of Terrorism 
A strategic model, or typology, provides a logical construct for understanding why a 
particular form of behaviour or action is occurring.  One of the most important examples of 
a strategic framework was developed by Ivan Pavlov, following his psycho-physiological 
experiments with his dogs, which focused on the nervous system (Straleu 1997).  When it 
comes to terrorism, a strategic model is considered useful as a rational frame of reference 
from which to conduct empirical and epistemological research.  In their Handbook on 
Terrorism, Marsden and Schmid (2011) explain how the ubiquity of typologies 
demonstrates that robust frameworks capable of encompassing theoretical, empirical, and 
philosophical components can aid knowledge development and generate new paths of 
thinking.  Regardless of the plethora of definitions on terrorism, it does not spontaneously 
arise in a vacuum.  Instead, there is a strategic imperative that drives the use of terrorism as 
a tactic, irrespective of the enemy or target audience - such as a government, an occupying 
power, a dominant social and political hegemony or a support base whose inspiration and 
commitment is required for the terrorist organisation’s on-going survival.   
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In the strategic model of terrorism based on political objectives, terrorist organisations are 
assumed to be rational actors calculating the costs versus the benefits of using terrorism, as 
opposed to other forms of action, to achieve the same political objective.  In other words, a 
rational choice is being made around actions that will maximise utility.  While there may be 
an overriding strategic imperative, the model of terrorism can also contain a sub-set of 
complimentary or parallel objectives.  One of the early contributions to determining a 
strategic model of terrorism was put forward by Thornton (1964), who argued that terrorist 
acts also serve to build morale within the insurgent organisation, to disorient the lives of 
the target population and to advertise the insurgency.  From here, Thornton (1964) 
proposed there were five proximate objectives: morale building, advertising, disorientation 
(of the target population), elimination of opposing forces, and provocation.  In her work on 
the causes of terrorism, Crenshaw (1981) finds additional factors, including weakening the 
government, controlling the population and outbidding.  These additional factors identified 
by Crenshaw (1981) still suggest the deliberate choice of rational actors who have 
calculated the potential impact of their terrorism. 
 
In their opening analysis on the strategic model, Kydd and Walter (2006) state: “Terrorism 
often works.  Extremist organisations AQ, Hamas and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam 
(LTTE) engage in terrorism because it frequently delivers the desired outcomes” (Kydd and 
Walter 2006, p.1).  In their cost signalling model, Kydd and Walter (2006) assume terrorists 
employ one of five strategies:  1) attrition, 2) intimidation, 3) provocation, 4) spoiling, and 
5) outbidding - as originally described by Thornton (1964) and Crenshaw (1981).  Using 
empirical data from between 1980 and 2003, Kydd and Walter (2006) argue half of all 
suicide terrorist campaigns were closely followed by substantial concessions by the target 
governments.  Kydd and Walter (2006) offer examples of success, such as: the US 
withdrawal of soldiers from Lebanon following the 1988 bombing of the US Marines 
Barracks in Beirut; the withdrawal of US forces from Saudi Arabia and drawing the US into a 
war that would mobilise Muslims against the West after the 9/11 terrorist attacks by AQ; 
and the evacuation of Philippine forces from the Second Gulf War (2003-2011) after a 
Filipino truck driver was kidnapped.  While not in their data set, Spain’s withdrawal from its 
participation in the US-led war in Iraq (2003 – 2011) is often mistakenly interpreted as a 
result of the terrorist attack on the Madrid train network on 11 March 2004.   
 
In their analysis of the goals and strategies of successful and unsuccessful terrorist attacks, 
Kydd and Walter (2006) argue terrorist violence is a form of “cost signalling” and in fact has 
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been successful in achieving political objectives.  This typology of terrorism is parallel to the 
game theory of terrorism described by Acre and Sandler (2009) that assumes terrorists and 
Government counterterrorism actions are chosen on the basis of cost minimisation.  
Similarly, Sautter (2010) explores domestic terrorism through a microeconomic model, 
using mathematics to demonstrate the logical calculations terrorist organisations use to 
determine the utility of carrying out an attack.  Both models treat terrorists as rational, 
although Acre and Sandler (2009) make the case that terrorist organisations are operating 
on the basis of procedural rationality rather than assuming they are rational actors.  An 
insightful observation is made by Acre and Sandler (2009), who describe how terrorists may 
choose tactics that hide their capabilities and signal their intent.  This is relevant for 
analysing Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism through the OODA Loop because, 
according to Boyd, a vital aspect of surviving in conflict is to distort the mental image that 
opponents perceive as this may force them to make the wrong strategic and tactical 
decisions.  Western governments must be careful in how they interpret the actions by 
Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations, as they could be a diversion from their real intentions 
and capabilities.   
 
It has also been proposed that the use of suicide attacks is a tactic that exists within a 
broader strategic model of terrorism.  In his analysis of suicide terrorism, Robert Pape 
(2006) used data collated by the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism that includes every 
suicide terrorist attack between 1980 and 2005.  In that period, the Chicago Project 
recorded 315 completed suicide terrorist attacks by 462 suicide bombers.  Rather than 
religion or any other ideology, Pape (2006) argues what almost all suicide terrorist attacks 
since 1980 have in common is a specific, strategic, political objective that seeks to compel a 
democratic state to withdraw combat forces.  As Pape (2006) goes onto say, “terrorists 
almost always seek a withdrawal from territory that they consider to be their homeland or 
which is greatly prized. From Lebanon, the West Bank, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Chechnya, 
every suicide terrorist campaign since 1980 has been waged by terrorist groups whose 
principal goal has been to establish self-determination” (Pape 2006, p.28).  In the case of 
AQ, the overriding objective, as issued in a so called fatwa by its then leader bin Laden in 
1995, was to force the US to withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia.  
 
There also exists contrasting, empirically-ground conclusions as to whether the strategic 
model of terrorism based on political objectives has been successful.  One of the most 
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significant academic contributions to challenging the strategic model was made by Abrahms 
(2008).  In his paper, Abrahms (2008) questions the external validity of the strategic model 
and questions the assumption that, “terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians for 
political gains” (Abrahms, 2008, p.79).  Abrahms (2008 and 2012) argues that the strategic 
model is based on three theoretical assertions: 1) that governments respond to terrorism 
by making concessions to the perpetrators in order to spare their populations additional 
pain; 2) disenfranchised groups turn to terrorism because of its tactical effectiveness in 
forcing government compliance; and 3) terrorism is adopted when the expected political 
pay-off is higher than other possible courses of action.  Abrahms (2008 and 2012) goes on 
to explain that from these assertions, the strategic model assumes that successful 
counterterrorism policy and actions must remove or neutralise the political utility of 
terrorism to be effective.    
 
Abrahms (2012) sets out how the basis of the strategic model comes from the international 
relations of bargaining theory that began with the work of Schelling (1960 and 1966) and 
not with empirical evidence.  Bargaining theory presumes the coercive power of an 
attacking state over another in its resolve to escalate the costs beyond what the defending 
state is prepared to pay instead of complying.  Abrahms (2012) believes the legacy of 
Schelling is that the threat of escalation promotes concessions.  Essentially, the attacker is 
signalling that these threats are not hollow and the attacker is prepared to raise the scale of 
punishment for non-compliance.  Here it is assumed the scale of punishment by a state is 
the threat of war to such a cost that the defender is not prepared to or able to endure. 
 
The weakness in the theoretical foundation of the strategic model is that bargaining theory 
derives from an assumption that one is examining a contest between state actors or 
governments.  Abrahms (2012) explains that the research behind bargaining theory was not 
developed through an examination of a contest between a government and non-state 
actors, such as AQ or other terrorist organisations.  Significantly, Abrahms (2012) points out 
that, “since the September 11 attacks, a series of large-n observational studies has offered 
a firmer empirical basis. These indicate that although terrorism is chillingly successful in 
countless ways, coercing government compliance is not one of them” (Abrahms 2012, p. 
587).  In fact, in the study by Abrahms (2006) examined twenty-eight groups listed as 
Foreign Terrorist Organisations by the US Department of State and found less than ten 
percent achieved their political objectives.  Abrahms (2012) also cites a Jones and Libicki 
(2008) study that investigated the universe of known terrorist groups between 1968 and 
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2006.  Of the 648 groups identified in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database, only 
four percent obtained their strategic demands.  Abrahms (2012) argues that terrorist 
groups only obtain their long-term strategic goals when they abandon violence and 
participate in the political process through dialogue, as did the IRA and the Palestinians.  
These groups may have had more success with achieving short-term material goals such as 
the release of prisoners.   
 
In further research challenging the strategic model of terrorism based on political 
rationalism, for the period of 1982 to 1983 the Rand Corporation (1984) reported a sixty-
two percent rise in the number of civilians killed or injured in terrorist attacks across Europe 
and noted the increased lethality and indiscriminate nature of these attacks.  Despite this 
rise in the tactical effects of terrorism, the Rand Corporation (1984) observed that, 
“modern-day terrorists have not succeeded in attaining their stated long-term goals”.  
Further, the Rand Corporation (1984) research argues that despite these political failures, 
many terrorist groups continue either to maximise their publicity or to engage in violence 
for its own sake with little commitment to an overriding objective.  This is reinforced by 
Schelling (1991), who argues that terrorist organisations never achieve their political 
objectives.  While using organisational theory, Crenshaw (1981) argues terrorism is a 
function of the internal politics of the terrorist organisation rather than an external political 
strategy.  While the Kydd and Walter (2006) research was completed before the end of the 
Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, the use of terrorism by the LTTE failed in securing their political 
objective to secure an independent Tamil state. 
 
In contrast to the strategic model, Abrahms (2008) proposes that individuals become 
involved in terrorist organisations to build closer bonds or relationships with fellow 
terrorists.  In other words, Abrahms (2008) argues for a social model.  This social model has 
also been proposed by Oberschall (2004) and Beck (2008), who describe it as a form of 
collective action.  In his sample of 150 subjects, Sageman (2004) finds that sixty-eight 
percent joined the jihad because of social bonds such as friendship and kinship.  Sageman 
(2004) explains that the social context, in which this adherence to the strict and rigorous 
behavioural code demanded by Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations, makes the bonds even 
stronger within the group.  However, Sageman (2004) also argues that a critical element to 
joining a Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisation is the, “accessibility of a link to the Jihad. 
Without it, the group of friends, kin, pupils, and worshippers will undergo progressive 
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isolation” (Sageman 2004, p.120).  The internet and social media have made the ability to 
find a link to the jihad very easy; also, they help overcome the tyranny of physical distance. 
This does not mean the Crenshaw (1981) strategy of outbidding is defunct or that the 
political and social strategic models are mutually exclusive.  In other words, the social 
model could be a subset of the political model, in that friends and like-minded social 
networks are more likely to join the same cause or group.  As Boyd argued, the OODA loop 
of an individual can operate at the tactical level and within the OODA loop of a larger 
organisation operating at the higher strategic level.  Terrorist organisations require 
followers and supporters; further, they look to create an environment where networks of 
close friends and even family members join.  Terrorist organisations may also be competing 
for members.  This has direct relevance in the current climate, as it could be said that ISIS 
has outbid AQ as the pre-eminent global Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisation.  While terrorist 
organisations have always looked to gain notoriety through the media, ISIS’ synthesis of its 
graphic violence with the instantaneous nature of social media and the 24-hour 
mainstream media cycle, as well as their creation of a jihadi warrior image, has a powerful 
effect on aspiring supporters.  This is relevant when viewed through the OODA Loop for 
two reasons:  firstly, Boyd (1986 and 1987) argued the significance of shaping and 
exploiting the mental images in the minds of followers and enemies; and secondly, the 
OODA Loop challenges the notion of the prevailing strategic models of terrorism because 
they appear to be fixed, closed systems or frameworks. 
 
There are alternatives to both the strategic model and Abrahms’ (2008) model of terrorism 
based on social networks.  For example, Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that terrorism is 
motivated by threatened values or idealised religious doctrine, while Sageman (2004) and 
Bendle (2003) refer to the strains of modernisation in society.  Alternatively, Ayoob (2005) 
considers terrorism partly a consequence of foreign military occupation; while Stern (2003) 
argues broad grievances are important triggers.  However, grievance alone has been widely 
dismissed as a major factor in home-grown terrorism by Sageman (2004) and Horgan 
(2005), who argue many people have grievances but do not become terrorists to kill their 
fellow citizens.   
 
One of the most cited authors in academic literature on terrorism is Rapoport (2001), who 
proposed four waves of modern terrorism.  While Rapoport (2001) does not offer a new 
strategic model, his wave theory could be used to support the political model as it has 
progressed throughout history.  The Rapoport (2001) wave theory of terrorism suggests the 
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first wave of terrorism began with the anarchist movement in the nineteenth century.  The 
second wave was waged by the anti-colonial movement in the 1920s, while the third wave 
began in the 1960s with the socialist-revolutionary movements.  By 1979, Rapoport argues, 
the fourth wave was religion-based and began with the Iranian revolution.  In their 
exploration of grand strategies of terrorism, Cronin and Ludes (2004) also contend the 
events and consequences of the Iranian revolution coincided with the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan (1979 – 1989), significantly influencing this “religious” wave.  
However, in the context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, Rapoport’s (2001) 
wave theory is not an applicable model of terrorism because Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-
grown terrorism is a phenomenon that is more complex than the correlation between 
major international events and terrorist organisations.  The Rapoport (2001) wave theory 
could be used to argue that international events inspire new waves of terrorism, but it is 
not applicable for Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.  Further, as Marsden (2013) 
explains, the Rapoport wave theory neglects whole genres of terrorism, such as right-wing 
terrorism.  She goes on to say, “its high level of abstraction, whilst indicating broad trends, 
is limited in the extent to which it helps us interpret how individual groups rise and fall” 
(Marsden, 2013, p.36).   
 
In the context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, when examined through the 
OODA Loop, this thesis supports Abrahms’ (2008 and 2012) critique of the strategic model 
of terrorism based on political objectives.  One argument in its favour is that a key aspect of 
Salafi-Jihadi terrorism is its powerfully communicative effect on supporters and the ability 
to inspire a mass base of followers, many of whom are friends.  The communications model 
is also another alternative to the predominant strategic model of terrorism.  In fact it 
compliments Abrahms (2008) where he offers a model based on organisational or social 
networks because it is hard to imagine a social network without communication.  The 
challenge for proposing a different model is that the notion of inspiring others and the goal 
of communicating through mass media is considered neither strategic nor material 
according to the predominant strategic models of terrorism.  However, this does not mean 
this thesis completely supports Abrahms’ (2008) social model.  The argument being made 
here is that in order to survive, organisations need to adapt and regenerate.  This means 
not being confined to a strategy that is inflexible to changing circumstances or events, in 
order to create new frameworks.  This may result in the use of increasingly brutal and 
barbaric acts of terrorism for their communicative value or indeed the synthesis of new 
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communications and media technology with violence to continue to inspire others and 
communicate to an audience physically disconnected by the tyranny of distance. 
 
Along with the evidence from the empirical research, another potential argument against 
using the predominant strategic model is that it is a closed or linear argument.  Despite 
being underpinned by bargaining theory, nothing in the academic literature has created a 
rule that confines the strategic model to political objectives.  It does not take into account 
that terrorism is controlled by humans interacting within a dynamic, fluid, disorientating 
and evolving environment.  The same argument could be used to challenge Abrahms’ 
(2008) typology of terrorism, because even the reason for building or sustaining or 
belonging to a social movement or network is too confined and not conducive to the use of 
terrorism by the Salafi-Jihadi movement as a tactic of asymmetric warfare.  Even the 
original reason why a group used terrorism may change over time.  The terrorist 
organisation may have formed to pursue a political objective, but as that failed, the reason 
for being has evolved.  As Moussalli (2009) explains, the war in Afghanistan against the 
Soviet Union brought together all sorts of Islamic groups under the umbrella of jihad.  In 
this environment bin Laden and the now leader of AQ, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were able to 
engineer the beginnings of a new Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisation even after the Soviet 
Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.  For these reasons, this thesis challenges 
Abrahms (2008), the predominant strategic model and the other fixed models.  When 
analysed through the OODA Loop, it is evident that an evolving, adaptive and dynamic 
strategic model is more applicable to the phenomenon of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism.   
 
3.3 The OODA Loop as a General Strategic Model 
 
Given the dynamic, manoeuvring and adaptable nature of terrorism, a more enduring and 
applicable model is the OODA Loop as a general strategic model.  Terrorism is essentially a 
conflict witnessed through the tactical and strategic application of violence and the OODA 
Loop is a general theory of conflict that can be applied at the tactical and strategic level.  In 
his presentation The Strategic Game of ? and ?, Boyd (1987) states: 
What is strategy? A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonising 
and focusing our efforts as a basis for realising some aim or purpose in an 
unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many 
contending interests. (Boyd, 1987, slide 59) 
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This is a strong argument for challenging how the predominant strategic model is confined 
to political objectives.  Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is itself an evolving, 
dynamic phenomenon that adapts to both internal and external contending interests.  The 
very nature of asymmetric warfare requires a mindset that cannot be confined to a 
strategic model that is linear or closed. 
 
As Osinga (2006) explains, good strategic theory does not equate to an ability to provide 
certainty and predictability.  This is perhaps one of the flaws the predominant strategic 
models of terrorism have faced, in that they are seeking certainty, and any deviation from 
certainty is interpreted as a weakness within other strategic theories.  Osinga (2006) 
argues, “even if an underlying pattern is discovered and some level of predictability 
established, the paradoxical nature of strategy guarantees that the pattern will be altered” 
(Osinga, 2006, p.30).  Instead, a sound, relevant and applicable strategic model in the 
context of the current terrorism phenomenon should be evolutionary and able to withstand 
novelty, intense competition and penetration.  It should also avoid being a predictive tool 
or be seen as a mechanical process.  Importantly, and relevant to this research, any 
strategic model of terrorism should be dynamic so as to accommodate what Boyd saw as 
the important interaction between the alternating struggles of the moral, mental and 
physical levels of conflict. 
 
As explained in Chapter Two, in his essay Destruction and Creation, Boyd (1976) took the 
second law of thermodynamics, Heisenberg’s “Uncertainty Principle” and Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem to support the idea that “any inward-oriented and continued 
effort to improve the match-up of concept with observed reality will only increase the 
degree of mismatch” (Boyd 1976, p.6).  Fortunately, Boyd offers a way out of this 
metaphorical clash between closed theoretical frameworks and comprehending 
phenomena that continually move away from that theory.  Boyd explained that the first 
requirement is to shatter the rigid conceptual pattern, or patterns, firmly established in our 
mind.  The second requirement is to find some common qualities, attributes or operations 
to link together isolated facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions and 
observations as possible concepts to represent the real world.  Finally, Boyd argued it is 
necessary to repeat this deconstructing and restructuring until a concept is developed that 
begins to match up with reality.  Boyd (1976) said:  
by doing this in accordance with Gödel, Heisenberg and the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics—we find that the uncertainty and disorder generated by an 
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inward-oriented system to talking to itself can be offset by going outside and 
creating a new system. Simply stated, uncertainty and related disorder can be 
diminished by the direct artifice of creating a higher and broader more general 
concept to represent reality. (p. 6) 
 
It is important to continually be reminded that the OODA Loop is not merely a simple, 
conceptual framework but is comprised of a complex synthesis of scientific, engineering, 
mathematical and biological principles, as well as an epistemological evaluation of strategic 
theories of warfare.  This multi-faceted approach to constructing an adaptable general 
strategic model of terrorism highlights that the prevailing models are too restrictive and 
static, while offering an understanding of why each theory appears equally plausible at any 
one time.  An applicable example of this adaptable, strategic model used by AQ, in its early 
days before the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, is demonstrated in the writings of 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, now AQ’s leader.  In his book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, 
Zawahiri describes his decision, during his time as a leading figure in the Egyptian Islamic 
Group, to shift from attacking the “near enemy” (the governments of Muslim countries in 
the Middle East), when that approach had failed, to attacking the “far enemy”, namely the 
US and other Western countries.  The strategic adaptability and manoeuvrability of AQ’s 
leadership, as evident in Zawahiri’s work, has been translated by Mansfield (2006).  
Sageman (2004) also points to Zawahiri’s work as a clear indication of “this new global 
Salafi-Jihad, where young Mujahedin left their families, country, studies and jobs in search 
for jihad arenas” (Sageman 2004, p.20). 
 
Similarly, this thesis argues that the use of home-grown terrorism is another demonstration 
of the adaptable capacity of AQ within a broader theme of manoeuvre warfare against the 
so-called “far enemy”.  The application of this form of manoeuvre warfare can be tactically 
applied by individuals as well as by groups who are cognitively networked through an 
implicit mindset along the moral, mental and physical continuum of conflict.  Boyd (1986) 
provides this explanation for a moral design of grand strategy: 
 
Use moral leverage to amplify our spirit and strength as well as expose the flaws 
of competing or adversary systems, all the while influencing the uncommitted, 
potential adversaries and current adversaries so that they are drawn toward our 
philosophy and empathetic toward our success; or put another way 
 
Preserve or build-up our moral authority while compromising that of our 
adversaries’ in order to pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversaries’ resolve, 
and attract them as well as others to our cause and way of life. (p.54) 
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For Boyd the aim of a general theory of strategy is to improve the ability to shape and adapt 
to unfolding circumstances, so that individuals (or groups, a culture or a nation) can survive.  
In order for a terrorist organisation to survive, Crenshaw (1988) argues it needs to continue 
to adapt through such means as innovation, surprise and escalation.  As governments 
respond to the terrorists’ tactics, they implement counter-measures, which then force the 
terrorist organisation to shift tactics again.  Crenshaw (1988) explains how terrorist 
organisations are constantly engaged in a process of adaptation to the strategic 
environment.  Similarly, those who are inspired by terrorist organisations may have a 
variety of self-activating factors.  Further, each individual who carries out a terrorist attack 
may not have easily-defined objectives where the rationale between cognitive decisions, 
actions and outcomes are clear to any external observer.  As Boyd (1992) described in A 
Discourse on Winning and Losing, his conceptual spiral represented a general way of 
comprehending, shaping and adapting to the world around us. 
 
Therefore, this thesis will employ the OODA Loop as the adaptable, general strategic model 
to be applied in the analysis of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism as a tactic of 
asymmetric warfare, through the use of case study research methodology.   
 
3.4 Theoretical Approaches to Salafi-Jihadi Inspired Home-grown Terrorism 
 
There has been significant debate around the organisational nature of AQ and its approach 
to implementing terrorism, including home-grown attacks.  In other words, how AQ’s 
organisation is structured and how it provides support or direction to followers.  In the 
context of critically assessing Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, this is an 
important distinction.  However, as with the search for a strategic model of terrorism, the 
various approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive.  The two leading theories are: 1) 
the leaderless jihad, proposed by Sageman (2008), in which it is suggested that AQ central 
does not exist; and, 2) the most prominent theory, argued by Bruce Hoffman (2008), 
proposes the opposite and argues that the AQ leadership continues to be directly relevant 
in planning and implementing terrorist attacks.   
 
However, there is a potential third approach involving the construction of an AQ brand 
through a symbolically powerful and prophetic Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  For example, 
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Kimmage (2008 and 2010) provides an informative analysis of AQ’s branding through its 
media production entity, al-Sahab, in a new media age.  Interestingly, Kimmage (2010) 
raises the conflicting power in jihadi circles between the AQ brand and the brand of bin 
Laden, and points out that the bin Laden brand was arguably more powerful.  Compare this 
to other Salafi-Jihadi groups such as al-Shabab, Boko Haram and even ISIS where little is 
known about the leaders of these groups.  In fact the branding of these groups appears to 
be as synonymous with brutal violence as it is with an Islamic cause, even if they have 
become affiliates of AQ.  In fact, the attempt to expand the AQ brand through a franchise 
approach is examined in Mendelsohn (2011).  Interestingly, Mendelsohn (2011) points out 
that the franchise of AQ in Iraq (AQI) provided AQ a lifeline largely due to AQI’s leader Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, who offered both Iraqi and foreign jihadi fighters the opportunity to 
fight the US military in the heartland of the Middle East.  
 
In his examination of AQ’s unique selling points - a key requirement for a brand - Lia (2008) 
explains AQ’s support is based on three factors: 
 
First, al-Qaida propagates a simple popular message, which resonates strongly 
with deeply held grievances in the Muslim world. The organisation strives to 
follow the popular mood in many respects. Second, al-Qaida has created for 
itself a powerful and captivating image. It has become the world's most feared 
terrorist organisation, which has an immense attraction for certain groups of 
young people. In some countries in Europe, it has become "cool" to be a jihadi. 
Third, the strength of al-Qaida's appeal lies in its global character; unlike most 
terrorist groups of today, membership of al-Qaida is open to virtually everyone, 
irrespective of ethnicity and nationality. As long as one is willing to accept its 
extremist ideology, anyone can, in principle, become an al-Qaida member. (Lia, 
2008, p.3) 
 
This analysis by Lia (2008) describes the core components of a strong brand in the modern 
era.  It has global name recognition, it represents a powerful image and it makes people 
feel good about having a connection to this brand.  This concept of branding and AQ was 
poignantly summarised by Brachman (2008), who described AQ as a movement that 
mastered the art of transforming consumers of its ideas and acts of terrorism into 
producers of them.  It could also be argued that the making and reinforcing of the AQ brand 
was greatly assisted by the so-called global war on terror and the Western media’s 24-hour 
news cycle.  When describing how the internet gave AQ’s leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, the means to build a brand quickly, Greenberg (2005) argued the point of building 
a brand in this way is that it magnified the impact of that violence.   
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In an analysis of the creation of the AQ brand through communications, Archetti (2015) 
uses the Kapferer identity prism to examine the brand identity of AQ.  It could be argued 
that ISIS is now creating a further brand built on graphic violence, power and the physical 
symbolism of a declared Caliphate.  In their critical review of the online AQ magazine, 
Inspire, researchers Lemieux, Brachman, Levitt and Wood (2014) used an Information-
Motivation-Behavioural framework to examine the publication’s impact around what they 
describe as the “social normative support for violence,” as well as its encouragement for 
do-it-yourself style terrorism.  From the work of Lemieux et al (2014), there is a strong case 
for an AQ brand that it not locked into any confined operational paradigm. 
 
One of the most cited critical analyses of the AQ brand is from Feiser (2004), who 
explained: 
 
The key attribute of al-Qaeda's role at the moment and of the future must rely 
on the illusive power of its manufactured symbolism. This characteristic rests on 
the empowerment gained from its Islamic message and the emotional appeal to 
universal brotherhood via the external process of jihad that rests on the success 
of a powerful propaganda campaign. These elements are essential to 
maintaining any true impression of al-Qaeda's global power, both real and 
perceived. (Feiser 2004, p1). 
 
This description makes an important addition to the branding notion of AQ summarised by 
Lia (2008) and that is the idea of emotional appeal to universal brotherhood.  More 
significantly, this building of an enduring, universal brand, as described by Feiser (2004), 
reinforces the arguments made in the previous section on the adaptable strategic model of 
terrorism, instead of a strategic model confined to closed system.  Perhaps one of the most 
important, but least referred to figures, in the creation and adaptation of an AQ brand 
through a paradigm shift in strategy, is Syrian born Abu Mus’ab al-Suri.  Before his arrest in 
November 2005, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri was regarded as one of AQ’s best strategists and most 
effective producers of a global Salafi-Jihadi narrative (Lacey 2008, Cruickshank and Ali 2007; 
Zackie 2013).   
 
The Call to Global Islamic Resistance (GIR), written by al-Suri, is a valuable primary source 
with which to analyse the construction of a powerful message to justify ideological or 
political-based violence.  Abu Mus’ab al-Suri saw the ability for the AQ brand not only to be 
the vanguard of the Salafi-Jihadi global fight against US-led Western constructs, but also to 
appeal to the ordinary person.  As described by Ryan (2013), “Al-Suri summarises three 
dimensions to the call to Jihad that he is proposing in the post-Desert Storm era, in which 
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he sees the entire world as against the Salafi-Jihadist current.  The call is designed to appeal 
to the ordinary people and not the extremists” (Ryan 2013, p.209).  Perhaps even more 
significantly, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri envisioned a new strategic model based on a military or 
warfare strategy and not a model based on political objectives that he recognised were 
easily defeated by the West.   
 
In their analysis of Abu Masab Al-Suri (real name Mustafa Setmariam Nasar), considered 
the architect of the new al Qaeda, Cruickshank and Hage Ali (2007), explain how, “the loss 
of its training camps in Afghanistan and the killing or capture of much of its pre-9/11 senior 
leadership meant that if Al Qaeda was to continue to be relevant it had to switch toward 
inspiring and steering jihadist groups…” (Cruickshank & Hage Ali, 2007, p.2).  The OODA 
loop can be used to explain how as a Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisation, al Qaeda 
transformed its approach through an adaptable, regenerative strategic process.  Following 
study of al-Suri’s lectures and teachings on strategy obtained from his published videos, 
Cruickshank and Hage Ali (2007), explain that al-Suri’s strategic concept was based in 
“individual terrorism”.  Cruickshank & Hage Ali (2007) quote al-Suri who said: 
 
“We ask the Muslim youth to be a terrorist. Why do we ask for such 
individual terrorism? First because secret hierarchical organizations failed 
to attract Muslims. The youth fear joining such an organization because if 
there is a mistake then the authorities will reach them. Second because we 
need to give the youth the chance to play a role without being part of an 
organization. Some youth don’t want to join an organization and don’t 
know how to act on their beliefs. Third due to pressure from the Jews, 
Crusaders and lapsed Muslim regimes.”(cited in Cruickshank & Hage Ali 
2007, p. 8). 
 
In effect through this adaptable strategy to broaden the base, AQ brand became more 
enduring and able to withstand setbacks through the use of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative and 
symbolism, not via a rigid strategic framework but through an adaptable model of terrorism 
that could be regenerated in the minds of inspired followers.  This alternative, theoretical 
approach to describe the functional paradigm of AQ is one that is adaptable to a 
dynamically competitive environment, continually manoeuvring within Western moral, 
mental and physical boundaries that are treated as asymmetric weaknesses.  This is a core 
theme throughout this thesis and important for critically analysing the use of Salafi-Jihadi 
inspired home-grown terrorism. The strategic impact of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri is a shift to a 
global military strategy implemented through the grassroots, or what Sageman (2008) calls 
a leaderless network. 
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3.5 AQ - Leaderless Network or Top-Down Direction?  
 
One of the dominant, contemporary, operational approaches to describing how AQ 
implements its terrorism against the far enemy is offered by Sageman (2008), who argues 
that AQ has evolved into a leaderless jihad.  In other words, AQ has transformed into a 
decentralised network or social movement of self-perpetuating individuals or small groups.  
In his empirical analysis of Salafi-Jihadi and Islamic-based terror networks, Sageman (2008) 
describes how they often form organically through friendship and family relationships, as 
opposed to a “top down”, heavily controlled structure.  This is congruous to Abrahms’ 
(2008) social or organisational strategic model of terrorism.   
 
In his analysis of the personal backgrounds of those who linked up with like-minded 
followers of AQ and the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, Sageman argues it is inaccurate to refer to 
‘‘AQ strategy, tactics, leadership, membership, recruitment and ‘divisions of labor’ 
(operators, communicators, financiers, supporters, logisticians)’’ (Sageman 2008, p. 31).  
This analytical assumption is shared by Atran (2010) who argues that there is “no AQ 
central” or hierarchical, command-and-control structure.  In his field-based case study 
analysis, Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists, Atran 
(2010) cites investigations following the suicide bombings in Bali (12 October 2002), Madrid 
(11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005), as well as Canadian Police surveillance of the so-
called “bunch of guys” Millennium bomb plotters, suggest an unstructured arrangement of 
like-minded individuals, and weak and distant relationships with al-Qaeda.  Sageman (2008) 
describes those who become involved in the AQ Salafi-Jihadi “movement” (note the use of 
the term “movement” by Sageman as any way to describe AQ) as informal groups of 
“wannabes”.  This leaderless jihad concept has been made seamless because of the 
internet, where these physically disconnected individuals and groups can connect through 
social media and virtual chat rooms.  However, in a T E Lawrence and Boyd-like observation, 
Archetti (2015) argues that “it is always humans (governments, citizens and extremists 
among them) who use technology as a tool to advance their own goals and that audiences, 
as already indicted, actively select and embrace – rather than merely absorb – messages 
they are interested in” (Archetti 2015, p.50).  It also allows AQ’s publicity to be freely and 
virally distributed and shared.   
 
A number of studies have since sought to substantiate this theoretical notion regarding the 
leaderless jihad organisational and operational approach.  For example, in his paper on 
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understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad, Bousquet (2012) uses 
complexity theory to test the Sageman (2008) construct.  Bousquet (2012) describes how 
terrorist networks are best understood as complex, adaptive systems that self-organise in a 
decentralised fashion.  The recognition of the adaptive, complex and evolving nature of the 
jihadist movement reinforces the applicability of the OODA Loop and its fundamental 
premise of strategy and adaptation.  Further, Bousquet (2012) identifies a system of 
“distributed intelligence” allowing networks to pursue terrorist attacks on the basis of 
partial localised information.  As discussed, Boyd argued that the significance of the 
German command-and-control paradigm during the World War II emphasised a 
decentralised execution.  This allowed for varying patterns, speed, and methods of 
achieving the overall objective, or schwerpunkt, implemented through an implicit 
understanding.   
 
The concept of schwerpunkt is very similar to how Bousquet (2012) described the way 
these seemingly isolated jihadist terrorist cells operated.  Further, it reinforces the 
significance of the Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s military strategy of a loose network of Salafi-
Jihadists involved in a perpetual global war to defend Islam.  Anyone can become a Salafi-
Jihadist and participate.  For example, a relevant phenomenon that demonstrates this in 
action and reinforces the Sageman leaderless jihad theory is that of foreign fighters.  
Sageman (2008) explains how the foreign fighters, who at that time were travelling to Iraq 
to fight against the US-led Coalition, are part of the AQ social movement.  Whether 
conducting jihad at home or becoming a foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq or Mali or Somalia, 
it is all self-initiated. 
 
The decentralised, leaderless conceptual framework argued by Sageman has been strongly 
countered by the likes of Bruce Hoffman (2008 and 2011), who insists that AQ is a top-
down, command-and-control network.  In “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama 
Bin Laden Still Matters”, published in Foreign Affairs, Hoffman (2008) provides a strong 
critique of Sageman’s leaderless jihad concept.  Hoffman (2008) states that at the time 
(note: that was before the death of bin Laden in May 2011), the evidence accumulated 
points to AQ’s and bin Laden’s oversight of the most consequential terrorist attacks.  In a 
further critique of Sageman’s theory, Hoffman (2011) extends his alternative view by 
presenting a number of examples from the evidence gathered by the US Special Forces unit 
that carried out the raid that killed bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan.  As Hoffman (2011) 
points out, analysis by US intelligence of bin Laden’s personal diary concluded that he was 
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involved “in every recent AQ threat”.  Hoffman (2011) goes on to say bin Laden remained 
involved in planning future attacks and urged his followers to recruit non-Muslims and 
minorities – especially African Americans and Latinos - for attacks on New York City and Los 
Angeles, as well as smaller cities.     
 
Another example Hoffman (2011) uses to challenge the leaderless jihad theory was a plot 
discovered by the FBI and NYPD in September 2009, to stage simultaneous suicide attacks 
on the New York City subway system to coincide with the eighth anniversary of the 9/11 
attacks.  The ring-leader was Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan-born Green Card holder who lived 
in the New York suburb of Queens.  He and his two fellow conspirators had been trained in 
bomb-making at an AQ camp in Pakistan.  Senior AQ commanders had overseen and 
directed the operation, which was linked to another set of attacks planned for April 2009 in 
Manchester, England.  The US Department of Justice’s indictment of Zazi and the two 
others, filed on 7 July 2010, unambiguously describes how this “American-based al-Qaeda 
cell” was commanded by “leaders of al-Qaeda’s external operations program dedicated to 
terrorist attacks in the United States and other Western countries” (Hoffman, 2011, p. 1). It 
further describes how three longstanding senior AQ operatives - Saleh al-Somali, who is 
said to have participated in attacks on US and coalition peacekeeping military forces in 
Somalia during 1993; Adnan El Shukrijumah, who in 2003 was placed on the FBI’s “Most 
Wanted” list as a result of his growing role in al-Qaeda attack planning; and Rashid Rauf, 
who played a key role in two December 2003 assassination attempts on the then Pakistani 
President Pervez Musharraf - oversaw the plot.  
 
To understand the mindset of those who join home-grown terrorism networks, Kohlmann 
(2008) argues that these networks do not emerge merely as the result of coincidence or 
happenstance but, rather, with the active support and endorsement of particular high-
ranking AQ spokesmen and military commanders.  As Maliach (2010) explains, together 
with the late Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden formed Mujahideen (Maktab Khadamat al-
Mujahideen, or MAK) as a unifying vehicle to lead the jihad or “struggle in the defence of 
Islam” against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  Maliach 
(2010) explains that it was Azzam who organized the arrival, training of, and deployment to 
the battlefield of Muslim volunteers who came to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, with bin 
Laden working by his side.  After Azzam’s death in 1989, bin Laden took control and a more 
traditional structure followed, with various deputies and senior members such as al-
Zawahiri, Dr Fashl el-Masry, Abu Ubadiah al-Banshiri, Muhammad Atef, Jamal Ahmed al-
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Fadl, Abu Faraj al-Yemeni, Abu Musab al-Saudi and Abu Burhan.  In other words, there was 
a distinct command and leadership organisational structure.  The terrorist attacks on the US 
African embassies in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000, as well as the attack on the United 
States on 9/11 were organised, planned, funded and implemented involving the direct 
command-and-control from AQ’s central leadership.   
 
There are a number of cases examined in the literature where clear direction has been 
given by either AQ or its affiliated networks.  For example, in his analysis of home-grown 
terrorism in Australia, Mullins (2011) examined AQ and its affiliated networks, including 
Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Shabaab.  Mullins (2011) explores the 
role of the Salafi-Jihadi leadership on inspiring home-grown terrorism in Australia.  The 
sample used by Mullins (2011) included sixteen publicised cases of suspected Islamist 
terrorist activity involving thirty-six Australians.  Mullins (2011) finds that more than half 
(55 percent) of those individuals are alleged to have trained with, been part of or at least 
been in communications with foreign organised terrorists.  Further, 88 percent of 
Australian cases included members with foreign organisational affiliation.  Even though the 
Mullins (2011) work is five years old and does not take into account the foreign-fighter 
phenomenon, it does assist in explaining that the associations or links with foreign 
terrorists appear to be based on encouragement and limited facilitation rather than 
substantial control.  The Mullins study found that Jack Roche, the Ayub twins, David Hicks, 
Jack Thomas, Willie Brigitte, Izhar Ul-Haque and Faheem Lodhi received quite high levels of 
support from foreign Islamic terrorist organisations.  This does not categorically refute the 
idea that home-grown terrorists can be autonomous and conduct their own leaderless 
jihad, instead it shows how the foreign terrorist organisations, including AQ, adapted and 
manoeuvred in form and outreach.   
 
A critique of Sageman’s leaderless jihad theory is that he never acknowledges that it was in 
fact Abu Mus’ab al-Suri who originally advocated this strategic shift.  In other words, a 
member of AQ’s leadership circle developed this concept.  This potentially challenges the 
Sageman position because the idea of shaping the environment to cultivate and inspire a 
leaderless jihad appears to have been a strategy developed from the leaders of AQ.  It is 
precisely what this chapter refers to when analysing the limitations of the various closed 
systems of terrorism models.  The shift by AQ demonstrates the capacity for both tactical 
and strategic OODA loops to be operating simultaneously through the use of asymmetric 
warfare in a global conflict.  The fact that Abu Mus’ab al-Suri recognised the need to 
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destroy existing paradigms within AQ and create novel approaches illustrates the 
adaptability of AQ.  This thesis will attempt to argue that the OODA Loop offers a different 
frame of reference from which to examine and explore both the leaderless and the 
command-and-control involvement of AQ in the application of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-
grown terrorism. 
 
While examining the predominant strategic models of terrorism through the OODA Loop, 
closed systems of analysis appear to be at risk of being redundant at the moment of their 
conclusion.  In A Discourse on Winning and Losing, Boyd (1992) said that while we can 
comprehend and predict some portions of the ever-changing world that unfolds before us, 
other portions seem forever indistinct and unpredictable.  That may explain why, to 
Hoffman (2011), the leaderless jihad appears inconclusive.  Similarly, in her evaluation of 
how AQ created its ideology, Hellmrich (2008) criticises many of the predominant 
paradigms for being “outside-in” perspectives on the underlying logic of AQ.  According to 
Hellmrich (2008), the risk of such conduct is that one ends up with a misrepresentation of 
the very issue he or she seeks to comprehend.  Both theoretical propositions also neglect 
the premise that to continue to survive, organisations need to create novelty.  Boyd (1992) 
described how “novelty is produced by a mental and physical feedback process of analysis 
and synthesis that permits us to interact with the world so that we can comprehend, cope 
with and shape that world as well as be shaped by it” (Boyd 1992, p.24).  This argument 
could be applied to AQ in its attempt to create a novel approach to how it functions.  In 
other words, the leaderless jihad and the AQ central command-and-control theory could be 
equally applicable in different contexts and times.   
 
3.6 The Strategically Adaptable AQ Brand 
 
This thesis proposes a paradigm shift in describing the organisational and operational 
manoeuvring of AQ to become the dominant, strategically adaptable brand of the Salafi-
Jihadi movement.  As the work of al Suri demonstrates, the descriptions offered by 
Sageman or Hoffman are not exclusively unequivocal propositions.  They can both exist in 
parallel, shaped and re-shaped by their effect on the world depending on the context and 
time.  For Boyd, the goal of human nature is to survive on our own terms or improve our 
capacity for independent action, while at the same time denying our adversaries the 
capacity to survive on their own terms.  To achieve this it is necessary to employ a variety of 
responses.  The need to shape and adapt to change cannot be passive; instead one must 
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take the initiative.  Variety, rapidity, harmony and initiative are qualities that permit one to 
shape and adapt to an ever-changing environment.  As the vanguard of the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement, AQ have shaped and empowered the minds of individuals, just as T E Lawrence 
and Boyd emphasised as important in an asymmetric conflict.  
 
The decision for individuals to become involved in home-grown terrorism is then a 
reflection of the power of the AQ narrative and brand to be personalised by individuals in 
their local context; as described by Braniff and Moghadam (2011), AQ “enables the violence 
of others”.  It is a powerful brand because of its regenerative capacity; that is, the story is 
re-written by individuals who personalise the narrative from their own situations.  For 
example, the majority of foreign fighters who were born and raised in Western countries or 
young Muslim males living in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada or the US have never 
suffered in Gaza or been targeted by the Syrian regime.  However, AQ and the ISIS narrative 
appeal to them because it resonates with their identity and personal circumstances.  The 
brand and what it stands for is localised, personalised and becomes their identity.  An 
illustration of this can be found in the blog, 'From Melbourne to Ramadi: My Journey' by the 
Australian teenager Jake Bilardi, who carried out a suicide attack on behalf of ISIS in March 
2015.  For example,  
 
My Atheist secularist views led me to support the aspirations of the Palestinian 
state and blinded me from realising what the true problem was, not Israel, nor 
Israelis but the religious ideology that governed them. I began to support the 
violent resistance in the Gaza Strip… AND 
  
I could wrap this up very shortly but I want to divert away from my interest in 
violent Islamic movements for a minute to explain how I developed a wider 
world view and how I transitioned from being a reluctant-supporter of Islamic 
militant groups in different lands to become certain that violent global revolution 
was the answer to the world’s ills. (Jake Bilardi Blog January 13, 2015, From 
Melbourne to Ramadi: My Journey) 
 
Using single case-study research methodology, Moghadam (2013) examines the role played 
by middle- or lower-ranking operatives in AQ’s innovation process.  The Moghadam (2013) 
research focused on the planning of the 9/11 attacks, which is before any US-led attack on 
AQ training camps in Afghanistan or drone attacks in Pakistan or Yemen.  Moghadam 
(2013) finds that the 9/11 attacks involved a combination of high-ranking, lower order and 
who Moghadam describes as independent terrorist entrepreneurs.  Moghadam (2013) 
concludes that the findings suggest that the conventional wisdom of the predominance of 
top-down innovation in terrorism is dependent on a problematic assumption, namely that 
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terrorist groups are centralised, hierarchical and localised entities.  As more terrorist groups 
adopt decentralised structures, they are increasingly likely to display multi-directional 
processes of innovation.  This conclusion by Moghadam (2013) is more relevant to 
reinforcing the adaptable model, dependent on the context and events at the time, as 
described through the OODA Loop. 
 
Evidence of both leaderless jihad and direct AQ involvement can be found in a case 
involving the conviction of Irfan Naseer, Irfan Khalid and Ashik Ali who were convicted in 
2013 in Birmingham, UK for planning to conduct a suicide bombing campaign across Great 
Britain (Laville, 2013, February 22).  This case also gives weight to the strengthening of the 
AQ brand.  Investigations by West Midlands Police determined that two districts in the City 
of Birmingham were key localities of AQ activity propagated by the preaching of the late 
Anwar al-Awlaki through the Inspire magazine – the publication produced by AQ in the 
Arabian Peninsula, which is available online.  Al-Awlaki was the US-born leader of AQ in the 
Arabian Peninsula until he was killed by a US drone strike in September 2011.  In their 
examination of the Inspire magazine, Lemieux et al (2014) describe its radicalising and 
mobilising force: 
 
With its slick production values and graphics, Inspire is characterized by a 
streamlined and seamless fusion of ideologically driven material with pragmatic 
instructional and skill-building content. Taken together, these elements are 
intended simultaneously to increase motivation and lower the barriers of entry to 
terrorism, with the aim of fostering a do-it-yourself ethos resulting in terrorist 
behaviors. (Lemieux et al 2014, p.355) 
 
Not only did Naseer and Khalid receive training in a Pakistan-based AQ terrorist camp but 
they were instructed to return home and train others because it was getting too dangerous 
to stay in Pakistan.  At the same time Shinkman (2013) reported in a US News article that 
evidence collected by wiretaps from the Birmingham trio revealed AQ’s new strategy of 
training aspiring terrorists to train others at home, a do-it-yourself form of terrorism.   
 
What the Birmingham case demonstrates is the ability of AQ to shift from being actively 
involved to shaping and nurturing self-perpetuating home-grown terrorists, as and when 
the broader strategic environment changed.  This notion has been reinforced by research 
completed by the Henry Jackson Society, entitled Al-Qaeda in the United States: A Complete 
Analysis of Terrorism Offenses, published in February 2013, and in their Islamist Terrorism: 
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The British Connections research, published in 2011.  Both documents present 
comprehensive overviews of the US’s and the UK’s links to Islamism-inspired terrorism 
worldwide.  The authors of the US study, Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer (2013), provide 
profiles, statistical breakdown and analysis of 171 cases in the US from 1997-2011.  Data 
from Simcox and Dyer (2013) showed 38 percent of individuals were linked to AQ or an AQ-
affiliated group such as LeT or al Shabbab.  This followed a similar 2010 study by the Henry 
Jackson Society, where Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart and Houryia Ahmed profile 140 
Islamism-inspired terrorist convictions and attacks in the UK, from 1999 – 2010.  Both sets 
of data showed a roughly even distribution in the relationship between individuals 
preparing to carry out a terrorist attack in the US or the UK, and links or no links with AQ, 
even after the death of bin Laden. 
 
This thesis does not reject the leaderless jihad theory or the proposition that AQ central 
remains in control.  When viewed through the strategic, adaptable model of the OODA 
Loop, they are not mutually exclusive.  Instead it is an applicable example of adaptation by 
AQ.  However, Sageman (2008), Atran (2010) and Hoffman (2008) have confined their 
structural and operational paradigms too rigidly.  Alternatively, the leaderless jihad could 
be a product of AQ’s capacity to adapt and regenerate in the face of counter terrorism 
strategies.  It could also be a product of the AQ brand built along the Boyd notion of the 
moral-mental-physical continuum of conflict.  As demonstrated through the works of 
Abdullah Azzam, Zawahiri, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Al-Awlaki, AQ has shaped its brand 
through the Salafi-Jihadi narrative by arranging and inspiring the minds of followers 
through stories, images, fantasies and prophetic messages delivered across a global 
network.  As General Stanley McChrystal (2013), former Commander of US-NATO Forces in 
Afghanistan, argued, AQ represents three things in one: an organisation, an idea and a 
brand.   
 
It could be argued that bin Laden began shaping the Salafi-Jihadi narrative through the 
brand of AQ as early as 1998.  In February 1998, bin Laden published a so called fatwa, 
publicly declaring that it was God’s decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill 
any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world, because of American occupation 
of Islam’s holy places and aggression against Muslims.  In the minds of disenfranchised 
impressionable young Muslims or new converts to Islam living in Australia, the US or the UK 
this could be interpreted as direction to participate in, to plan and to implement acts of 
terrorism in their Western country of residence.  As mentioned earlier, the call by Abu 
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Hamza al-Masri (Kohlmann, 2008) to resist and to learn terrorism skills in one’s own 
backyard was used as an example of AQ recognising its OODA loop had been penetrated, 
and therefore it had to adapt.  It also offers another example of an attempt to strengthen 
the globalised brand, to inspire followers to be their own interpretation of AQ.  However, it 
is difficult to determine whether Hamza al-Masri is merely actively promoting the strategy 
of Zawahiri (2001), as expressed in the Knights of the Prophet’s Banner, or taking his own 
initiative.   
 
Before he was killed in mid-2003, al-Alyiri, one of the most trusted AQ operatives, became a 
key communicator to radicalised Muslims around the world (Kohlmann 2008).  In 2003 al-
Alyiri said, “the war is based on a strategy to widen the battlefield.  The entire world has 
become a battlefield and not in theory” (al-Alyiri 2003a).  A relevant example to reinforce 
that idea that the world has become a battlefield can be found in Storm (2014), as he 
describes his journey from being a Salafi-Jihadi convert to becoming a spy for MI5 and the 
CIA. Storm attended many lectures by the then UK-based Salafi-Jihadi preacher Omar Bakri 
Mohammed, where he recognised that to many who attended Bakri Mohammed’s lectures, 
“the enemy was everywhere, in uniform and out of uniform, in Baghdad and Birmingham” 
(Storm, 2014, p.76).  Following the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London transport system, 
even Storm (2014) asks himself, “We had all talked about jihad; we had cheered on our 
brothers in Iraq. Now it was on our doorstep. Was England the next frontline in this war of 
religions” (Storm, 2014, p.85). 
 
While the example by Kohlmann (2008) further supports the argument being made in this 
thesis for the OODA Loop as a broad strategic model or a new lens through which to 
examine the phenomenon of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, first it is 
important to evaluate the narrative of Salafi-Jihadism that has been exploited and shaped 
by AQ. 
 
3.7 Salafi-Jihadism and the Prophetic Brand of AQ  
 
The following section examines and explores the significance of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative 
created and exploited by AQ.  Through a powerful prophetic brand and symbolic language, 
AQ has shaped the mental images of followers and enemies.  For example, the term jihad 
has been virtually monopolised by AQ and along with terrorism provides the basis for a 
mainstream, generalised mental image of Islam.  An understanding of jihad, and other 
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important Islamic concepts, is important for analysing the tactical use of the AQ brand for 
its inspirational effect on home-grown terrorism and for luring Western governments into 
numerous cultural, social, community and military ambushes as a result of the reaction to 
both AQ’s actions and the actions of home-grown terrorists.  These actions by Western 
governments in turn reinforce the AQ narrative, effectively penetrating the Western 
government’s OODA loop.  This section will draw largely from one of the most 
comprehensive discussions on defining the complexities within Islamic theology, produced 
by Moussalli (2009).  The contribution by Moussalli is relevant to this thesis because it 
provides a contextual understanding for being able to evaluate how AQ has shaped the 
Salafi-Jihadi narrative to inspire home-grown terrorists.  As Archetti (2015) argues, the 
terrorist action is the outcome of an identity and a corresponding narrative that legitimises 
violent action. 
 
Violence can be used for its communicative value when justified through a prophetic 
narrative to effect the reinforcement of a powerful identity.  As Brachman (2008) explains, 
it was AQ that crafted a symbiotic relationship between graphic violence and the use of the 
media to publicise and magnify their movement around the world.  This was especially the 
case with AQ in Iraq.  Given the apparent brand competition between new and evolving 
Salafi-Jihadi groups, such as ISIS, the graphic nature of that violence in the bid for followers 
increases the threat against Western interests, both domestic and foreign.  A 5 February 
2015 Time magazine article reports how two of the terrorists involved in the attack on the 
offices of Charlie Hebdo (a French satirical magazine) in Paris had separately pledged 
allegiance to AQ and ISIS.  This presents potential long-term challenges for neutralising an 
outbidding contest that competitively manoeuvres for the hearts and minds of Western-
based Muslim youth and converts to radical Islam.  However, first it is important to discuss 
some of the Islamic concepts that have been assimilated and manipulated by AQ and its 
brand managers.  
 
The work by Moussalli (2009) provides a clear understanding of the complex discourses 
that are generally placed under one belief system, variously termed Islamism, radical Islam, 
militant Islamism, fundamental Islam, Salafism and/or Wahabbism.  Although, Lauziere 
(2016), offers a comprehensive examination of how the meaning of Salafism has been 
expanded by self-proclaimed Salafis to make it easily confusing.  This thesis is focused on 
Salafi-Jihadism and Mousalli (2009) demonstrates how this is defined.  As he explains, 
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Salafism is a diversified and complicated ideology and a religiously-motivated trend that is 
not constructed by one unified discourse or group or authority; and: 
 
As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are Wahhabis.  Islamism is 
also another complex trend that includes moderate and radical movements, but it 
is not equivalent to Wahhabism: it is actually its antithesis.  While Islamism and 
Wahhabism/salafism share a few theological and intellectual doctrines, they are 
theologically and politically very different.  However, after September 11, 2001 
and the invasion of Iraq, some Wahhabis and salafists merged together with 
radical Islamists and consequently have created neo-salafism and takfiri-jihadism 
(p.3)  
 
First theologised and driven by Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703 – 1792), Wahhabis 
are differentiated from orthodox Sunnis by calling themselves “salafists”, on the 
assumption that they follow the Prophets’ Companions (sahaba), the Companions’ 
followers (tabi‘in), and the followers’ followers (tabi‘i al-tabi‘in).  Heavily influenced by the 
Islamic medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Wahhabism rejects traditional practices 
such as visiting tombs and shrines, labelling them as shirk (polytheism) and bida 
(innovations) and promoting excommunication for Muslims who stray from what 
Wahhabism believes is pure Islamic behaviour. Through a familiar reasoning to many of 
modern-day Salafi-Jihadists, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab perceived at the time that a 
crisis existed in Islam and this required a “fundamentalist return to the Quran and sunnah.” 
(Armstrong, 2000, 114).  As Armstrong (2000) explains Abd-Wahhab tried to create “an 
enclave of pure faith, based on his view of the first ummah of the seventh century,” 
(Armstrong, 2000, p.114).  In addition, Abd al-Wahhab labelled all Shia as unbelievers for 
their kufr, or unbelief, in contrast to Wahhabism’s drive to restore what he believed was 
the real meaning of tawhid.  As Moussalli (2009) explains, through a series of attacking 
moves by Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman in 1902 (founder of Saudi Arabia), Wahhabism 
resurfaced and by 1929 was turned into a state institution in the Arabian Peninsula.  In a 
similar symbolic act on 28 June 2014, through its spokesperson Abu Mohammed Al Adnani, 
ISIS declared the establishment of a Caliphate between Syria and Iraq, (Bradley, 2014, June 
29 and ABC News, 2014, July 2).    
 
Alternatively, Salafism, or those who follow the concept of al-salaf al-salih (the pious 
predecessors), is an alternative theological model (Stanley 2005 and Moussalli 2009).  In 
general, Salafism is centred on transforming individuals and communities to the pure Islam 
of the Prophet Muhammad and the prophetic sunna, as understood and practiced by al-
salaf al-salih.  Salafists believe they are the true practitioners of Islam and that neglecting 
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‘the purist’ interpretation of Islam, or that of al-salaf al-salih, is tantamount to neglecting 
Islam itself or kufr.  Even other Muslims are labelled non-believers if they engage in certain 
ways of life of or are distracted by infidels, including participation in democracy.  A total 
rejection of democracy is another distinction between Salafists and mainstream forms of 
political Islam.  For example, as Islamic historian Majid Khadduri explains, “in conformity 
with its public order, political justice in Islam, indeed – all other aspects of justice, proceeds 
from God,” (Khadduri, 1984, p.14).  In addition, as Wiktorowicz (2006) describes, Salafists 
are united by a common religious creed.  In summarising the positions of Khadduri (1984), 
Wiktorowicz (2006) and Moussalli (2009) it could be concluded that they explain the salafi 
creed centres on a unilateral definition of tawhid (the oneness of God) and the total 
rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire.  This could partly explain the 
challenge faced by Western governments when implementing secular frameworks to 
counter the AQ brand that builds the commitment of this creed through a global campaign 
of violence.  
 
Salafists are not known to use violence against non-believers or use violence as an 
inspirational tool between Muslims to promote revolutionary activism.  However, loyalty to 
the Prophet Muhammad, al-wala’, and hostility towards heresy and unbelief, al-bara, are 
important tests of whether followers of Islam are true Muslims.  Salafists also proclaim the 
need to remove themselves from mainstream society so as to avoid the corrupting 
influences of innovations and to live in accordance with the example of al-salaf al-salih.  
Moussalli (2009) explains that all religious, political, intellectual and social doctrinal 
conflicts have resulted from failure to follow the method of al-salaf al-salih. As noted 
earlier in this section, in his discourse on the making of Salafism, Lauziere (2016), describes 
how confusion has often accompanied the definition of Salafism, particularly in more 
modern times.  Lauziere (2006), explains how traditional religious scholars such as Yusuf al-
Dijwi argued listed, “Salafi’s [Salafiyyin], along with “reformers [muslihin]”, “renewers 
[mujaddidin]”, and “proponents of ijtihad [mujtahdin]”, (Lauziere, 2016 p. 93)   As Lauziere 
(2016) points out, confusion over who could be a Salafi was partly the fault of self-
proclaimed Salafis who the more they sought broaden the meaning of Salafi, the more 
confusion they created.   
 
Importantly for this thesis, it is the Salafi-Jihadists, or neo-Salafi-Jihadists, such as AQ, who 
promote and agitate for violence against non-believers and infidels, not only to counter the 
corrupting effect on a pure form of Islam from external influences but also to reinstate a 
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global Caliphate.  It appears ISIS has gone further and uses extreme graphic violence as the 
only interpretation of jihad to inspire and promote its brand of Salafi-Jihadism.  However, 
this may be what ISIS wants its followers and enemies to believe (manipulating their mental 
image as Boyd would have described) and begs the question whether the current terrorist 
phenomenon is merely about strategic power and control.   
 
In regards to interpretations of jihad and its role in Islamic society, mainstream media and 
commentary on Islam tends to only equate this term with terrorism (Moussalli 2009; 
Antúnez and Tellidis 2013).  Similarly, Ghazi bin Muhammad, Ibrahim Kalin and Mohammad 
Hasim Kamali (2013) explain that the translation of Jihad, “in the Western media as ‘holy 
war’ would in Arabic be equivalent to al-harb al-muqaddasah, which is totally unfamiliar 
and unknown to Arabic speakers.” (Ghazi bin Muhammad et al, 2013, p. XII).  As 
Hegghammer (2010) explains, “most works on militant Islamism use generic terms such as 
“jihadists” or “salafi-jihadists” to describe any transnational violent Islamist” (Hegghammer 
2010, p.58).  It is as if a homogenisation of Islam has been constructed without 
comprehension of the complexities and diversities across the lexicon of Islamic theology.  
As Dayem and Ayub (2008) argue,  
 
This has allowed individuals and groups to manipulate the concept for temporal 
ends. Bin Laden's perversion of Islamic theology and specifically of Islam's 
conceptions of war and peace are not new; several others have improperly 
invoked 'holy war' or 'armed jihad.' Such improper invocations coupled with 
Western misconceptions about Arabia that predate Islam itself,' have 
contributed to an image of a violent and intolerant tradition. (Dayem and Ayub 
2008, p.69) 
 
In order to isolate the elements of Islamic thought that are shaped and exploited to release 
triggers for violence, it is important to have an understanding of which school of thought 
and strain of belief system is at the centre of AQ’s interpretation of jihad.  For example, 
Antúnez and Tellidis (2013) explain al-Qaeda has based and justified its confrontation 
model on a partial and extremist interpretation of jihad (also Bergen 2001).  While it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full historical and epistemological examination 
of jihad, it is a central concept in Islam for all Muslims, where AQ has created a monopoly 
over its meaning and implementation.  An examination of jihad by Dayem and Ayub (2008) 
finds that its original Arabic meaning from the Arabic noun jihad is a derivative of the root j-
h-d,II, literally translated as "to exert oneself," "to struggle" or "to make an effort" (Dayem 
and Ayub 2008, p.71).  In his early work on jihad, Peters (1979 and 1996) describes jihad to 
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mean striving towards a religiously commendable aim.  Further, Dayem and Ayub (2008) go 
onto explain that, “the Qur'an explicitly distinguishes between the notions of war (harb), 
fighting (or more accurately, battling with the intent to kill) (qital) and exerting oneself (in 
the path of God) (jihad), while contemporary discourse on Islam and war has often 
conflated these three” (Dayem and Ayub 2008, p. 72).  Similarly, Streusand (1997) explains, 
A hadith defines this understanding of the term. It recounts how Muhammad, 
after a battle, said, "We have returned from the lesser jihad (al-jihad al-asghar) 
to the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar)." When asked, "What is the greater 
jihad?" he replied, "It is the struggle against oneself."  Although this hadith does 
not appear in any of the authoritative collections, it has had enormous 
influence in Islamic mysticism (Sufism).  (Streusand 1997, p.11) 
 
Even though Wahhabism, Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism are divergent strands of Islam, they 
still share a symbolic language drawn from the same texts.  The concept of jihad is one of 
many examples.  As Stanley (2005) and Wiktorowicz (2006) explain, because all Salafis 
accept the same religious precepts, whether someone in the community becomes a jihadi 
depends on the resonance of the contextual analysis made by jihadi scholars and 
entrepreneurs.  However, Delong-Bas (2004) points towards Ibn Taymiyya for “his espousal 
of the division of the world into two absolute and mutually exclusive spheres—the land of 
Islam (dar al Islam) and the land of unbelief (dar al-kufr) which for him described both a 
status (Muslim or unbeliever) and a necessarily hostile relationship between the two” 
(Delong-Bas 2004, p.248).  In other words, for Salafi-Jihadists, Ibn Taymiyya’s influence has 
seen jihad justify prosecution against Westerners and any non-Salafi-Jihadi Islamic belief, 
such as Shia.  Historically and importantly, this has not only focused on Western hegemonic 
power, but has also targeted corrupted Muslim leaders.  As Saba Mahmood (2005) explains, 
a popular hadith cited in support of violence against immoral rulers or those considered 
takfir, is “the most excellent type of jihad [striving in the way of Allah], is peaking a true 
word in the presence of a tyrant ruler, (Mahmood, 2005, p.60). For example, Dayem and 
Ayub (2008) and Ghazi bin Muhammad et al (2013) point to how the modern calls for jihad 
as ‘holy war’ by such Muslim extremists as Abd al-Salam Faraj, author of al-Fariat al-
ghai’bah (The Neglected Duty) justified the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981.  In 
relation to the current terrorist phenomenon, the historical Islamic theologians have been 
replaced by jihadi scholars, or ‘google and twitter imams’, and terrorist entrepreneurs as 
leading figures of AQ and ISIS. 
 
From this amalgamation of the Salafism of Abdullah Azzam, the Wahhabism of bin Laden 
and the radical Islamism of Ayman al-Zawahiri, new takfiri jihadism or Salafi-Jihadism arose 
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with AQ as its global vanguard.  In his book Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and 
Ideology of Martyrdom, Mohammed M. Hafez (2007) describes Salafi-Jihadism as an 
extreme form of Sunni Islamism that rejects democracy and Shia rule.  Hafez (2007) 
distinguishes Salafi jihadists from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars (such as 
Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd Allah 
ibn Baaz and Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh), but also from the sahwa 
movement associated with Salman al-Ouda or Safar Al-Hawali.  According to Hafez (2007), 
Salafi-Jihadism is characterized by five features that can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. an immense emphasis on the concept of tawhid (unity of God) 
2. God's sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah) which defines right and wrong, good and evil, 
and which supersedes human reasoning and unIslamic other ideologies such as 
liberalism or humanism 
3. rejection of all innovation (Bid‘ah) to Islam 
4. permissibility and necessity of takfir (the declaring of a Muslim to be outside the 
creed, so that they may face execution) 
5. centrality of jihad against infidel regimes 
 
For Salafi-Jihadists, infidel regimes can include Muslim states if they rule according to 
secular laws and allow democracy, both of which violate God’s sovereignty and therefore 
mean they are no longer considered Muslim, (Mahmood 2005).  According to Haykel 
(2001), Hellmrich (2008) and Moussalli (2009), it has been Ibn Taymiyya who remains the 
inspiration for Salafi-Jihadists in his willingness to “hereticise” fellow Muslims and Muslim 
rulers who did not apply Shari’a law.  For example, Hafez (2007) argues that for Sunnis in 
Iraq, the heresy of Shia is justification for the violent jihad against them.  As Moussalli 
(2009) explains, Islam’s interaction with democracy is of key importance for neo-Salafi-
Jihadi groups, which hold as sacred doctrine their rejection of both Western democracy and 
man-made laws in favour of the principle of al-shari’a.  Attempts by the US to bring 
democracy to the Arab region are not only seen as heresy by the Salafi-Jihadists but also as 
part of the new “crusader” campaign against the Muslim world.   
 
Moussalli (2009) describes AQ as the most notorious manifestation of the various strands of 
Islamic belief that came together and evolved out of the fight against the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, in 1979.  An important contribution to the academic and policy discourse on 
AQ’s construction of its own Salafi-Jihadist master narratives was made by the Open Source 
Center (OSC), Monitor 360 and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications 
(2011) - the “Master Narratives” researchers.  In their analysis of online counter-
communications campaigns against terrorism, Aly, Weimann-Saks and Weimann (2014), 
104 
 
explain that, “unlike narratives, master narratives transcend localised differences, are 
deeply embedded in culture and, importantly, are constantly re-interpreted according to 
the historical context” (Aly et al, 2014, p.9).  The researchers analysed what they identified 
as the six master narratives AQ has constructed to build its message of a global attack on 
Islam.  This is aimed at promoting the need for all Muslims to embark on a violent campaign 
to defend Islam.  The six master narratives identified are: 
 
1. A war on Islam 
2. Agents of the West (corruption of leaders in Muslim countries by Western 
imperialism) 
3. The Nakba (the catastrophe of Israel’s existence) 
4. Violent Jihad 
5. Blood of the Martyrs 
6. Restoring the Caliphate 
(Open Source Center, Monitor 360 & Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, 
2011, p.5) 
 
The Master Narratives research explains that the “narratives emphasise themes of shared 
humiliation, injustice, faithful duty and the promise of establishing a golden age”  (Open 
Source Center, Monitor 360, and Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, 
2011, p.7).  The first Master Narrative establishes the foundation for each subsequent 
narrative.  By instilling fear and anger around a global conspiracy against Islam, AQ appeals 
to subscribers and sympathisers in its justification for global war.  Under these Master 
Narratives, and significantly for this thesis, the global war is both military and ideological.  
In other words, the themes running through the Master Narratives parallel Boyd’s emphasis 
that conflict exists along a mental, moral and physical continuum. 
 
The analysis by the Master Narratives researchers is reinforced by Zackie (2013), through 
the use of Eidelson and Eidelson’s five-belief model in an examination of Abu Mus’ab al-
Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance.  As mentioned earlier, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri was 
instrumental in the AQ narrative.  Zackie (2013) explains that the Eidelson and Eidelson 
(2003) five-belief model includes the triggering themes of superiority, injustice, 
vulnerability, distrust and helplessness.  These were identified by Eidelson and Eidelson 
(2003) as beliefs that could be directly correlated with conflict, in the realms of both 
individuals and groups.  In conclusion, Zackie (2013) contends that al-Suri’s narrative in the 
Call to Global Islamic Resistance “presents the reader with a powerful story that they can 
connect to (via symbols) and one that they can potentially play a leading role in; a story that 
will not properly climax to its resolution for the reader without them actively participating 
in it – by joining the Jihadist in-group” (Zackie 2013, p. 18).  The strategic influence of al-Suri 
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also reinforces the argument in this thesis that through their strategic brand managers such 
as al-Suri, AQ’s leadership implicitly directed home-grown terrorists to become part of the 
AQ brand.  While al-Suri may not have had operational control, he cultivated what Boyd 
constantly referred to as schwerpunkt (a term Boyd had learned from the German military 
command doctrine).  Through his symbolic narrative, al-Suri encouraged Salafi-Jihadis, 
especially those living in Western countries, to adopt brutal methods in order to achieve 
their goals, with scant regard for civilian life (Cruickshank and Ali 2007).  This sat within 
what the OSC identified as AQ’s fourth master narrative of violent jihad.  
 
While this has been a brief overview of the manifestation and transformation of Salafi-
Jihadism, it demonstrates the symbolic impact and inspirational effect on Muslim 
communities, including those born or resident in Western countries.  Given the deep, 
cognitive and existential significance of terms such as da’wa, and commitment to important 
pillars of Islam such as tawhid, the doctrines of al-wala’ wa al-bara, as well as shura and 
ijma, it is evident that AQ can shape the narrative to exploit what connects with 
impressionable Muslims and converts to Islam, along the mental, moral and physical 
continuum of war.  Like any powerful brand, the effectiveness of the AQ brand has been to 
create the impression in the minds of followers that they can be their own AQ, irrespective 
of where they are located.  As Jones (2012) notes, it was the kind of strategy AQ’s Abu 
Mus’ab al-Suri supported, whereby Muslims can be involved in their own jihad and small-
scale terrorism.  Yet, they are not on their own because the AQ narrative connects them 
through a shared identity.  As Sarah Lawler (2002) explains, narratives are “social products 
produced by people within the context of specific social, historical and cultural locations” 
(Lawler, 2002, p.242).  The web of social identity can be woven between the narrative of an 
individual narrative and a group or collective narrative, or what Archetti (2013) refers to as 
a “constellation of relationships” (Archetti, 2013, 133).  These relationships are then 
reinforced by AQ’s call to action to the uncommitted. 
 
The OSC (2011) research relates this call to action as falling within a master narrative that 
directs the blame for the humiliation of Islam on the umma (the wider Islamic community) 
for failing to fulfil their individual duty.  Inspiring home-grown terrorism is an example of 
the asymmetric adaptation of that strategic narrative in action.  Once again, Boyd’s own 
discourse on the core themes behind the OODA Loop and its application as a new strategic 
model can be identified in his presentation Patterns of Conflict, in which he said the central 
theme is to: 
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Evolve and exploit insight/initiative/adaptability/harmony together with a 
unifying vision but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so 
that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our 
success…[sic]. (Boyd, 1986, slide 185) 
 
In other words, AQ understood how to connect with the individual narrative of this 
diaspora of Muslims in Western countries whose uncommitted minds could be shaped into 
supporting this post-modern form of warfare.   
 
For AQ’s leaders it could be argued that because they implicitly understood the broad 
themes and values within Islam that are deeply significant to all Muslims they were able to 
connect these themes with a range of grievances already held by many Muslims, 
particularly those who may have felt disenfranchised living in Western countries.  The AQ 
“master narratives” simply built an identity that connected with these values and mental 
images held by these individuals that reinforced how they already felt about themselves 
and the world.  Western attempts at a counter-narrative cannot assume that individuals 
who connect with AQ’s narrative can be deflected through Western-based constructs of 
Islam, especially when the values of those individuals holding these grievances are 
irreconcilable with Western values; even if they have been raised in a Western social 
context.   
 
In his work, Ibn Warraq (1995) summed up this notion when he said, “Americans tend to 
think that deep down we all have the same values. Americans believe that all these 
terrorists, if you scratch beneath the surface, are looking for religious equality and justice. 
That's complete and utter nonsense. Americans can't face the reality that different people 
have different values” (Ibn Warraq; Why I am Not a Muslim. 1995).  In the context of the 
OODA Loop, this means Western-based narrative strategists have misunderstood the 
orientation of those members of the Muslim community who are adopting the AQ 
narrative; whereas AQ has demonstrated its ability to connect with the orientation of its 
audience through a prism built on a prophetic set of “master narratives”, creating an 
existential brotherhood of resistance.  As Archetti (2013) explains, the prism is about the 
internal and external dimensions of a brand.  That is, the picture or image constructed by 
the sender and the picture or construction of that image in the mind of the receiver.   
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Significantly for this thesis, the identity prism can be interpreted as forming an important 
element within the Orientation of the individual’s OODA loop.  As argued through this 
chapter, in presenting the case for a new general strategic model of terrorism, Salafi-Jihadi 
inspired home-grown terrorism reflects the product of AQ’s adaptive capacity to cultivate a 
shared identity that grants its followers permission for violence.  That violence then 
becomes indistinguishable from the narrative, the brand and the orientation of the Salafi-
Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorist.  As Braniff and Moghadam (2011) concluded in their 
assessment of AQ’s adaptations since 9/11, “Al-Qaeda continues to enable the violence of 
others, orient that violence towards the United States and its allies in a distributed game of 
attrition warfare, and foster a dichotomous “us versus them” narrative between the 
Muslim world and the rest of the international community” (Braniff and Moghadam, 2011, 
p.7).  This is the mental, moral and physical environment, in which inspired individuals 
interact within their own search for identity and connectivity to something beyond 
themselves.   
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by examining and critiquing the established models of terrorism in the 
context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.  It was argued that the 
predominant models are closed systems and lack adaptability.  While the contributions by 
Thornton (1964), Crenshaw (1981), Pape (2006) and Abrahms (2008) remain significant and 
applicable in this field of inquiry, they are systems or frameworks that suffer from what 
Boyd would have described as succumbing to Gödel’s incomplete theorem.  For example, in 
Destruction and Creation Boyd (1976) said: 
 
Gödel's Proof indirectly shows that in order to determine the consistency of 
any new system we must construct or uncover another system beyond it.  Over 
and over this cycle must be repeated to determine the consistency of more 
and more elaborate systems. (Boyd 1976, p.4) 
 
As described in Chapter Two, the Second Law of Thermodynamics is directly applicable to a 
closed system.  As Boyd (1976) argued, all observed natural processes or systems generate 
entropy when placed under pressure.  In comparison, the predominant strategic model 
begins to suffer from entropy when the political objectives fail but the terrorist 
organisation has evolved and continues to exist.  This chapter attempted to question why 
the strategic model needed to be confined to political objectives, when the objectives, 
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context, time and events in which the terrorist groups exists may evolve.  According to 
Boyd (1986), the objective in a conflict is to survive on one’s own terms.  In order to 
contend with the changing context in which a terrorist organisation exists, it was argued 
that the most enduring and adaptable strategic model of terrorism for this thesis was 
Boyd’s OODA Loop.  
 
This chapter also compared and contrasted the existing theories in the literature that have 
been used to describe how AQ has evolved in its application of home-grown terrorism; for 
example, whether it is has adopted a leaderless network approach or one that remains 
directed by a command-and-control structure.  When analysing these positions through the 
OODA Loop, it was argued that there is no reason why both the leaderless jihad and the 
command-and-control theories could not exist.  How AQ prosecutes its application of 
terrorism may depend on the context and events at the time.  Further, by evaluating AQ 
leaders and strategists such as Zawahiri and al-Suri, it was determined that the leaderless 
jihad model was a decision directed by those in command and control of AQ.   
 
Significantly, this chapter also explored how AQ had built an adaptable brand of Salafi-
Jihadism through a calculated symbolic narrative.  Understanding the narrative and the 
symbolic language AQ uses to inspire home-grown terrorism that enables the violence of 
others as tactic of asymmetric warfare, is a core objective of this thesis.  It was determined 
that AQ’s narrative, symbolism and prophetic methodology make up not only the 
Orientation of AQ but also connect with the Orientation of those who are inspired to join 
AQ and carry out acts of terrorism on their behalf.  The following chapter describes the case 
study research methodology used for this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 - Application of the OODA Loop & Case Study Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the case study research methodology or approach applied in this 
research.  The multiple key case study research design is exploratory and descriptive, and 
used to test the theory that home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare by the 
Salafi-Jihadi movement, based on historical or retrospective comparative use of the 
selected case studies.  Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations are represented by Islamic 
extremist entities such as AQ, LeT, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), al 
Shabaab, al Nusra and ISIS.  Three case studies have been selected to test this theory, 
through descriptive and evaluative critical inquiry, against Boyd’s OODA Loop, the 
conceptual framework employed for this research and used as the analytical lens.     
 
Case study research methodology is a well-established research discipline within social 
science and qualitative research practices.  It is used to conduct exploratory analysis using 
real-life examples within a conceptual framework.  This chapter justifies the use of case 
study research by reviewing, comparing and contrasting the predominant academic 
literature on case study research methodology.  This includes critiquing the works of 
Thomas (2011), Yin (1981; 1984 and 2003), Flyvbjerg (2006), Gillham (2000) and George and 
Bennett (2005).  A brief examination of the weaknesses of case study research 
methodology from established academic literature is also identified.  The chapter then 
presents the case study methodology and its applicability to the research for this thesis.  
This provides the opportunity to describe the selection criteria used for this research.  
 
Importantly, the argument for using the OODA Loop as the analytical lens is also made.  
This involves further examination of the OODA Loop and in particular, the Orientation 
component.  The internal dynamics of the orientation component have direct applicability 
to AQ’s construction of its own Salafi-Jihadi brand.  It is also essential for a general, 
adaptable strategic model of terrorism.   
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4.2 Aim of the Research Using Case Study Methodology 
 
This research aims to make a contribution to the field of inquiry into Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
home-grown terrorism through the use of the OODA loop as a novel and adaptable strategic 
model of terrorism.  It seeks to develop a new contextual explanation for the phenomenon 
of AQ generating a unique Salafi-Jihadi narrative to inspire home-grown terrorism as a tactic 
of asymmetric warfare. 
 
These aims are determined through the following broad questions: 
 
a) How can the OODA Loop be applied to key case studies in Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
home-grown terrorism? 
 
b) How do cases of home-grown terrorism demonstrate AQ’s strategically adaptable 
approach to implementing its war against Western targets? 
 
c) How does AQ and the home-grown terrorist demonstrate a capacity to manoeuvre 
within and to exploit Western moral, mental and physical boundaries while 
simultaneously manipulating Western-born or resident Muslim males through a 
Salafi-Jihadi narrative? 
 
4.3 The Case Study: Subject of an Inquiry 
 
Case study is an established research strategy that can provide detailed contextual analysis 
of a field of inquiry.  Thomas (2011) describes case study research as “analyses of persons, 
events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied 
holistically by one or more methods” (Thomas, 2011, p.513).  Research on the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement is essentially a sociological enquiry into people, events, decisions, context and 
institutions, as well as a belief system that requires a theoretical focus.  Yin (2003) explains 
that case study design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the study is to answer 
“how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in 
the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant 
to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the 
phenomenon and the context.  The subject of inquiry of this thesis is to focus on the “how” 
and “why” questions of the Salafi-Jihadi movement and its use of home-grown terrorism.  
The behaviour of those involved cannot be manipulated and, significantly, the thesis intends 
to explore the contextual conditions of how the Salafi-Jihadi movement has adapted to 
pressure placed on it by counter-terrorism strategies employed by Western governments.  
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Therefore, case study research methodology is an appropriate and applicable research 
methodology for this thesis. 
 
The use of case study research methodology is applicable to testing a theory, as well as 
describing and evaluating a field of inquiry focused on the notion of home-grown terrorism 
as a tactic of asymmetric warfare employed by the Salafi-Jihadi movement.  Flyvbjerg (2006) 
argues that the case study is a necessary and sufficient method for certain important 
research tasks in the social sciences and it holds up well when compared to other methods 
in the gamut of social science research.  Yin (1981; 1984) and George and Bennett (2005) 
explain that a case study as a research strategy is used to test a contemporary phenomenon 
in a real-life scenario.  Further, it is particularly helpful where the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the scenario are not clearly defined.  It could be argued that home-grown 
terrorism, as a phenomenon, is complex, without concrete boundaries.  Gillham (2000) 
describes a case as a unit of human activity embedded in the real world that can only be 
studied in context.  Gillham’s (2005) definition is an entirely appropriate description of case 
study research in relation to this thesis, given Boyd emphatically declared that people fight 
wars, not machines, and they use their minds.  It is through people’s minds that a 
movement of groups or individuals is created, radicalised through an existentially moral 
dimension to support terrorism or to become a terrorist in one’s country of residence - that 
is, home-grown terrorism.   
 
In his earlier work, Yin (1981) demonstrated how a case study can contribute to research.  
Firstly, Yin argues that the case study does not imply the use of a particular type of 
evidence; case studies can be done by using either qualitative or quantitative evidence.  
That evidence may come from fieldwork, archival records, verbal reports, observations, or 
any combination of these.  Secondly, Yin goes onto explain “nor does the case study imply 
the use of a particular data collection method” (Yin, 1981, p.59).  Similarly, Thomas (2011) 
argues that the case study is a focus on one thing, looked at in-depth from a range of 
perspectives; in other words, pulled apart, broken-up, to explore tensions between various 
constructs and angles.  Stakes (1995) addresses the issue of triangulation of data and 
argues that this enables researchers to understand a phenomenon from multiple 
perspectives.  In other words, triangulation can balance the researcher’s socially-
constructed understanding of that phenomenon.  Yin (1981 and 2003) also emphasises the 
importance of multiple sources of evidence for case study research, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion.   
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In relation to the epistemological basis of Boyd’s theoretical construct, Boyd sought to 
assimilate scientific, mathematical and logical principles into what he believed was required 
to pull apart, from all angles, a design, a system or a structure.  This is an approach that can 
be compared to case study research.  As Hammond (2001) explains, in Destruction and 
Creation Boyd (1976) sought to describe how humans or organisations must be prepared to 
destroy models, concepts, perceptions and methodologies in order to create truly novel 
and fresh constructs, or change.  While Boyd did not specifically state that he was 
employing the use of case study research, it is exactly what he did in devising his OODA 
Loop strategic model.  Boyd conducted a multiple case study research approach to the 
study of human conflict in war, insurgency or guerrilla warfare.  Through retrospective 
inquiry, Boyd sought to study the strategy employed by military commanders and theorists, 
generals and guerrilla warfare leaders - from Sun Tzu, Genghis Khan and the Mongol 
armies, to Clausewitz, Napoleon, T.E. Lawrence and German Generals Ludenorff and 
Blumentritt - in order to analyse why these innovative leaders of war were successful, and, 
in some cases, what led to their demise. 
 
French sociologist Wieviorka (1992), in his work on terrorism, violence and social 
movement, determined that there are two essential components to a case study.  Wieviorka 
(1992) explains there must be i) a practical, historical unity or the essence of the subject 
(the thing being studied); and ii) the theoretical, scientific basis, which is the analytical 
frame, or the object (of what is being studied).  Thomas (2011) describes how the analytical 
frame must extend beyond a mere description of the thing being studied.  Flyvbjerg (2006) 
explains that according to the conventional view, a case study cannot be of value in and of 
itself; it needs to be linked to hypotheses, following the well-known hypothetico-deductive 
model of explanation.  For example, in the case studies chosen by Boyd, it was not enough 
for him to merely relay the details of how each military strategist or commander engaged in 
battle; neither was it enough to describe conventional war, insurgency or guerrilla warfare.  
Instead, Boyd embarked on an in-depth analysis of each of his chosen military commanders 
and strategists (the subjects) to determine what each had in common in their application of 
strategy in war (the analytical frame).  
 
Given Wieviorka was a sociologist focused on violence, terrorism and social movement, his 
interpretation of what case study means as a social science research methodology is 
entirely appropriate in the context of this thesis.  Wieviorka (1992) explains that for a ‘case’ 
to exist: 
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we must be able to identify a characteristic unit[…] This unit must be observed, 
but it has no meaning in itself.  It is significant only if an observer […] can refer it 
to an analytical category or theory.  It does not suffice to observe a social 
phenomenon, historical event or set of behaviours in order to declare them to 
be ‘cases’.  If you want to talk about a ‘case’, you also need the means of 
interpreting it or placing it in a context.” (Wieviorka 1992, p.160) 
 
Thomas (2011) offers a simple illustration to describe what a case study is, by using a 
capsule or pill that can be split in half.  The separate ingredients in each half are required in 
order for the other half to work; that is, it has to contain the ‘practical, historical unity’ (the 
subject) and the analytical frame (the object).  For example, a description on its own of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States would not be a case study; analysing those 
terrorist attacks as a new phase of terrorism employed by AQ would form a case study.  
Even if this was the only terrorist attack by AQ that was analysed, it would still constitute a 
case study.  The use of one sample to form a case study is an often-criticised aspect of case 
study methodology, since it is argued that one example cannot provide reliable evidence or 
data from which to draw generalised conclusions or even revelations.     
 
4.4 Single or Multiple Case Studies 
 
In regards to single or multiple case study research, Flyvbjerg (2006) debunks a number of 
misunderstandings, including the criticism that one cannot generalise from a single case, 
therefore the single case study cannot contribute to scientific development.  Galileo’s 
rejection of Aristotle’s law of gravity through the application of a single conceptual 
experiment is used by Flyvberg (2006) to address criticisms of a single case in research.  Yin 
(2009) explains that single case studies are relevant for critical cases in order to test theory, 
or to analyse cases that may be extreme, typical, revelatory or longitudinal.  Before Galileo, 
Aristotle’s law had existed for two thousand years.  Galileo determined that if two objects 
of equal weight are released from the same height at the same time, they will hit the 
ground simultaneously.  If the two objects are then stuck together into one, this object will 
have double the weight and therefore, according to the Aristotelian view, will fall faster 
than the two individual objects. This conclusion seemed contradictory to Galileo. The only 
way to avoid the contradiction was to eliminate weight as a determinant factor for 
acceleration in free fall.   Galileo did not use a large random sample of trials of objects 
falling from a wide range of randomly selected heights under varying wind conditions; 
instead, he used a single experiment, or a case study.  
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According to Gillham (2000) a case study can be an individual or a group, such as a family, a 
class, an office or a hospital ward.  It can be an institution such as an educational institute, a 
company or organisation, or indeed a large community or profession and industry.  Case 
study research can also involve multiple cases such as a number of football coaches, or 
World War II allied Generals, or individuals dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder.  
Regardless of whether an individual sample is used or a number of samples, Gillham (2000) 
argues that the use of multiple sources of evidence, each with its strengths and 
weaknesses, is a key characteristic of case study research.  Yin (2009) believes multiple case 
study design has its advantages in constructing a framework in which either literal 
replication predicts similar results across multiple cases, or it aims at theoretical replication 
whereby different results are likely for theoretical reasons.   
 
Single case study research is common in the field of psychology and a number have become 
ground-breaking pieces of research.  For example, one of the most famous single cases used 
in social psychology on the phenomenon of bystander intervention is the murder of “Kitty” 
Genovese in New York on 13 March 1964 (Rosenthal 1964; Manning, Levine & Collins 2007; 
Dubner and Levitt 2009).   During the rape and murder of Ms Genovese, carried out by 
Winston Moseley over a 30-minute period, it is estimated that between twelve and thirty 
people heard her call for help, with some even witnessing initial parts of the attack.  
Relaying the details of the attack, even to the point of the estimated number of people who 
were witnesses, does not form the case study; the Kitty Genovese murder became a case 
study when analysed in the context of social behaviour, in particular the reluctance of 
bystanders to intervene (the analytical frame).  This social phenomenon became known as 
“the bystander effect”.  While a number of the reported facts of the murder have since been 
questioned, the murder of Kitty Genovese became one of the most significant examples of 
the use of single case studies as an established research methodology.    
 
4.5 Case Study Research in the Field of Terrorism 
 
There are a number of examples where single or multiple case study research design has 
been applied to the field of terrorism and home-grown terrorism.  For example, the New 
York Police Department (NYPD) model of radicalisation was developed through case study 
research by Silber and Bhatt (2007).  The methodology employed by the NYPD involved 
comparative case study analysis of five home-grown terrorist events - including Madrid’s 
2004 attack, Amsterdam’s Hofstad Group, the London-Leeds 2005 attack, Australia’s 
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Operation Pendennis (which thwarted an attack(s) in November 2005) and Canada’s 
Toronto 18 Case (which thwarted an attack in June 2006).  From these case studies Silber 
and Bhatt (2007) developed a conceptual framework that was then tested against five post-
9/11 home-grown terrorism cases in the US.  These included the Lackawanna, New York, 
Portland, Oregon and Northern Virginia cases, as well as two New York City cases (34th 
Street/Herald Square and the radicalisation of two al-Muhajiroun members).  Finally, Silber 
and Bhatt (2007) applied the framework to the Hamburg cluster, who led the 9/11 
hijackers.  The NYPD research observed that all the cases of home-grown terrorism used in 
their research had been carried out by seemingly “unremarkable” groups of individuals who 
sought to attack their country of residence. 
 
In an Australian context, Mullins (2011) sought to clarify the nature of the contemporary 
security threat within Australia by analysing the involvement of Australian citizens and 
residents in Islamist terrorism, both at home and abroad.  To do this Mullins used sixteen 
cases of terrorist activities in an Australian context and found that whilst the Australian 
context is quite unique, overall patterns in terrorist activity are comparable to other 
Western countries.  Similarly, Atran (2010) used multiple cases from the individuals 
involved in the 2002 Bali, 2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist attacks in an attempt to 
answer the question: why do people believe in a cause, and why do some die and kill for it?   
The use of multiple case studies was employed by Taylor (2010) to undertake the analysis 
of terrorism as a group behavioural phenomenon.  In his analysis on terrorist networks, 
Sageman (2004) used the cases of 172 terrorist biographies gathered from open sources to 
examine the social movement that he calls “global salafi jihad”.  In an examination of the 
strategic model of terrorism, Pape (2003) selected 188 cases of suicide terrorist attacks 
from 1980 to 2001 to analyse the use of this phenomenon as a tactic by groups to force 
political objectives.   
 
To understand the functions and structures of terrorist networks in order to be better at 
tackling terrorists, Qin et al (2005) used the global Salafi-Jihad network as a single case 
study.  Qin et al (2005) explain how their study is unique compared to other works on 
terrorism: 
 
First unlike most previous studies, which used unreliable data sources such as 
news stories and media-generated incident data-bases, our study was based on 
reliable data collected in a large-scale, in-depth empirical study on the GSJ 
network.  Second, our study introduced multiple advanced network analysis 
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methodologies into the study of terrorist networks including the Web 
structural mining techniques, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never 
been used in this domain.  Third, our results provide not only insights for 
terrorism research community but also empirical implications that may help 
law-reinforcement, intelligence and security communities to make our nation 
safer.  (Qin J et al, 2005, p. 288.) 
 
The Qin et al (2005) research is a good example of the use of a single key case study 
analysis providing a powerful level of information and data from which to evaluate and 
draw a picture of how a global enterprise held together by expansive personal, 
organisational and social connections can have far-reaching economic, psychological, 
political and social consequences. 
 
Multiple case study design was employed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), where they 
analysed multiple cases from criminal organisations, terrorists groups, drug-cartels and 
protest movements to examine, illustrate and test their theory on “netwars.”  Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (2001) describe “netwars” as being composed of conflicts waged, on the one hand 
by terrorists, criminals, and ethno-nationalist extremists, and on the other by civil-society 
activists.  What distinguishes “netwar” as a form of conflict is the networked organisational 
structure of its practitioners—with many groups actually being leaderless - and the 
suppleness in their ability to come together quickly in swarming attacks.  Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (2001) argue the concepts of cyberwar and netwar encompass a new spectrum of 
conflict that is emerging in the wake of the information revolution.    
 
In the context of this research, the use of case study methodology was also critical to the 
work of Boyd in developing the OODA Loop.  While Boyd did not explicitly state he was 
employing the use of case study research methodology, his exploratory and historical, deep 
evaluation of science, logic and military strategy and conflict used a multiple case study 
approach.  For example, in his 196-slide presentation, Patterns of Conflict, Boyd (1986) 
compared and contrasted the cases of multiple Commanders, Generals and military 
theorists throughout history and their use of military strategy.  
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These are summarised in table 4.2 below: 
 
Commander / General / Tactician / Army Battle or War or Theory 
Sun Tzu Art of War 
German vs. French Blitzkrieg vs. Maginot Line Mentality (1940), 
Israel Raid in 1976 
Wars fought between 300BC and 1400AD Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC 
Battle of Arbela 331 BC (Alexander Great vs. 
Darius) 
Battle of Canmae 216 BC 
Table 4.2. Summary of Military Theorists and Wars from Patterns of Conflict 
 
In Patterns of Conflict, Boyd analyses each General and battle in a multiple case study 
design to test his theory on conflict.   For example, in Patterns of Conflict, Boyd (1986) set 
out to: 
 Make manifest the nature of moral-mental-physical conflict 
 Discern a pattern for successful operations 
 Help generalise tactics and strategy 
 Find a basis for grand strategy 
 
Importantly, in line with Stake’s (1995) explanation, each case used by Boyd is a specific, 
complex, functioning thing in itself; they are not generalisations.  Boyd’s intent was to 
unveil the character of conflict, survival and conquest.  While a single case study approach 
may have provided an example to generate theory, it would not have been enough to create 
a grand theory or generalisation.  In the context of this thesis, the same multiple case study 
approach will be taken to test a generalised or grand theory of home-grown terrorism. 
 
4.6 Criticisms of Case Study Methodology 
 
While the case study as a research strategy or methodology is widely used, it remains 
subject to a number of criticisms.  The main criticisms attempt to highlight flaws in methods 
of sampling, data collection, analysis, generalisation, reliability and validity.  For example, in 
his examination of case study research, Flyvbjerg (2006) explains there are five common 
criticisms of case study research.  These are: 
 
1. Theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge 
2. One cannot generalise from a single case, therefore the single case study cannot 
contribute to scientific development 
3. The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, while other methods are 
more suitable for hypothesis testing and theory building 
4. The case study contains a bias toward verification; and 
5. It is often difficult to summarise specific case studies 
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The use of case study research has also been criticised when the research has been limited 
to pilot studies.  Flyvbjerg (2006) explains the criticisms describe how these case studies are 
too subjective, and the validity of the case studies is undermined by the researcher’s own 
bias or interpretations. 
 
A major criticism of case study research highlighted by Gillham (2000) comes from positivist 
philosophers, who argue that only observable and verifiable phenomena can be the subject 
of science.  For example, Mohd (2008) criticises case studies for lacking in scientific rigour 
and reliability and believes that they do not address the issues of generalisation (Mohd, 
2008).  Stake’s (1995) explanation of what is a case can help deal with this kind of criticism.   
Stake explains that: 
 
Custom has it not everything is a case.  A child may be a case.  A teacher may 
be a case.  But her teaching lacks the specificity, the boundedness, to be called 
a case.  An innovative program may be called a case.  All the schools in Sweden 
can be a case.  But a relationship among schools, the reason for innovative 
teaching or the policies for school reforms are less commonly considered a 
case.  These topics are generalities rather than specifics.  The case is a specific, 
a complex functioning thing. (Stakes, 1995, p.2) 
 
The use of case study as a research strategy is defended in Gillham (2000) who argued that 
the naturalistic style of study research makes it entirely appropriate to human phenomena 
in the real world.  The importance of context in the learning experience through case study 
research is also argued by Flyvbjerg (2001).  Nearly all subjects of inquiry have an enormous 
amount of complexity and it is the focus on complexity that makes a case study (Thomas 
2011, Simons 2009, Stake 1995, Yin 1985).  Simons (2009) explains a case study is, “an in-
depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a 
particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a ‘real life’ context” (Simons, 
2009, p.21). 
 
Similar criticisms could be applied to this thesis given it uses case study research 
methodology.  However, study of people or groups involved with promoting, supporting, 
planning and carrying out terrorism is a field of inquiry with a number of obstacles that 
prevent direct contact with those involved.  Members of terrorist organisations such as AQ, 
al Shabaab, Boko Haram, JI, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), or other terrorist groups, are reluctant 
to meet anyone not closely associated with their group.  In his working on understanding 
the psychology of terrorism, Horgan (2005), explains there is a major challenge in how data 
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is collected when studying terrorism, “because to say that terrorism does not lend itself to 
investigation by traditional research methods is a considerable understatement” (Horgan 
2005, p. 35).  Obtaining interviews with any members of the AQ network who are hiding 
from international counter-terrorism authorities poses ethical as well as other risks, making 
it almost impossible for academic researchers to obtain ethical approval.  In his guide to 
research on terrorism, Dolnik (2013) describes the conventionally accepted view in 
academia regarding research involving actual terrorists and their organisations as 
restricting genuine field-based case study research.  In his work on the collection of data 
from the field in terrorism research, Silke (2004) explains that: 
 
Due to reasons of personal safety, political sensitivity and perceived 
methodological difficulty, researchers have largely shied away from action and 
actor-based research, largely leaving those topics to a handful of individuals who 
encounter the terrorists as part of their professional work and for whom 
research is both a peripheral and generally sporadic activity (for example, prison 
psychiatrists). The inevitable result has been a very lopsided literature, which 
says surprisingly little on some very important aspects of the subject. (Silke 2004, 
p. 9). 
 
In his work on what makes a terrorist leave a group, Horgan (2009) describes the personal 
challenges of conducting field-based case study research on terrorism.  In relation to home-
grown terrorism, it would be difficult to expect those convicted of committing, or 
attempting to commit terrorism, to openly divulge the personal circumstances that led to 
them becoming involved in Salafi-Jihadi terrorism against the country of their residence of 
citizenship, especially if their first-hand information could risk them being prosecuted or 
subject to further police investigation.  Effectively, the appropriate case study research 
approach offers a recognised, academically accepted methodology that can overcome the 
practical and ethics-based obstacles faced by this research. 
 
The rebuttals to criticisms of case study research provided by Thomas (2011), Simons 
(2009), Stake (1995), Yin (1984) and Gillham (2000) apply to this research.  While this 
research is focused on a specific field of inquiry, it is not a science.  That does not mean that 
data collection, statistical analysis and other instruments of scientific inquiry could not be 
applied.  However, it is not a field of inquiry that could use human-based experimentation, 
which is typical in the field of science.  A positive argument for the use of case study 
methodology for terrorism can be made by examining the research by Qin, Sageman, Xu, 
Hu, Chen, and Hsinchun (2005).  Qin et al (2005) successfully collected reliable data in a 
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large-scale, in-depth empirical study on the Salafi-Jihadi network.  Their study introduced 
multiple, advanced network analysis methodologies into the study of terrorist networks. 
 
Perhaps the arguments of Flyvbjerg (2001) and Simons (2009) offer the strongest applicable 
defence of case study research for this thesis.  The use of home-grown terrorism as an 
asymmetric tactic is an example of a “real life”, contextual subject matter, with multiple 
perspectives of complexity and uniqueness.  This research undertook an in-depth 
exploration of those complexities and sought to critically analyse and evaluate the 
phenomenon from multiple perspectives of a particular system - in this case, a religious, 
faith-based system of the Salafi-Jihadi movement.  As set out further in this chapter, there 
are numerous examples of academic inquiry using case study research methodology 
focused on terrorism, home-grown terrorism and Salafi-Jihadi inspired or supported 
terrorism by movements and networks such as AQ. 
 
4.7 Different Kinds of Case Study 
 
One of the challenges of the case study, as explained by Thomas (2011), is the 
misconception that the researcher needs to do and cover everything.  When 
“completeness” is emphasised, Thomas states, “this does not mean that everything has to 
be covered.  The trick is to get a line of inquiry running through the study” (Thomas 2011, p. 
89).  This will be made easier when the researcher has decided how they will relate the 
subject to the analytical frame.  A specific line of inquiry can be the research question one is 
attempting to answer (theory-testing) or the research question one is attempting to 
develop (theory-generating).  In relation to this thesis, the subject is the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement and its use of home-grown terrorism.  The analytical frame is Boyd’s OODA 
Loop, to test the hypothesis that home-grown terrorism evolves as an asymmetric tactic.  
Regardless of whether the intention is theory-testing or theory-generating, there are 
different kinds of case studies that can be applied.   
 
The quantum of possibilities available for research can be defined through the kind of case 
study chosen.  As Yin’s (1981) explanation of a case study suggests, there is a wide range of 
descriptions of the kinds of case studies that can be employed.  That said, Yin (1981), Stake 
(1995) and Thomas (2011) say differentiating between types of evidence, data collection 
method and research strategy are critical in defining case studies.  As such, Yin (1981) 
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defines three kinds of case studies that are exploratory, descriptive and explanatory.  He 
goes further by explaining the types of case study designs and explains: 
  
all must cope with the essential problem that, because the context is part of 
the study, there will always be too many "variables" for the number of 
observations to be made, thus making standard experimental and survey 
designs irrelevant). (Yin, 1981, p.59) 
 
Stake (1995) sets out three distinct kinds of case studies that he calls intrinsic, instrumental 
and collective.  An intrinsic case is one of specific interest for its own sake and not because 
there is an attempt to learn about a general problem.  Instead, it is about trying to learn 
something particular about that case.  An instrumental case is one where the researcher is 
analysing or collecting data about – for example - a person, in order to obtain a general 
understanding or to answer a research question.  In other words, the case is a means to an 
end, not the end itself.  To describe his definition of collective, Stake (1995) argues if several 
teachers are chosen to be studied - as opposed to just one or several schools - then each 
case study is instrumental to learning about the specific issue being studied.  In Stake’s 
example, it was new marking regulations for teachers.  He goes on to explain that there 
would be important coordination between the individual studies and this would form what 
Stake (1995) calls collective case study.  However, Stake’s explanation is just one set of 
definitions to explain the different kinds of case studies.  The scope of established kinds of 
case studies, as defined by academic experts on case study methodology, is summarised in 
the following table, provided by Thomas (2011): 
 
Merriam (1988) Stake (1995) Bassey 
(1999) 
De Vaus (2001) Mitchell (2006) 
(drawing on 
Eckstein1975) 
Yin (2009) 
Descriptive 
 
Interpretative 
 
Evaluative 
 
Intrinsic 
 
Instrumental 
 
Collective 
Seeking a 
theory 
 
Testing a 
theory 
 
Storytelling 
 
Drawing a 
picture 
 
Evaluative 
 
Descriptive/ 
Explanatory 
 
Testing or 
building a theory 
 
Single or 
multiple cases 
 
Holistic 
embedded 
 
Parallel or 
sequential 
 
Retrospective or 
prospective 
Illustrative 
 
Social 
analytical 
 
Extended 
(overtime) 
 
Configurativeid
iographic 
 
Disciplined, 
configurative 
 
Heuristic 
 
Plausibility 
probes 
Critical 
 
Extreme or 
unique 
 
Longitudinal 
 
Representati
ve 
 
Revelatory 
 
 
Table 4.3. Summary of Kinds of Case Studies Defined by Academic Authors (Thomas. G., 
2011, p.91) 
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Despite the summary by Thomas (2011), a great deal of overlap is shown in the way case 
studies are described.  It may be the interpretation and use of words and language by 
particular authors seeking to establish their unique academic framework in the area of case 
study theory.  However, it is more important when deciding which kind of case study 
definition to use that it is focused on the subject (already discussed) and through the 
quality of case study research.  Both starting points are not mutually reinforcing and may 
assist in establishing the purpose, process and approach, or how to conduct the case study 
research.  Thomas determines three kinds of subjects for case studies.  These are: 
 
1) Key cases 
2) Outlier cases; and  
3) Local knowledge cases.   
 
Key cases are those that have significant interest.  Thomas gives the example of Hurricane 
Katrina (23 August 2005) as a key case because of its enormous size and the unprecedented 
amount of destruction it caused to the city of New Orleans, in the US.  In the context of this 
thesis, the 7 July London terrorist attack is another example of a key case.  Outlier cases on 
the other hand are unique or special.  They are not ordinary, nor do they stand out as 
distinct examples of what may be normal in particular field of research, science, industry or 
sport.  The 9/11 terrorist attack on New York and Washington DC could be described as an 
outlier case, in that it was the first time AQ successfully carried out a terrorist attack on the 
United States using hijacked civilian aircraft as the method of attack and destruction.   
 
Local knowledge cases involve special knowledge about something unusual or particularly 
interesting with which you are highly familiar.  This could be one’s own work, home, family 
environment, children’s school or business sector.  The fact that you have been embedded 
within these groups or environments gives you unique and personal knowledge.  A 
potential weakness in the local knowledge case study may be that researchers could find 
themselves becoming part of the research itself.  Because of their intimate understanding 
of the subject they may anticipate the expected results, or may unknowingly guide the 
subjects to those results, thereby confirming the expected outcome.  This is known as the 
self-fulfilling prophecy or Pygmalion effect (named after the George Bernard Shaw play) 
and Gillham (2000) believes not recognising this is bad science.  This research adopted 
evaluative case study design and used three key cases because of their significance and 
because they provided an appropriate and relevant source of qualitative data collection. 
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4.8 The Application of Case Study Methodology Used for this Research 
 
This research adopts the explanation of case study methodology provided by Yin (2009), 
which describes case study research to be: 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth 
and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In other words you should 
use the case study method because you wanted to understand a real-life 
phenomenon in depth, but such understanding encompasses important 
contextual conditions-because they were highly pertinent to your phenomenon 
of study. (Yin & Davis, 2007 cited in Yin, 2009:18). 
 
This research employs a multiple case study design using three key cases to conduct an 
empirical inquiry into the contemporary phenomenon known as Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-
grown terrorism.   The following section establishes the selection criteria and provides an 
informative description of each case chosen for this research.   
 
As with the definitions of case study research and the kinds of case study, there is no “one 
size fits all” definition of how to conduct case study research.  Evidently it depends on the 
research purpose, process and approach upon which one decides - and whether the 
research intends - to test a theory or create a theory.  However, there appear to be three 
conditions that are necessary for conducting case study research.  They consist of 1) the 
type of research question posed; 2) the extent of the control an investigator has over actual 
behavioural events; and 3) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events.  Table 4.4 summarises the broad, but generally agreed ways to conduct case study 
research. 
 
Types 
 
From Research 
 
Required 
Control 
 
Focus on Contemporary 
Events 
 
Experiment 
 
How, Why? 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Survey 
 
Who, What, Where, How 
Many, How much? 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Actual Analysis 
 
Who, What, Where, How 
Many, How much? 
 
No 
 
No 
 
History 
 
How, Why? 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Case Study 
 
How, Why? 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Table 4.4 Forms of Research (Cosmo Corporation, 1998 cited in Yin, 2009, p.80) 
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In relation to this research topic, the type chosen was case study research exploring the 
“how and why”.  Controls were not required in this instance and the case studies selected 
can be defined as contemporary events.  The rationale for defining the research question is 
explained in Eisenhardt (1989) as the same as it is in hypothesis-testing research and for 
theory generating.  Without a research focus, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the 
volume of data.  A logical place to begin is an initial definition of the research question, at 
least in broad terms, and this is important in building theory from case studies.  Eisenhardt 
cites Mintzberg (1979) who noted: "No matter how small our sample or what our interest, 
we have always tried to go into organizations with a well-defined focus to collect specific 
kinds of data systematically" (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.536).   
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), defining the research question within a broad topic is also 
important as it permits researchers to isolate the kind of organisation to be approached and 
the kind of data to be collected.  Following Eisenhardt’s guidance, the question for this 
research was defined to the use by AQ of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism as a 
tactic of asymmetric warfare against the West.  This defined the core group and 
organisation, namely AQ and those individuals inspired through AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative 
and brand to commit home-grown terrorism.  This is similar to the example, used by 
Eisenhardt in citing Pettigrew (1988), who defined the research question in terms of 
strategic change and competitiveness within large British corporations.  Following the 
decision on whether to use single or multiple case studies, as well as defining the research 
question, there remains the requirement to describe and link all elements of the study.   
 
As Thomas (2011) explains, the research subject, purpose, approach and process are all 
related to one another and can be categorised, or mapped out, to illustrate the design for a 
case study.  The table below adopts the guidance provided in Thomas (2011) and 
summarises the application of the case study methodology used for this research on Salafi-
Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.   
 
 
Subject 
 
Purpose 
 
Approach 
 
Process 
 
 
Key 
 
 
 
Evaluative 
Exploratory 
 
 
 
Testing a theory 
 
 
 
 
Multiple                        Retrospective  
                                         (historical) 
                                     
Table 4.5. Design for the Case Study Approach used in this Research  
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Table 4.5 demonstrates the key components of the approach applied for this research topic 
using case study methodology.  As Thomas (2011) explains, the researcher must decide on 
the subject and explain why that particular subject has been chosen - for example, it might 
provide a unique example and stand out.  For this research topic the subjects were chosen 
because they were key cases of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, while the 
purpose of it is evaluative and exploratory, because the research aims to analyse and 
examine the nature of relationships by going deep into the background and to provide 
granular detail of each case.  The approach chosen for this study was to test a theory.  The 
next stage in research design is the selection criteria of the key cases used, followed by an 
explanation of using the OODA Loop as the analytical lens through which to test the theory 
in this research.   
 
 
4.9 Case Study Selection Criteria  
 
To mitigate the risk of this research project becoming too broad or having too many 
objectives, the recommendations in Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) were applied, in which they 
advised placing boundaries on case study research.  An appropriate method of introducing 
boundaries to research is to establish the selection criteria.  The following sets out the 
selection criteria used to elect the three cases and then provides a brief summary of each 
case.  The selection criteria relates to the context in which they occurred and the 
characteristics of the cases themselves.  A detailed case study analysis is undertaken in 
Chapter Five.   
 
4.9.1 Context 
 (i) Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
 
The use of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism as a selection criterion for this 
research is comparable to previous research into home-grown terrorism.  For example, 
Mullins (2011) established that to be included in his sample cases had to involve individuals 
who espoused rhetoric or justification for their actions in terms of Sunni Islamist, jihadi 
ideology and were involved in one or more related activities including: a) promoting jihadi 
ideology, b) recruiting others to the jihad, c) engaging in paramilitary-style terrorist training, 
and/or d) planning acts of violence in furtherance of Salafi-Jihad.  For the three cases used 
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in this research the available open-source data confirms a direct or indirect connection with 
Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations, even if this connection does not involve any contact by 
or with members of Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations, such as the AQ leadership.  It can 
include those who obtained their inspiration from the internet or attended mosques where 
extremist Islamic ideology was taught, without the members of the mosque being members 
of AQ, JI or other Salafi-Jihadi groups. 
 
A key case used in Jones (2012) describes the successful counter-terrorism actions in 2007 
that stopped the Fort Dix plot by a group of Muslim men who had been long-term US 
residents.  The group had no direct link or contact with AQ, but, as Jones explains, they 
were inspired by messages from bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki, that also 
demonstrated a change of strategy of AQ: 
 
It was the kind of strategy that some extremists, including the Syrian strategist 
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, had embraced.  Al-Suri, whose work was widely circulated 
on jihadist websites, encouraged Muslims to become involved in individual 
jihad and small cell terrorism.  (Jones, 2012, p.289). 
 
One of the most effective producers of Salafi-Jihadi narrative and inspiration for AQ’s 
movement to a global strategy to generate home-grown terrorists was Anwar al-Awlaki.  
Jones (2012) explains that al-Awlaki’s clever use of language, his passion for Jihad and his 
internet and social media skills were “a powerful combination” (Jones, 2012, p.293).   Al-
Awlaki was continually making DVDs and YouTube and Facebook presentations of his 
sermons on Jihad, whereby impressionable young Muslims could connect anywhere in the 
world.  Al-Awlaki’s most effective publication that continues today is the Inspire magazine.  
One of the first issues contained an article with the title “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of 
Your Mom”.  Until the time of his death on 30 September 2011, al-Awlaki had become one 
of the most influential figures promoting the Salafi-Jihadi narrative through AQ in the 
Arabian Peninsula, after he moved back from the United States to his original homeland of 
Yemen.    
 
In 2009, al-Awlaki published 44 Ways to Support Jihad, which became one of the most 
widely read of all his publications.  It outlines the obligation of violent jihad on every 
Muslim, which can be achieved by assuming either a direct or supporting role.  It was an 
easily readable document that connected with young, disaffected and unexceptional 
Muslim men.  A CBS News Online article reported that according to a January 2009 
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intelligence document obtained by The Associated Press, about eleven percent of visitors to 
al-Awlaki's website are in the United States.  Essentially, here is an illustrative example of 
the Salafi-Jihadi narrative inspiring Western-based, unexceptional and impressionable 
Muslim men, where no direct connection or contact is required to be prepared to commit 
home-grown terrorism. 
   
Another report demonstrates the irony of how AQ promoted the Salafi-Jihadi narrative 
through US-based registered websites.  A 2010 ABC News report from an FBI Intelligence 
assessment determined that approximately 80 percent of those sites existed on US-based 
computer servers.  US officials said these sites rapidly gained popularity when Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, the leader of AQ in Iraq, began to post beheading videos on the internet in 
2003.  Former US White House Counterterrorism Adviser, Richard Clarke, was quoted in the 
ABC News report saying, "this is what we have feared for a very long time—that finally the 
ideology of radical Islam is effectively reaching into the United States to disaffected people 
here over the Internet" (Ryan, Thomas and Olivaries, 22 July 2010).   
 
This research will not look at terrorism or acts of terrorism that occur within the context of 
a civil war, insurgency or guerrilla war between a government and an internal anti-
government movement.  Typical examples of this, involving the use of terrorism, would be 
the conflict in Northern Ireland, the civil war in Sri Lanka, or the Muslim and Communist 
insurgencies in the Philippines.  Even though these conflicts involved versions of home-
grown terrorism within their own specific contexts, they were not inspired by the Salafi-
Jihadi narrative and therefore are out of context for the study of this phenomenon.  It is not 
possible to consider all cases of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism and therefore 
this thesis has selected three key cases, one each from the United Kingdom, Australia and 
the United States.   
 
 (ii) Home-grown terrorism 
 
The second contextual criterion for selection as a key case for this research is that the 
terrorism must be home-grown terrorism.  For each case, the individuals involved must 
have either succeeded in carrying out a terrorist attack, conducted activities that were 
intended to directly assist a terrorist attack, or were involved in the direct planning of a 
terrorist attack on their Western country of residence, or the Western country where they 
were a citizen.  According to Wilner and Dubouloz (2010), the source of home-grown 
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terrorism influence is AQ, who has created a Salafi-Jihadi movement that found pockets of 
opportunity within certain groups or individuals resident in Western society.   
 
In 2007, the US Congress defined home-grown terrorism in legislation in the Violent 
Radicalization and Home-grown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007.  In that Act, it defined 
the term as follows: 
 
The term ‘home-grown terrorism’ means the use, planned use, or threatened 
use of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and 
operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United 
States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian 
population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives. (Violent Radicalization and Home-grown Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2007) 
 
This definition is similar to the themes and indicators described in other research into 
home-grown terrorism.  For example, in their work for the NYPD on radicalisation, Silber 
and Bhatt (2007) explained that rather than being directed from AQ abroad, these plots 
have been conceptualised and planned by “unremarkable” local residents or citizens who 
sought to attack their country of residence, utilising AQ as their inspiration and ideological 
reference point.  Silber and Bhatt (2007) point out some of these home-grown terrorism 
cases include: 
 Madrid’s March 2004 attack 
 Amsterdam’s Hofstad Group 
 London’s July 2005 attack 
 Australia’s Operation Pendennis (which thwarted an attack(s) in November 2005) 
 The Toronto 18 Case (which thwarted an attack in June 2006) 
  (Silber and Bhatt 2007, p 7). 
 
In Thachuk, Kimberley, Bowman and Richardson (2008), home-grown terrorists are said to 
fall into three categories:  
 
1) immigrants and visitors: legal or illegal; 2) second- and third-generation 
members of the Muslim diaspora community; and 3) converts to Islam. These 
groups are not mutually exclusive, as, for example, immigrants who may 
undergo religious conversion after arriving in the country in which they 
eventually plot acts of terrorism. (Thachuk et al, 2008, p.2). 
 
For the most part, home-grown terrorists have been citizens and residents born, raised and 
educated in the countries they attack, and groups have been self-generated and 
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independently organized.  A study by Bakker (2006) of over two hundred European 
jihadists, revealed that over 90 percent were residents of a European country and almost 
60 percent retained European citizenship.  In their comparative research into home-grown 
in the US and the UK, Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) explain that home-grown 
terrorism describes terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals who were either born or 
raised in the West.  “In recent years, over two hundred men and women born or raised in 
the West have participated in, or provided support for Islamic terrorist plots and attacks” 
(Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009, p.11).  In a paper by Khatchadourian (2007), an FBI 
official is reported as stating that home-grown terrorists are those who “have picked up the 
sword of the idea” and are willing to attack their own countries, even if they are themselves 
killed in the process.”  This could be just as easily used to describe convicted terrorists such 
as Timothy McVeigh, a US born-and-bred white male who was convicted, tried and 
executed for the 1995 Oklahoma bombing which killed 168 people.  However, McVeigh did 
not intend to take his own life in the process.  Nevertheless, this research will be confined 
to the Salafi-Jihadi movement’s use of terrorism within Western countries.  It will not focus 
on terrorist attacks against governments or regimes in the Middle East or other Islamic 
countries.   
 
4.9.2 Characteristics 
 
Under Characteristics there were three prerequisites to qualify for selection as a key case in 
this research. 
 
 (i) Conspiracy to commit and attempt to commit a successful attack 
 
For selection in this research a key case must have involved an individual or group who have 
either conspired to plan, attempted and failed, or successfully carried out a home-grown 
terrorist attack.  Under the legal system of most Western countries, conspiracy to commit a 
serious criminal offence such as armed robbery, murder or terrorism is an offence of which 
one can be convicted.  In his review of Australian legislation on terrorism since the 
September 2001 attacks on the US, Crowley (2010) explains the disjunction between the 
traditional criminal law principles of attempted offences and modern counter-terrorism 
legislation becomes obvious in the Benbrika and Elomar trials where no terrorist act 
occurred.  Crowley argues “this lack of a completed terrorist act is a consistent fact in the 
conduct of all 21 persons convicted in Australia since 2001” (Crowley 2010, p. 62). 
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In 2005, the Australian Government amended the key provisions in the Criminal Code Act 
1995, to extend the legal responsibility and accountability for terrorism.  
  
Section 101 - Terrorism 
 
101.1 Terrorist acts 
(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in a terrorist act. 
Penalty: Imprisonment for life [...] 
 
101.2 Providing or receiving training connected with terrorist acts 
(1)[...] 
   (2)[...] 
   (3) A person commits an offence under this section even if: 
  (a) a terrorist act does not occur; or 
(b) the training is not connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person 
in, or 
                     assistance in a specific terrorist act; or 
(c) the training is connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, 
or    
      assistance in more than one terrorist act[...ix] 
 
 The Australian Criminal Code is explicit and therefore provides a sufficient guide to this 
aspect of the selection criteria. 
 
 (ii) Availability of adequate open-source data 
 
For selection as a key case in this research there also had to be available adequate open-
source data.  As Thomas (2011 and 2009) explains, gathering data from documents 
represents an entirely different proposition from gathering data from people.  As this 
research did not involve interviewing subjects involved in terrorism, the primary source of 
data gathering is from documents such as court transcripts, government reports and official 
evidentiary findings.  Use of documentary evidence only is not uncommon in academic 
research.  For example, historians and anthropologists rely on this form of data collection as 
many of their areas of academic research involve people and events where there is no one 
alive to interview.  In his work on the use of documentary evidence for research, McCulloch 
(2004) emphasises the potential power of documentary studies in education, history and 
the social sciences and states that to understand documents is to read between the lines of 
our material world.  
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The seal of good case study research is the use of multiple data sources to enhance data 
credibility (Baxter and Jack 2008; Patton 1990; and Yin 2003).  Data for this thesis was 
obtained from a variety of open-source material in the form of academic journals, media 
publications, official published government reports and findings from investigations, 
archival records and published interviews recorded with those involved in the attempted or 
successful terrorist attacks.  This variety was a primary component of the research strategy 
to triangulate and test the veracity of the multiple sources of information.  No direct 
observations or participant observations were possible or practical for this research.  
 
Open-source data and information for this research included, but was not limited to, the 
following: 
 
1. All traditional and online media reports from magazines, major newspapers, TV and 
radio interviews and reports; these were particularly useful when there was limited 
availability of Official Government reports of information.   
 
2. Publications, pamphlets, online articles, speeches, interviews and written sources 
from members of the Salafi-Jihadi movement, the convicted terrorists and 
Government officials, terrorism analysts and Government law enforcement, security 
and intelligence officials. 
 
3. Legislation, court reports and judges’ statements, Government Department policy 
statements, white papers, counter-terrorism policy and other formal government 
documents, where available. 
 
4. Non-fiction books and other published works on terrorism and home-grown 
terrorism. 
 
5. Academic peer-reviewed journal articles, conference papers and presentations. 
 
 
 (iii) Unexceptional individuals 
 
The final characteristic selection criterion required the Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorists to be unexceptional individuals.  This may seem like an unnecessary or irrelevant 
requirement; however, what makes these key cases significant and relevant is the fact that 
unexceptional residents or citizens of Western countries could be inspired to carry out 
terrorism on their home soil.  It would be obvious if the terrorists were already hardened 
members of AQ or JI and somehow covertly entered Australia, Canada, the UK or the US.   
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As established in Sageman (2004), Mullins (2010) and Jones (2012), before the home-grown 
terrorists selected in their research had travelled to Pakistan, Afghanistan or Yemen for 
basic military training, none had any experience in the military.  They did not come from a 
hard-core of guerrilla fighters or former special force soldiers, nor had they served on the 
front lines in Iraq with al Zarqawi, against US forces.  For example, the first US citizen to be 
charged with treason in over 50 years was Adam Gadahn, who Jones (2012) describes from 
FBI reports as being an unexceptional, ordinary person.  As reported by Khatchadourian 
(2007) and Jones (2012), Gadahn was born in Oregon, grew up in rural California and 
converted to Islam at age 17.  Khatchadourian (2007) describes how no one who knew 
Gadahn before his religious awakening ever thought he would join AQ.  However, as 
Khatchadourian (2007) explains, in a short timeframe Gadahn, or “Azzam the American”, 
became a senior operative for AQ.  
 
In his analysis, Sageman (2004) aimed to empirically test traditional theories of terrorist 
behaviour, psychology, social status and other potential profile factors.  After analysing 172 
cases of Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorists, including members of AQ, he found that they had 
received a wide range of education, and many who had been radicalised in the West were 
from caring, middle-to-upper-class, mainstream families.  The vast majority of the men had 
no criminal records or history of mental disorders.  In their case study research leading to 
the development of the NYPD model of radicalisation, Silber and Bhatt (2007) determined 
that those vulnerable at the pre-radicalisation stage tended to be educated and from 
middle-class backgrounds, with little if any previous criminal involvement.  In fact, they 
were described as ‘‘having ‘ordinary’ lives and jobs’’ (Silber and Bhatt 2007, p.23).  In other 
words, they were unexceptional people.  The one single specific trait they all had in 
common was their shared support of the cause inspired AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  The 
table below summarises the selection criteria for this research: 
 
 
 
 
Case Study 
Selection Criteria 
Contextual Characteristics 
 
1. Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
 
1. Conspiracy to commit (attempted 
or successful) attack 
 
 
2. Home-grown 
 
2. Enough open source data 
 
3. Unexceptional individuals 
Table 4.6: Summary of Selection Criteria  
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Even with the selection criteria established, it is important to place limits on the scope of 
the case studies chosen to ensure feasibility and to maintain a focus on the research 
objective.  The three cases have been chosen because they provide distinct examples of 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, while their geographical spread covers 
different operational environment settings.     
 
This scope assists with the analysis of the data and adheres to a warning by Yin (2003), who 
argued there is a temptation during the analysis phase to analyse data out of the scope of 
the research question.  These particular cases are from three different countries and 
demonstrate the operational and environmental adaptation of home-grown terrorism.  
That said, they have not been treated independently, but as part of a focused analysis that 
continues to test and challenge the research hypothesis.  Baxter and Jack (2008) explain: 
 
one danger associated with the analysis phase is that each data source would 
be treated independently and the findings reported separately. This is not the 
purpose of a case study. Rather, the researcher must ensure that the data are 
converged in an attempt to understand the overall case, not the various parts 
of the case, or the contributing factors that influence the case. (Baxter and 
Jack, 2008, p.555)   
 
This thesis adopts the recommendations of Baxter and Jack (2008) and Yin (2003) by 
critically assessing the relevance of the three cases chosen and identifying a convergence of 
themes and common elements that either confirm the hypothesis or are rejected.  The 
validity of this research could be criticised because it only uses three key cases.  In an 
examination of case study research on terrorism, Sheehan (2012) argues that insights 
gained from the study of small-n qualitative case studies may be relevant to the 
development of standards to assess and compare large-n terrorism datasets.  Equally 
important to consider is what Sheehan (2012) argues - that ever since Geddes’ (1990) paper 
on “how the cases you choose affect the answers you get,” small-n qualitative researchers 
have quite self-consciously tried to improve the quality of small-n data.  Importantly, the 
insights and illustrative lessons from testing a theory can be relevant and equally applicable 
to any number of key case studies in the area of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism.  Further, the three cases chosen for this thesis were selected to ensure 
transparency and to debunk criticisms of self-fulfilling examples to pre-determine the 
outcome or research objective. 
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4.10 The OODA Loop – Unit of Analysis 
 
While Chapter Three established the OODA Loop as the strategic model of terrorism to be 
used in this thesis, critical to the significance of this research are the contextual conditions 
in which the Salafi-Jihadi movement has evolved.  These contextual conditions include 
terrorism against Western countries and, more specifically, how the movement adapted to 
use home-grown terrorism as an asymmetrical tactic.  These conditions are important for 
understanding the current terrorism phenomenon and case study research methodology is 
a relevant and appropriate tool.  In this research the aim is to analyse the adaptation of the 
Salafi-Jihadi movement and its use of home-grown terrorism through the use of Boyd’s 
OODA Loop.  This is the unit of analysis for this research. 
 
It is critical to the case study methodological design of this research to understand the use 
of the OODA Loop as the unit of analysis, or the analytical lens; it is the point at which the 
theory is tested for this research.  Boyd’s theory of strategy, as described in his Theme for 
Disintegration and Collapse, describes the need to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses.  Home-grown terrorism is definitely a method of achieving 
this strategic objective.  In relation to strategy, Boyd was heavily influenced by Sun Tzu’s 
The Art of War and, overwhelmingly, by Sun Tzu’s discourse on strategy.  Osinga (2005) 
describes Sun Tzu as Boyd’s conceptual father and distils Sun Tzu’s strategic advice down to 
the following: “Preserve harmony, create chaos and achieve victory by continually keeping 
the enemy off balance through a superior capability to adapt” (Osinga 2005, p.64).  The 
ability to inspire impressionable Muslim men to carry out terrorist attacks on the Western 
countries in which they live is a representation of Sun Tzu’s advice on strategy.  Given how 
Boyd built his conceptual framework, the OODA Loop, with a heavy influence from Sun Tzu, 
this adaptation by the Salafi-Jihadi movement is a relevant and highly applicable analytical 
lens for this research. 
  
The purpose of the case study is descriptive and evaluative and the research approach used 
is theory testing, through a process using multiple case studies.  A multiple case study 
approach, each subjected to a detailed assessment, offers greater scope of comparison 
against the analytical frame used in this thesis.  The use of multiple, historical case studies 
allows for triangulation of contextual issues and actions of influence from which to explore 
and test the hypothesis in this thesis.  It also allows for cross-case comparisons as a means 
of drawing inferences and conclusions.  Further, access to information on historical cases is 
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easier, as the most prominent Salafi-Jihadi home-grown incidents have been widely 
reported through open-source data collection points.    
 
This research focuses on three cases of home-grown terrorism - from Australia, the United 
States and the UK - using Boyd’s OODA Loop as the conceptual or analytical lens.  One of 
the few academic attempts to apply the OODA Loop to Salafi-Jihadi terrorism was published 
by Ford (2010).  However, Ford (2010) provides very little direct comparison with terrorism 
at all, even though there is a chapter entitled “The War on Terror”.  It is only towards the 
end of the paper that there is a real focus on AQ, but this is more in relation to the recent 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Essentially, there is no use of the OODA Loop as the analytical 
lens by Ford (2010).  While it is feasible to argue that the US-led wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan provided AQ the opening in Iraq to start a jihad defensive war, Ford (2010) 
offers no discussion on actual terrorism and none on the use of home-grown terrorism as a 
tactic by the Salafi-Jihadi groups.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Osinga’s 2006 work is one of the few academically, peer-
reviewed research contributions available on Boyd and modern conflict.  Even though he 
does not entirely focus on the Salafi-Jihadi movement, Osinga (2006) provides an excellent 
contextual and theoretical discussion on Boyd and the paradigm shift required to analyse 
and examine terrorism inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi movement.  Osinga (2006) delivers a 
critical analysis of the eclectically dynamic paradigms that Boyd explores in his development 
of the OODA Loop.  However, Osinga (2006) does not use case study research methodology 
to test a theory or critique a unique human phenomenon.  In fact, there appears to be no 
available academic, peer-reviewed publications using case study methodology with the 
OODA Loop as the analytical lens used to examine Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism. 
 
4.11 Three Key Cases of Salafi-Jihadi Inspired Home-grown Terrorism 
 
The following sets out the three key cases selected for this research and establishes how 
they meet each of the selection criteria.  Chapter Five contains the detailed case study 
analysis. 
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4.11.1 Case Study 1 - The Australian Case of Jack Roche 
 
The first key case study explored and evaluated for this research involves Jack Roche, 
widely known as Australia’s first convicted terrorist.  In 2000, it was discovered that the 
Salafi-Jihadi movement, in this case Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), considered attacking Israeli and 
American interests, or assassinating a prominent Melbourne-based Jewish businessman.  
The details of this case study are well established in the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia case, R. v. Roche 2005.  There is also significant open-source reporting and 
academic, peer-reviewed research that together meet the selection criteria requirement 
for this research project.  The Jack Roche case also meets the selection criteria of being 
inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi movement.  According to R. v. Roche, WASCA 4 2005, Roche’s 
acceptance of and inspiration from the Salafi-Jihadi movement is evidenced by the letter he 
wrote to his son, making reference to: 
 
The greater sacrifice worthy of the highest reward from Allah that I am about 
to undertake.  As Muslims we are obligated to perform jihad to uphold the laws 
of Allah.  As we see today, the disbelievers are now out of control and believe 
that their ways based on inequality, arrogance, et cetera, are right.  I hate them 
for that and need to learn more about how to combat them. (R. v. Roche, 
WASCA 4, Supreme Court of Western Australia, January 14, 2005) 
 
This quote alone is not enough to confirm Roche is a Salafi-Jihadist himself.  However, the 
rhetoric around injustice, insult and Western transgression of Islam, and the need to punish 
them for this, is a common theme among those who have been inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative.  Further, it fits with first of the AQ master narratives identified by the OSC (2011) 
as discussed in Chapter Two.  In this quote, Roche is expressing what Aly (2011) described 
as the violent, religious aspects of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative as opposed to the secular 
aspects.  Aly (2011) explains that the secular aspects involve political, economic and social 
contexts in the radicalisation process of an individual.  A commitment to the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement is a criterion for selection as a relevant case study for this thesis.  As Aly and 
Striegher (2012) established, cognitive radicalisation (the adherence to radical Salafi-Jihadi 
ideologies) is a key predictor for violent behaviour.  In this regard Roche was an ideal and 
impressionable candidate for the Salafi-Jihadi movement.  In 1997, Roche joined Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) in Australia and in 2000 he travelled to Afghanistan and met with senior AQ 
leaders (including bin Laden).  While in Afghanistan, Roche received military training, 
including a 10-day explosives course.  It was at this time that Roche was given instructions 
to carry out surveillance on potential Israeli targets in Australia.  As Mullins (2011) explains, 
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Roche received money and training in Afghanistan, as well as advice and direction from JI 
and AQ.   
 
While not part of the criteria, Roche was also intent on recruiting others to establish a local 
AQ cell in Australia.  As established in the Supreme Court Appeal Case of R. v. Roche, 
WASCA 4, 2005, the "central core" of the conspiracy, had it proceeded, would have 
involved the manufacture of some kind of bomb or explosive device, the acquisition of 
some means of conveying that device to the Israeli Embassy, its detonation and 
(presumably) the escape of those involved.  In November 2002, Roche was arrested under 
suspicion of conspiring to bomb the Israeli embassy in Canberra in 2000.  In 2004, he was 
convicted under the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 and sentenced to 
nine years in prison, effective from the date of his arrest.  Roche subsequently appealed the 
sentence on the grounds that it did not take into account the extent of his full cooperation 
with Australian authorities.  His appeal was rejected and Roche served the full term of his 
sentence; he was released on 7 May 2007.  
 
The Roche case meets the home-grown selection criteria for this thesis because Roche was 
born in a Western nation, the UK, and migrated to Australia around 1979, where he 
remained a long term resident.  In 2004 Roche was convicted and sentenced for terrorism 
after conspiring and planning to carry out an act of terrorism in Australia.  There is a need 
to deal with the potential criticism that while Roche originally intended to carry out 
terrorism in Australia, it was aimed at an Israeli target.  This does not detract from the 
relevance of the Roche case as an example of the Salafi-Jihadi movement inspiring an 
impressionable, potential home-grown terrorists.  It remains illustrative of home-grown 
terrorism being employed as a tactic of asymmetric warfare against Australian citizens, 
including members of the Jewish community in Australia.  It is likely that Roche’s planned 
attack would have resulted in collateral damage, thereby injuring or killing other 
Australians, regardless of their ethnic or religious background.   
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Roche key case is how it meets the selection 
criteria of a planned attack, attempted or successful.  As is known from open-source data, 
and specifically from the R. v. Roche, WASCA 4 case notes, Roche eventually abandoned the 
plot.  A fair criticism could be that the Jack Roche case did not involve a successfully 
completed or even attempted act of terrorism, therefore how can this be used as a credible 
key case of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism?  In responding to this criticism, 
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simply because an act of terrorism was abandoned, did not proceed for a range of 
conflicting influences, or proceeded but was not successful, its significance or relevance in 
relation to this thesis (nor in relation to Salafi-Jihadi home-grown terrorism) is not reduced.   
 
There is an appropriate analogy within criminal law in relation to conspiracy or an attempt 
to commit an offence.  This is succinctly stated by Justice Murray, in the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia appeal case of Jack Roche.  Murray ACJ stated that the “conspiracy to 
commit an offence, like an attempt to commit an offence and incitement to commit an 
offence, is an inchoate offence chargeable although the acts necessary to complete the 
commission of the principal offence have not occurred” (R. v. Roche, WASCA 4, Supreme 
Court of Western Australia, 14 January, 2005).  In other words, it is irrelevant whether Jack 
Roche successfully completed or conspired but failed to carry out the terrorist attack in 
Australia; therefore this is considered a legitimate case study for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
In their own case analysis of Roche, Aly and Striegher (2012) noted that while Roche 
disengaged behaviourally with terrorism (that is, he did not carry out the act), he retained 
the radicalised worldview through which he regarded himself as a “potential soldier”, 
fighting against perceived injustices.  Roche believed that there are conditions and 
circumstances in which militant jihad is justified (such as the US war in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and plight of Palestine).  This is a belief or frame of reference that is consistent with what 
Silber and Bhatt (2007) described as the indoctrination phase in their model of 
radicalisation.  Roche also saw himself as a “warrior in a holy war”—a belief consistent with 
Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) jihadisation.  The fact that Roche did not in the end follow through 
with a terrorist attack in Australia is not what is relevant to establishing the prima facie case 
in this thesis; what is relevant is that AQ and other vanguards of the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement, such as JI, changed their strategic construct of terrorism to home-grown 
terrorism.   
 
The Roche case meets another selection criterion because it involved an unexceptional 
individual.  Even though Roche received training in Afghanistan, he hardly comes across as a 
hardened, professional terrorist and or Jihadist fighter.  Similar to the four London 
Underground terrorists, there was nothing extraordinary about Jack Roche or his life that 
set him apart or pre-determined his trajectory towards being attracted to the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement.  As Porter and Kebbell (2010) establish, numerous studies have compared 
terrorists with non-terrorists and have found no differences in psychopathology or family 
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background, socioeconomic or educational factors.  As determined in Atran and Sageman 
(2006), Bakker (2006) and Copland (2005), no common terrorist profile exists.  As explained 
by Horgan (2008), “a temptation has been to assume that some qualities of specialness 
exist within a specific group of terrorists, in terms of both what makes them alike as well as 
what presumably makes them different from the rest of us (or at least from those who do 
not engage in terrorism)” (Horgan, 2008, p.83). 
 
 
4.11.2 Case Study 2 - 7 July 2005 London Transport Network Attack  
 
The second key case selected for this research was the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks on the 
London metropolitan transport network (7/7 London terrorist attack).  The British House of 
Commons Intelligence and Security Committee report into the London terrorist attacks 
recorded that on that day three explosions occurred at around 0850 on the London 
Underground system: the first on the Circle line between Aldgate and Liverpool Street; the 
next at Edgware Road station; and the third on the Piccadilly line between Russell Square 
and King’s Cross.  At 0947 a fourth explosion occurred on the upper deck of a London bus in 
Tavistock Place.  The bombers, who were also killed in what are known to have been suicide 
attacks, were identified as Mohammad Sidique Khan, Hasib Hussain, Shehzad Tanweer and 
Germaine Lindsay. (House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee: Report into 
the London Terrorist Attacks; May 2006). 
 
The terrorist attack on the London public transport system was chosen as a key case 
because it meets the selection criteria outlined in Table 4.6.  For instance, the terrorists 
were inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi movement, in this case AQ.  The House of Commons 
report describes the terrorists’ individual and collective pathways to seeking closer 
association with the Salafi-Jihadi movement, including possible connections with members 
of AQ networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  While the House of Commons Report is not 
unequivocal about the terrorists’ direction or instruction from AQ, it is irrelevant to the 
strategic context of this research.  Atran (2010) explains that “most present-day Takfiris are 
“born again” in their late teens and early twenties and have little knowledge of religion 
beyond the fact that they consider themselves true Muslims who must fight enemies near 
and far” (Atran 2010, p 271).     
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This key case also meets the second requirement under the contextual selection criteria - 
that is, the attack needed to be home-grown.  The 7/7 London terrorist attack assailants 
self-connected with the takfiri theme of violent consequences against the very same 
Western society and social structure in which they had all been raised and educated.  This is 
a classic indication of being inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi movement and a confirmation of 
home-grown terrorism.  The London public transport terrorist attack also met the selection 
criterion of the terrorists being unexceptional individuals.  Aside from Jermaine Lindsay, the 
members of the group were second-generation British citizens of Pakistani descent.  As the 
initial House of Commons report sets out, their parents had come to West Yorkshire from 
Pakistan many years before, found work, settled and taken British citizenship.  Jermaine 
Lindsay was born in Jamaica and moved to the UK with his mother at an early age, around 
1986, where they both converted to Islam.   
 
Apart from Jermaine Lindsay, the other three terrorists were born into families who were 
moderate followers of Islam.  That is, for most of their life they were unexceptional, 
moderate followers of Islam, from families who were also unexceptional.  As the British 
House of Commons report states: 
 
a) this case demonstrates the real difficulty for law enforcement agencies and local 
communities in identifying potential terrorists. All four were open about their strict 
religious observance but there was little outward sign that this had spilled over into 
potentially violent extremism. Khan generally appeared to others as a role model to 
young people; Tanweer as mature, modest and balanced. Hussain’s character did 
not stand out much: extremist doodling on his schoolbook was picked up but it is a 
long jump from this to identifying a potential suicide bomber. Lindsay, particularly 
towards the end, appears to have behaved erratically and possibly criminally, but 
not in a way that aroused suspicion of terrorist intentions. 
 
b) there is little in their backgrounds which mark them out as particularly vulnerable 
to radicalisation, with the possible exception of Lindsay. Khan, Tanweer and Hussain 
were apparently well integrated into British society. Lindsay appears to have had 
more instability at various points in his life, but not exceptionally so.   
(House of Commons, 2006, p.26) 
 
Lindsay became a Muslim after his mother converted to Islam following their emigration 
from Jamaica to the UK.  Mohammed Sidique Khan was described by his wife, when she first 
met him, as “sensible, polite…a good family man and he came from a good family” (Jones, 
2012, p. 188).  As this detail describes, this key case meets the relevant contextual criteria 
to qualify for selection. 
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Finally, this key case qualifies because there is a substantial amount of open-source data 
and information.  This is in the form of academic papers, media reports, official government 
inquiries and published intelligence reports.  The House of Commons report is a highly 
informative open-source data collection point, because unlike many media reports, it sticks 
firmly to known facts and does not emotively express a view that influences the reader’s 
judgement.  Even so, there is a substantial amount of information from all others sources to 
triangulate the data and draw logical and rational conclusions through evaluative and 
descriptive case study analysis. 
 
4.11.3 Case Study 3 – 15 April 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing  
 
The third key case selected for this research is the Boston Marathon bombing.  The United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Case 1:13-mj-02106-MBB, details that 
on 15 April 2013, two explosions hit spectators situated near the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon, killing three people and injuring just over 200.  Two brothers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev 
and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, separately detonated backpacks comprising so-called “pressure 
cooker” bombs, by the use of their mobile phones.  In 2004, the United States Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), issued an official warning about pressure cooker bombs: 
 
Typically, these bombs are made by placing TNT or other explosives in a 
pressure cooker and attaching a blasting cap at the top of the pressure cooker. 
The size of the blast depends on the size of the pressure cooker and the 
amount of explosive placed inside. Pressure cooker bombs are made with 
readily available materials and can be as simple or as complex as the builder 
decides. These types of devices can be initiated using simple electronic 
components including, but not limited to, digital watches, garage door openers, 
cell phones or pagers. As a common cooking utensil, the pressure cooker is 
often overlooked when searching vehicles, residences or merchandise crossing 
the U.S. Borders. 
(United States Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletin on 
pressure cooker bombs: Cited on 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/PotentialTerrorist.pdf) 
 
Following forensic investigation of CCTV footage, Boston Police and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) were able to determine the movements of the brothers up to the time of 
the explosions and as they escaped from the scene.  (United States vs. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 
Case 1:13-mj-02106-MBB, United States Department of Justice. 21 April 2013) 
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The Boston Marathon terrorist attack has been selected as a key case for this research 
because it meets all of the selection criteria.  Firstly, not only was it inspired by the 
narrative of the Salafi-Jihadi movement, but also it represented a further adaptation of the 
movement’s ability to enable self-perpetuating producers of home-grown terrorism.  Of the 
two brothers, it is reported that in the three to four years leading up to the Boston 
Marathon bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev increased his commitment to Islamic extremism 
and became a follower of Salafi-Jihadi secular and religious ideology.  For example, as a 27 
June 2013 District of Massachusetts Grand Jury Indictment alleged, “at time unknown to 
the Grand Jury but before or on April 15, 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev downloaded to his 
computer a digital copy of a book entitled, “The Slicing Sword Against the One Who Forms 
Allegiances with the Disbelievers and Takes them as Supporters instead of Allah, His 
Messenger and Believers.””(District of Massachusetts Grand Jury Indictment, 27 June 2013, 
p.6).  Dzhokhar Tsarnaev had also downloaded several other AQ publications encouraging 
followers to commit violence against the perceived enemies of Islam.  It appers the AQ 
master narratives were a key source for the Tsarnaev brothers as they progressed through 
their trajectory towards an attack against their own citizens.  Yet the FBI did not find any 
support from or direct link to a terrorist organisation.  Following his arrest, Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev told police that: 
 
[…] he and his brother had not been acting with any terrorist groups, the 
officials said, and told the investigators that they had learned about building 
explosive devices from Inspire, the online English magazine of the AQ affiliate in 
Yemen.  (Cooper, Schmidt & Schmitt, 2013, April 23). 
 
As stated, the Tsarnaev brothers learned how to make pressure-cooker bombs from AQ’s 
Inspire magazine.  They did not go to Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen to attend an AQ 
training camp or participate in training from any other AQ connected Salafi-Jihadi terrorist 
organisation.  Before his death in Yemen in 2010, a 24-year old American, Samir Khan, was 
the editor of Inspire and published an article entitled “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your 
Mom.”  Through the use of a modern, global interconnected tool such as the internet, the 
Salafi-Jihadi movement demonstrated its capacity to further evolve through the OODA Loop 
cycle to inspire self-generating, home-grown terrorism.     
 
Available open-source reports explain how in 2008 Tamerlan Tsarnaev became a devout 
Muslim and both brothers began attending the Islamic Society of Boston mosque, in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  Along with its sister mosque, the Islamic Society of Boston 
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Cultural Center, both places have a history of thier members being arrested and convicted 
for their direct involvement in Salafi-Jihadi terrorism (Dorrell, 2013, April 25).  In relation to 
the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center, The USA Today media report went on to say it: 
 
[…] has invited guests who have defended terrorism suspects. A former trustee 
appears in a series of videos in which he advocates treating gays as criminals, 
says husbands should sometimes beat their wives and calls on Allah (God) to kill 
Zionists and Jews, according to Americans for Peace and Tolerance, an interfaith 
group that has investigated the mosques. (Dorrell, 2013, April 25).   
 
The Islamic Society of Boston mosque and the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center take 
advantage of frustrated young Muslims who are resident in Western countries.  By exposing 
them to the Salafi-Jihadi narrative that connects their religious and secular feelings of 
disrespect and injustice, they continually tell their audience they are being humiliated by 
Western infidels.  This process seriously infects the audience’s orientation of their own 
OODA loop at the tactical level.  It begins to develop that schwerpunkt or implicit 
understanding between the strategic and tactical level of command and control, as 
identified by Boyd.  The next step in the cycle is when the members of the audience act 
upon this strategy for inciting violence through home-grown terrorism.  In 2012, Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev went to the North Caucuses, Chechnya and Dagestan, areas known for Islamic 
extremists.  According to US travel records, Tsarnaev arrived at Moscow's Sheremetyevo 
airport on 12 January 2012, returning on 17 July that same year.  He spent time in 
Makhachkala, Dagestan that summer (Huffington Post 21 April 2013; the UK Guardian 25 
April 2013).  Even so, there are a number of conflicting reports as to whether he met and 
trained with militant Islamic extremists.   
 
The brothers were also unexceptional people.  As with the other key cases in this research, 
they were not raised as hardened Islamic fundamentalists, they lived uneventful working 
class lives in Boston and did not perform above average academically.  While open-source 
information is ambiguous as to whether they received any military training, they certainly 
had no exceptional military training.  These factors meet the selection criteria of being 
unexceptional individuals and therefore qualify them for this research. 
 
This Boston Marathon bombing case demonstrates the full transformation from radicalised 
consumers to being self-generating producers of Salafi-Jihadi home-grown terrorism.  
Frustrated, hyper-sensitive, networked and impressionable young men who follow the 
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Salafi-Jihadi narrative, requiring few, if any, outside resources or assistance, are ideal 
candidates to become producers of Salafi-Jihadi terrorism.  More importantly relevant to 
this thesis is that the Boston Marathon bombing highlighted a further morphing of Salafi-
Jihadi home-grown terrorism.  In other words, the Boston Marathon bombing provided a 
third case that is descriptive, evaluative and tests the theory that AQ penetrated the 
Western government’s OODA loop through the use of the Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare.   
 
Even though there are few academic, peer-reviewed papers on the Boston Marathon 
bombing there is a significant amount of open-source data.  Nearly all information and 
qualitative data has been obtained from newspaper articles, opinion pieces and open-
source court and intelligence reports.    
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 
This chapter establishes that the subject of inquiry of this thesis is to focus on the “how” 
and “why” questions of the Salafi-Jihadi movement and its use of home-grown terrorism.  
This chapter also determines that the use of multiple case-study methodology is a relevant 
and applicable research design for this complex human phenomenon.  Further, each case 
selected for this research represents a unit of human activity embedded in the real world 
that can only be studied in context and cannot be manipulated or contrived to suit the 
objectives of the research.  It has also been established that the analytical framework from 
which to test the theory is COL. John Boyd’s OODA loop - a conceptual framework on 
strategy that has also been selected as the strategic model of terrorism, as established in 
Chapter Two. 
 
The three cases selected for this thesis from Australia, the UK and the US, are not only 
relevant, they also illustrate a progression in how the Salafi-Jihadi movement adapted 
through the OODA Loop in response to counter-terrorism strategies from Western nations - 
for example, from direct connection into Pakistan and Afghanistan and AQ terrorist training 
camps to the ideal model of self-generating home-grown terrorists who sat on their 
computer, mixed with close friends and were citizens or long-term residents of Western 
countries.  This chapter also established the selection criteria for determining the three 
case studies that consisted of contextual and characteristic prerequisites.  Even though 
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numerous cases of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism could have been chosen, it 
is not possible to study all known cases from available open-source data. 
 
Chapter Four also aimed to bring together key concepts and the critical theory from 
previous chapters.  This established a theoretically based understanding of the context in 
which the research methodology was applied.  Additionally, it set the foundations for the 
substantiative aspect of the case study analysis.  For example, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three, Brachman (2008) puts forward a very insightful argument about Salafi-Jihadism and 
supports an alternative theoretical application of home-grown terrorism that has been 
dominated by the debate between Sageman’s (2004) leaderless network and Hoffman’s 
(2006) command-and-control theory.  It was argued in Brachman (2008) that the Salafi-
Jihadi movement convinced a multitude of angry Muslim men to support and commit 
violent acts of terrorism through a puritanical call and interpretation of Islam.  The 
insightful part of Brachman’s argument is that the leaders of the global Salafi-Jihadist 
movement have mastered the art of transforming consumers of its ideas into producers of 
them.  In other words, the Salafi-Jihadi movement has got inside the Western government’s 
OODA loop, the fundamental objective for defeating an opponent.  The three cases set out 
in this methodology are significant and relevant in this context.  
 
Chapter Five examines and explores each case in detail to provide a descriptive and 
illustrative analysis to test the theory that home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric 
warfare by AQ and other Salafi-Jihadi terrorist movements, using the OODA Loop as the 
strategically adaptable model of terrorism. 
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Chapter 5: The Case Studies 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a descriptive and evaluative explanation of the three case studies 
selected for this thesis.  The qualitative data obtained through this case study research 
approach informs the critical analysis for Chapter Six by using the OODA Loop as the 
strategically adaptable model of terrorism.  The overall objective is to test the theory that 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare by AQ.  
Effectively, AQ observes, orientates, decides and acts, enabling it to cultivate terrorists to 
come from within the very population of the enemy it plans to attack.  The use of home-
grown terrorism demonstrates AQ’s strategically adaptable and dynamic approach to 
implementing its war against Western targets.   
 
Chapter Four established that the use of case study methodology is an appropriate research 
approach for the contemporary phenomenon of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism because it is a complex set of occurrences without concrete boundaries or 
borders (Yin 1981, George and Bennett 2005).  Through the detailed account of each case 
of home-grown terrorism presented in this chapter, it becomes evident that concrete 
boundaries and closed systems do not exist in regards to Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism.  As described in the previous chapter, the three case studies selected include the 
Australian home-grown terrorism case of Jack Roche, the 7/7 London terrorist attack, and 
the Boston Marathon Bombing that occurred on 15 April 2013.   
 
Using evidence obtained from primary and secondary open-source material, each case is 
presented as an example of tactical adaptability.  The use of Roche as an example of an 
unexceptional individual to avoid detection; the London Transport attack as an example of 
Western domestic planned attacks to overcome tactical challenges and penetrate the 
West’s OODA loop; and the Boston case of the Western domestic individuals with no 
known links to AQ but inspired by a narrative as an example of the evolution of AQ into a 
regenerative brand.  In effect the purpose of this Chapter is to highlight how the OODA 
Loop can be used to explain and explore the transformative, adaptability of AQ because the 
OODA Loop is itself a theoretical construct of continual transformation.  These are by no 
means the only cases of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism that could be used for 
this research.  
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5.2 Case Study 1 – The Australian Case of Jack Roche 
 
Jack Roche (also known as Khalid Roche) - born George Paul Holland in the United Kingdom 
in 1953 - was arrested in 2002 and became the first person in Australia to be convicted and 
jailed for terrorism offences, under the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 
1976.  His conviction related to conspiring between 15 February 2000 and 30 September 
2000 to commit a terrorist attack against the Israeli Embassy in Canberra (R -v- ROCHE 
[2005] WASCA 4).  As established in the Western Australian Supreme Court of Appeal, the 
Commonwealth offence of conspiracy is punishable "as if the offence to which the 
conspiracy relates had been committed" (R -v- ROCHE [2005] WASCA 4, p.5).  Significantly 
for this research, the preparations and planning for the conspiracy were directed and 
funded by AQ and inspired by its Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  Roche served the full term of his 
sentence until his release in 2007.  
 
As covered in Chapter Four, the Roche case succeeds in meeting the selection criteria.  For 
example, Jack Roche was unexceptional, with no history as a violent jihadist or experienced 
guerrilla fighter prior to converting to Islam or joining JI.  Roche was born into a military 
family and attempted to pursue a military career until he was dishonourably discharged 
only 18 months after joining the Royal Army Medical Corp.  As established in the previous 
chapter, Jack Roche also met the home-grown terrorist criteria having been born in the 
United Kingdom and living half of his life in Australia after moving to Sydney in 1973 
following his first marriage.  Not long after migrating to Australia his life began to fall apart 
as the result of alcohol abuse that led to his first divorce.  In 1992, Roche converted to Islam 
where the combination of pursuing Islam and the bonds built with other like-minded 
individuals filled a void in his life and provided a new sense of purpose (Squires 2004, Aly 
and Striegher 2012). 
 
The availability of open-source data was a key criterion for selection.  Information used to 
inform the analysis of the Jack Roche case was obtained from open-source documents that 
include court transcripts, academic published papers and media reports.  Nearly all 
available published academic work and media analysis on the Jack Roche case, when 
reporting the facts and chronology of events, draw on the 2005 Supreme Court Appeal, R -
v- ROCHE [2005] WASCA.  This research has also been fortunate to benefit from previous 
academic work by Aly and Striegher (2012), who as part of their primary source data 
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collection interviewed Jack Roche and were therefore able to record further contextual 
qualitative information. 
 
The objective in presenting the Jack Roche case is to use the OODA Loop to critically test 
the theory, that even before the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States AQ had 
identified the tactical significance of using Western-born or resident Muslims who were 
attracted to their Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  However, Roche’s religious conversion both to 
Islam and then to Salafi-Jihadism did not occur in a vacuum.  In their analysis of the role of 
religion in radicalisation and violent extremism in which they used Jack Roche as a case, Aly 
and Striegher (2012) conclude that religion plays a far lesser role in radicalisation toward 
violent extremism than other factors.  These other factors may include the combination of 
being intimately exposed to extremist views through the social bonds of an increasingly 
tight group and a deep sense of injustice as a result of Western foreign policy against 
Muslim people, led by the United States.  Roche’s conversion to Islam and trajectory 
towards violent Salafi-Jihadism came gradually and coincided with difficult personal 
circumstances in his life such as divorce and binge drinking.   
 
Before converting to Islam in 1992, Roche found solace within a close network of friends in 
Australia who happened to be Muslim, leading to an association with members of JI in 
Indonesia.  Upon becoming a Muslim, a sense of identity was built that became even 
stronger as the in-group felt it was under attack by the West and even Muslims who did not 
agree with its extreme interpretation of Islam (Porter and Kebbell 2010).  As argued by 
Sageman (2004) and Abrahms (2008) a social model of terrorism, or networks of friends, 
associates and family are strong factors in driving individuals towards extremism and even 
terrorism.  Through their proliferation of a Salafi-Jihadi narrative, AQ also created powerful 
bonds connecting physically disassociated individuals to become global network.  When this 
global community is perceived to be under attack, as presented by the AQ Master 
Narratives, the drive to defend Islam can be very strong.  For example, Squires (2004) 
reported Roche explaining that, “if someone punches you, you are allowed to punch them 
back. I am very concerned about my brothers and sisters of Islam who are being punched 
by these people” (Squires, 2004, p.9). 
 
The most concise primary source record of Jack Roche’s Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorist 
planning is set out in the 2005 Supreme Court Appeal Case, otherwise cited as Court 
Appeal, R -v- ROCHE [2005] WASCA.  Qualitative data, detailing the background and a 
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chronology of events leading to Roche’s arrest and conviction, was also established in 
interviews Roche gave to The Australian newspaper journalist Sally Neighbour in 2007, six 
months after his release from jail.   
 
Jack Roche’s conversion to Islam in 1992 saw him attend the Dee Why Mosque in Sydney 
and become a member of the Mantiqi Four, the Australian branch of JI that operated from 
the 1990s up until 2002 (see Neighbour 2007; Aly and Striegher 2012; Zammit 2010).  At 
that time JI was not a well-known Islamic organisation within Australia.  According to a 
2004 Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT) report, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to 
Australia, JI epitomises the evolution of Muslim militancy in South-East Asia.  The report 
explains that, “from origins as a separatist movement in Indonesia, it has evolved into an 
extremist organisation with links to AQ and is strongly influenced by bin Laden's ideology 
and methodology” (DFAT, 2004, 39).  Despite the emergence of JI as a terrorist group in 
Australia, evidence from the Supreme Court transcript and public interviews show that 
initially Jack Roche did not begin with the intention of being a Salafi-Jihadist or plan to 
conduct terrorist acts in the country in which he had become a long term resident.   
 
During the 2007 interview with Sally Neighbour, Jack Roche described this cognitive 
transition as taking place over several stages: first, around 1994, when he became JI’s 
Australian translator after he spent time teaching in Indonesia; then, in 2000, Roche was 
sent by JI to Malaysia to meet the group's chief of operations, Riduan Isamuddin, otherwise 
known as Hambali.  During this time, Hambali was transforming JI from a group devoted to 
securing an Islamic state in Indonesia into a fully-fledged terrorist organisation.  It is alleged 
that Hambali was responsible for seven terrorist attacks in 2000 (Magouirk, Atran and 
Sageman 2008).  The Sally Neighbour interview details how “Roche recorded in the 
notebook he kept during his journey that Hambali raised "the possibility to do something in 
Sydney during the Olympic Games.”” Roche’s time with Hambali is relevant in the context 
of this research for its illustrative effect.  As Aly and Striegher (2012) explain following their 
interview with Roche, Hambali was not just an important conduit to JI but also served as a 
spiritual leader.  This personal connection and experience is significant for its inspirational 
effect, positively reinforcing the cognitive transition Roche would have been experiencing 
at the time. 
 
According to the details established in the Supreme Court transcript, Roche became further 
embedded with the Salafi-Jihadi movement during visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan 
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between 15 February and 30 September 2000.  While in Afghanistan he met with bin Laden, 
where he was selected to join an AQ plan to attack Israeli and US targets in Australia (Aly 
and Striegher, 2012).  During this period in Afghanistan, Roche also met with other 
significant senior AQ figures such as Mukhtar (who turned out to be Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, the mastermind of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States) and 
AQ’s military commander, Mohammed Atef, also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri.  These 
meetings were coordinated by Hambali.  While in Afghanistan, Roche underwent a ten-day 
military and explosives training course at AQ’s Khandahar training camp.  Further, at this 
time Abu Hafs al-Masri asked him to recruit two or three white Australians to join a cell and 
carry out operations in Australia.  This is significant, as it may suggest that even before 9/11 
AQ had begun to recognise the potential, asymmetric utility of recruiting and supporting 
long-term residents or citizens of Western countries to conduct home-grown terrorist 
attacks.  In testimony released in the case United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui 
(2006), Khalid Sheikh Mohammed acknowledged the need for recruits with visas from non-
Arab countries for attacks inside the United States.  As described by Jones (2012), the case 
of US citizen Jose Padilla demonstrated that as early as 1998 AQ began training Western 
citizens, inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, to carry out attacks inside the US.  As Jones 
(2012) explains, Padilla’s US citizenship made him very useful for AQ.  Given Roche was 
born in a Western country and was a long-term resident in Australia, it is possible AQ began 
to determine the tactical and strategic significance of his attributes.  
 
The available open-source information on the Roche case describes how through a 
coordinated Salafi-Jihadi terrorist network between JI and AQ, Roche was provided with 
indoctrination, training, finances and direction as a British born, long-term resident of 
Australia (Zammit 2010; Aly and Striegher 2012; Neighbour 2007; Mullins 2011 and Court 
Appeal, R -v- ROCHE [2005] WASCA).  Despite this, in the statement of facts set out in the 
Court of Appeal transcript, upon returning to Australia Roche began to have doubts about 
fulfilling the planned attack.  Even so, Roche continued to conduct surveillance of potential 
targets and expressed his support for the Salafi-Jihadi cause in a letter to his son.  During 
Roche’s interview with Australian law enforcement agencies on 18 November 2000, the 
statement of facts explains the idea was either to destroy these targets or get rid of the 
person who was considered high up in the organisation or administration of US or Israeli 
interests in Australia.  In the letter to his son, Roche said: 
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The greater sacrifice worthy of the highest reward from Allah that I am about 
to undertake.  As Muslims we are obligated to perform jihad to uphold the laws 
of Allah.  As we see today, the disbelievers are now out of control and believe 
that their ways based on inequality, arrogance, et cetera, are right.  I hate them 
for that and need to learn more about how to combat them.  (Court of Appeal, 
R -v- ROCHE [2005] WASCA) 
 
In the context of this research it is irrelevant whether Roche became reluctant to carry out 
the terrorist attack in Australia, as he continued planning and preparations.  For example, in 
June 2000 Roche used funds provided by Hambali in Malaysia to purchase a mobile phone 
and a car that he then drove from Perth to Sydney, where he took photos of the Israeli 
Consulate.  Roche then drove to Canberra and took video footage of the Israeli Embassy.  
The Court of Appeal statement of facts describes how during surveillance of the Israeli 
Embassy, Roche commented to his son how it would be a good place to put a truck.  In 
addition, it is described in Aly and Striegher (2012) how Roche retained views that could be 
described as “extremist” and saw himself as a “potential soldier.”  As Roche’s letter (used in 
evidence in the Court of Appeal case) to his son describes, Roche was at that time full of 
zealousness and fanatical belief and had accepted the use of violence, as described by 
Justice Bongiorno.  Even after Roche began to reconsider his actions and informed the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), he did not stop his activities in support 
of JI and AQ.  For example, in September 2000 Roche searched on the internet for igniters 
that could be used for detonating a bomb; he then went ahead and purchased the igniters.  
This was even after the leader of JI, Abu Bakar Bashir, had called Roche in mid-August 
telling him to stop whatever he was doing.  In the end Roche did not send any of the video 
recorded surveillance or notes to Hambali or any other JI or AQ member.   
 
The Australian security and law enforcement agencies began to fully investigate Roche in 
2002 and obtained the recording of an interview between Roche and The Australian 
journalist, Colleen Egan (cited in Cornford 2002, November 27).  In that interview Roche is 
alleged to have detailed the full extent of his involvement with JI and AQ to plan and carry 
out a terrorist attack in Australia.  From available open-source information, following 
investigations by ASIO and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Roche was eventually 
arrested in November 2002; in 2004 he was convicted and sentenced to nine years in 
prison.  Roche served his full sentence and was released on 7 May 2007. 
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5.2.1 Case Analysis using the OODA Loop 
 
In his essay Destruction and Creation, Boyd (1976) described how in order to comprehend 
and cope with an ever-changing environment we develop mental patterns or concepts of 
meaning.  The purpose of Boyd’s paper was to explore how people or groups progress 
through the destruction and creation of designs, novelty and innovative constructs to 
respond and adapt to a changing environment.  Boyd (1976) argued that this process 
cannot be avoided in order to survive on one’s own terms.  This re-occurring cycle of 
creating novel mental images confuses the Orientation of an opponent and generates a 
high state of entropy.  This conceptual framework of strategy is significant in the critical 
analysis of the Roche case.  The OODA Loop can be used to emphasise the tactical 
importance of the unexceptional characteristics of Roche, as opposed to the use of highly 
experienced terrorists whose profile is what Western governments and their security forces 
would expect.   
 
Using the OODA Loop as the analytical lens, there are two aspects to the Jack Roche case 
which require critical analysis in relation to the relevance of this case to the research 
question.  The first is that Jack Roche’s inspiration through the Salafi-Jihadi movement and 
his active planning to carry out terrorist attacks in Australia occurred before 9/11, and also 
preceded the US-NATO war in Afghanistan and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  The second 
is that Jack Roche did not carry out the terrorist attack he had been planning.  This has been 
used by Michaelsen (2005 and 2010) to argue that there has been an overreaction to the 
threat of terrorism in Australia.  Other aspects used by Michaelsen (2010) to demonstrate 
the Australian government’s overreaction to terrorism relates to Roche’s amateurism.  For 
the purposes of this research the failure to carry out the attack is not relevant.  The fact is 
Roche was inspired through a network of friends by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative to such as 
extent that he became a strong advocate for the use of violence and began planning to 
carry out an act of terrorism.   
 
One of the selection criteria for this research was that the cases involved individuals who 
were ordinary and unexceptional.  This may result in amateurish planning and 
implementation of a terrorist attack.  While Jack Roche may have received a ten-day crash 
course in bomb making by AQ, he was hardly a professional guerrilla fighter or a terrorist 
with extensive combat experience.  A ten-day explosives training course would not 
necessarily enable Roche to be competent in making a bomb.  However, when analysed 
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through the OODA Loop, Roche represented an unexceptional, Western born, long term 
resident of Australia that did not fit the mental image held by Western security services.  
Other ordinary, unexceptional individuals who were inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi movement 
to become home-grown terrorists also undertook explosives training with AQ and failed to 
successfully carry out their attack.  For example, the so-called “shoe-bomber”, Richard Reid, 
on 22 December 2001; the 21 July 2005 attempted bombing of the London Metropolitan 
transport system; and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who on Christmas Day 2009 attempted 
to blow up a US domestic flight with explosives hidden in his underwear.  In Australia, since 
the Roche case twenty people have been convicted of terrorism-related offences under the 
criminal code (according to the Australian Government’s 2010 White Paper, Securing 
Australia, Protecting our Community, Counter-Terrorism).  None has been successful in 
carrying out any attack.  The point of this analysis is to use these examples to demonstrate 
that even ordinary individuals, whose attempts to conduct a home-grown terrorist attack 
failed, still saw AQ successfully penetrate the Western government’s OODA loop. 
 
In his analysis of Australian citizens involved in Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, 
Mullins (2010) noted that in the sixteen cases he focused on, no definite target was ever 
identified (the closest being Jack Roche), relatively few weapons were acquired and very 
little was accomplished as far as actually manufacturing explosives is concerned.  In an 
examination of the ordinariness of terrorists, Atran (2010) explains how the majority of 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorist attacks are neither well planned nor organised by people with 
extensive military experience, and are not under clear command and control.  In his 
analysis of the Madrid train bombing on 11 March 2004, Atran (2010) asserts that the 
ordinariness of many Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorist plots makes them difficult to detect.  
Conversely, Atran (2010) determines that if they were organised through a highly 
structured organisation they would have been caught much sooner.  The RAND Corporation 
paper, Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail (Jackson and Frelinger 
2009), examined factors that determine successful or unsuccessful terrorist attacks to assist 
the design of counterterrorism measures.  Jackson and Frelinger (2009) describe how in 
some unsuccessful or partially successful terrorist operations, the attackers involved are 
authors of their own misfortune.  The research defines a framework that is structured 
around three characteristics to determine the success or failure of a terrorist attack.   
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These involved: 
 Terrorist group capabilities and resources 
 Requirements of the operation it attempted or is planning or attempt 
 Relevance and reliability of security countermeasures 
 
Jackson and Frelinger (2009) determined that a terrorist or terrorist group did not require 
absolute compatibility with all three characteristics, but it was the relationship or mismatch 
between them that determined success or failure.  As already indicated, ordinariness and 
limited capability - not expertise in the tactics, techniques and procedures of terrorism - is 
one of the primary selection criteria for this research.  Ordinariness does not erode the 
fundamental concern in that a citizen and long term resident of Australia, such as Roche, 
would be inspired enough by the Salafi-Jihadi movement to even contemplate carrying out 
a home-grown terrorist attack.  Michaelsen (2010) cites Justice Bongiorno in his judgement 
during the trial of Abdul Nacer Benbrika, who was arrested in 2005 for leading a terrorist 
organisation planning attacks in Australia.  Justice Bongiorno said: 
 
[…]terrorist acts as they have been experienced in modern times are often 
carried out by amateurs whose principal attribute has not been skill, but rather 
zealous or fanatical belief in some ideology or other which seeks to promote 
itself by the use of violence (cited by Michaelsen, 2010, p. 22). 
 
Despite these observations, the ordinariness of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorists 
such as Roche is on the one hand a distorting mental image.  In other words, individuals 
such as Roche are not what Western governments and security agencies would initially 
expect.  In their consideration of asymmetric conflicts Dunne, Garcia-Alonso, Levine and 
Smith (2006) argue that one way a guerrilla force can overcome a stronger government 
opponent is through “exploiting second mover advantage by choosing to attack the 
opponent in ways that had not been prepared for, because it was locked into past 
investments” (Dunne, Garcia-Alonso, Levine and Smith 2006, p. 183).   
 
On the other hand, when the characteristics of these people (Western citizens or residents, 
Muslims or Muslim converts inspired by Salafi-Jihadi extreme violence, globally connected 
and unexceptional in nature) are analysed and synthesised they present a novel, mental 
image, which in turn offers AQ the tactical ability to penetrate the West’s OODA loop.  As 
Boyd (1987) argued in his presentation the Strategic Game of ? and ?, those who can 
synthesise seemingly unrelated components of a range of objects or images can survive on 
their own terms by creating novelty, ambiguity and adaptability.  As with T E Lawrence’s 
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epiphany in transforming the Arab revolt into a constantly manoeuvring idea across the 
vast desert, rather than a static physical target, made it almost impossible for the Turkish 
forces to defend or attack.  It created a distorting mental image and penetrated the Turkish 
force’s OODA loop; it was also a unique example of a successful tactic of asymmetric 
warfare that heavily influenced Boyd’s development of the OODA Loop.  However, it would 
be a false assumption to suggest the use by AQ of home-grown terrorists happened 
through a linear process.   
 
As Hammond (2013) explained, “for Boyd the OODA loop contains a complex 
interrelationship of feed forward and feed backward, along with implicit guidance and 
control. It was an on-going, many-sided, cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, 
correlation and rejection” (Hammond, 2013, p.601).  In other words, the OODA Loop should 
not be applied in a simplistic, mechanical fashion in order to explain how AQ realised the 
tactical, asymmetric opportunity offered by Western citizens or residents inspired by their 
Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  In applying the OODA Loop to strategic approaches to crisis 
management, Richards (2008) explains that getting inside an opponent’s OODA loop 
requires constant probing and testing of an adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, 
manoeuvres and intentions.  Employing a variety of measures that interweave menace-
uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty form the basis to sever an 
adversary’s moral ties and disorient its ability to respond.  It is plausible to deduce that AQ 
travelled through this conceptual strategic process. 
 
The analytical lens needs to be broadened and as part of this it is significant to note, as 
already mentioned, that Roche’s conversion to Islam and radicalisation trajectory through 
the Salafi-Jihadi narrative did not happen in isolation.  Roche’s escalation from Muslim 
convert to planning and conspiring to commit terrorism occurred as a consequence of his 
personal life events and his network of friends.  While this research does not intend to 
provide a critique of varying models of the radicalisation process, they are important 
theoretical road maps that provide contextual discourse underpinning where the Salafi-
Jihad movement manipulated an opportunity to exploit Western interests through the 
employment of home-grown terrorism.  Two of the predominant models of radicalisation 
were developed by Silber and Bhatt (2007) for the NYPD and by Innes et al (2007) in the 
United Kingdom.  Both described a “radicalization window”, where an individual is 
susceptible to being pulled towards joining a group that not only gives him or her bonds of 
friendship but also cultivates extremist views.  Aly and Striegher (2012) reinforce the 
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significance of these social bonds for the process of being inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement.  The Innes et al (2007) model also describes the importance of a connection to 
a global Islamic community.  With the benefit of the internet and other modern mediums of 
communications, the discourse of social justice and global jihad is promoted, supported by 
jihadist propaganda on the internet. 
 
Proponents of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, such as AQ and JI, drive this motivation towards 
legitimising the use of violence against those who it believes are responsible for perceived 
injustices against the Muslim community.  In the case of Roche, the downward spiral of his 
life through alcoholism, divorce and a loss of meaning and direction conspired to make him 
vulnerable to JI’s Salafi-Jihadi ideology.  At the same time, JI and AQ are adaptive, globally 
networked organisations, conducting a war against materially superior, conventional 
opponents.  As such, when analysed through the conceptual framework of the OODA Loop, 
it is rational to deduce that JI and AQ could have recognised the opportunity to conduct 
terrorist attacks inside Australia through the use of a vulnerable and impressionable 
Western-born convert to Islam.  It is also cost-effective in terms of financing and people, as 
there is no risk to any high-ranking AQ member and the planning, preparation and attack 
required only modest financing.  All these factors limit the potential of exposure and 
discovery by Western government security and police forces.  The Roche case may have 
been the beginning - even if by accident - of the Salafi-Jihadist movement’s trial-and-error 
approach to motivating, directing and supporting home-grown terrorism in Australia.  
Progressing through the OODA Loop is not a concise, structured and rhythmic process. 
 
 
5.3 Case Study 2 - 7 July 2005 London Transport Network Attack 
 
The 7 July 2005 terrorist bombing on the London metropolitan transport system was the 
first ever Salafi-Jihadi inspired, home-grown suicide attack in the UK.  This terrorist attack 
demonstrated a paradigm shift in how the Salafi-Jihadist movement adapted and evolved 
from attacking Western interests in foreign countries (such as the 1998 US Embassy 
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya) to inspiring citizens and long-term residents of Western 
countries to carry out attacks on their home soil.  Former Scotland Yard Assistant 
Commissioner for Counterterrorism, Andy Hayman, noted that his thinking before 7 July 
2005 “had been dominated by the threat of al-Qaeda mounting a 9/11-type attack from 
outside the UK, executed by terrorists from abroad. An attack by home-grown terrorists 
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with broad Yorkshire accents required a complete rethink of all our plans”(The Times July 7, 
2010).  As a case study, the 7 July 2005 terrorist attack on the London metropolitan 
transport system demonstrates - through the adaptive process of the OODA Loop – that 
those inspired by AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative transformed from consumers to producers  
through their act of home-grown terrorism.   
 
The events on the day of the attack and the individual profiles of each of the bombers have 
been thoroughly published and predominantly drawn from the House of Commons Report 
of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 and the subsequent 
Intelligence and Security Committee: Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005; 
May 2006.  While all published academic papers, opinion pieces and media reporting start 
by using the data from both the House of Commons reports, this research has sought to 
gather information from additional open-source data that has had the privilege of time, in 
order to shed more light on the background to the events and the four terrorists.  For 
example, Brigg, Cole, Gilmore and Soria (2011) describe and analyse the findings from the 
Coroner’s Inquest into the London attacks.  There has also been a significant amount of 
counter-terrorism activity since 7 July 2005, which provided further publically available data 
describing deeper links and connections between the four London bombers and their 
inspiration and involvement with AQ.  This information would not have been available at 
the time both House of Commons reports were published. 
 
The chronological events on the day of the London attack and the background to the four 
terrorists have been well documented and largely taken from the House of Commons Report 
of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005.  In a detailed account of 
the attack, Hayman (2009 and 2010) also provides extensive qualitative data on the 
background of the four suicide bombers.  Hayman (2009), who was in charge of the 
Metropolitan Police investigation into the London suicide attack, said “over the weeks and 
months our investigations led us to realise that the bombers had indeed been inspired by, 
and had learned their deadly skills from, AQ groups” (Hayman, 2009, p.113).  In addition, 
the ordinariness of the terrorists and their unexceptional backgrounds generated confusion 
not only across Western governments and security forces but also with friends and family.   
 
As with Roche, the four terrorists - Mohammad Sidique Khan, Germaine Lindsay, Hasib 
Hussain and Shehzad Tanweer - were unexceptional individuals.  As the House of Commons 
official report explains, little distinguishes their formative experiences from those of many 
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others of the same generation, ethnic origin and social background.  Findings from the 
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) study into home-grown terrorism in the US and the 
UK reinforced those of previous studies that suggest there is no general “terrorist profile.”  
That is, none of the terrorists studied displayed any distinguishing demographic, economic, 
marital, educational or social characteristics.  This illustrates how AQ was able to penetrate 
Western government’s security apparatus through the ordinariness of its home-grown 
terrorists.  What is also important is to understand how the four individuals became 
inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  In Briggs et al (2011), findings from the Coroner’s 
Inquest provide details in regards to the surveillance conducted by MI5 on the networks of 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired UK residents who were becoming persons of interest due to their 
growing links with AQ and proponents of conducting violence against civilians in Britain.  
Briggs et al (2011) describe how the most interesting aspect of the Inquest is how it reveals 
the way the four suicide bombers became inspired by their network of friends and acted as 
a cell.  The Briggs et al (2011) paper describes how, “fresh evidence on how the four 
became radicalised reveals the importance of working as a group and bonding through 
sport and communal activities” (Briggs et al 2011, p. 1).  Even so, despite how Briggs et al 
(2011) provide details into the preparation and planning in the lead up to the attacks, many 
friends and family who were not within the cell or group could not describe any notable 
change in the four suicide bombers even on the day before the attack.   
 
Mohammad Sidique Khan was the oldest of the group.  Born in Leeds on 20 October 1974, 
he was 30 at the time of the bombings.  He appears to have been the group’s ringleader as 
demonstrated in more in-depth investigations that allege Khan being at head of all 
organisation and preparation, and involvement with AQ contacts.  It was also Khan who 
created a martyr’s video recording that was made public by AQ and published by the BBC 
and Al Jazeera on 1 September 2005.  As Phillips (2006) describes, Khan declared that 
suicide bombing was the only way to make Britain acknowledge Muslim grievances.  
Tanweer was born on 15 December 1982, Hussain on 16 September 1986 - 22 and 18 
respectively when they died.  All three were second-generation British citizens whose 
parents were of Pakistani origin.  Their respective parents had come to West Yorkshire from 
Pakistan many years before, found work, settled and taken British citizenship.  Khan was 
the youngest of 6 children, Tanweer the second of four and the eldest son, Hussain the 
youngest of four.  Hayman (2009) reports that in July 2003 Khan travelled to Pakistan and in 
2004 he took extensive sick leave and resigned from the special needs school where he was 
employed at the time.  During this time he continued to be active as a youth worker in 
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Beeston.  The BBC profile of Khan goes onto describe that by the time he began this job in 
2001, he was clearly serious about his Islamic faith.  He prayed regularly at school and 
attended the local mosque on Fridays.  However, this is no different to the way many other 
people, regardless of the religion they follow, become more committed to their faith.  Khan 
told associates that he had turned to religion after a far from blameless youth that had seen 
him involved in fights, as well as bouts of drinking and drug-taking.   
 
Similar to Roche, Khan’s personal circumstances coincided with a reinvigorated immersion 
in Islam and an association with networks who held the extreme, Salafi-Jihadi violent views.  
For example, Hayman (2009) reported that in 2002 Tanweer became more extreme in his 
following of Islam and in 2003 established a close relationship with Khan.  Further 
information from police and UK intelligence found that Tanweer and Khan travelled 
together to Pakistan towards the end of 2004.  It is reported by the BBC profile of the 
bombers, both Tanweer and Khan became known to the security services, but were on the 
periphery of other surveillance operations.  Tanweer's uncle, Tahir Pervez, said his nephew 
and Khan had spent a great deal of time together in Pakistan before they returned to 
Britain in February 2005.  Pervez said: "They used to be up all the night talking to each 
other whenever Khan visited Tanweer during this period."  Tanweer's DNA, along with that 
of two other suicide bombers, was found at 18 Alexandra Grove in Leeds, the location 
where the attackers made their bombs.  On 6 July 2006, a video allegedly showing Tanweer 
was aired by Al-Jazeera television.  In the video, speaking in a Yorkshire accent, Tanweer 
said: "What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a string of attacks that will 
continue and become stronger” (Tanweer, 2006, July 6). 
 
Unlike his three companions, Germaine Lindsay was born in Jamaica, on 23 September 
1985, and moved to the UK with his mother in 1986.  Lindsay is reported to have been a 
bright student and good at sport.  Along with his mother, Lindsay converted to Islam in 
2000.  The House of Commons official report says his behaviour around this time was 
mixed.  At school, he is said to have begun associating with troublemakers and was 
disciplined for handing out leaflets in support of AQ.  At his local mosque and in Islamic 
groups around Huddersfield and Dewsbury, he was admired for the speed with which he 
achieved fluency in Arabic and memorised long passages of the Quran, showing unusual 
maturity and seriousness.  He began wearing the traditional white robe.  Although Lindsay 
lived in Huddersfield, Leeds, it is not known exactly when he met and became friends with 
Khan, but both are alleged to have frequented the same gyms, mosques and local venues in 
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the Huddersfield area.  It is believed that he was strongly influenced by the extremist 
preacher Abdallah al Faisal (also of Jamaican origin), who is now serving a prison sentence 
for soliciting murder, incitement to murder and incitement to racial hatred and distributing 
material of a racial hatred nature.  The Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) study 
determined that around 20 percent of the home-grown terrorists examined had a spiritual 
mentor, a more experienced Muslim who gave specific instruction and direction during the 
radicalisation process.  In the same study it was found that 25.6 percent of the home-grown 
terrorists studied had a spiritual sanctioner in their plot (an individual with perceived 
religious authority who provided specific theological approval for the violent activity).  
 
The only member of the London 7 July 2005 attack who publically demonstrated any 
outward sign of being interested in or supportive of the Salafi-Jihadi movement was Hasib 
Hussain.  Hussain was not a high achiever academically; he was keen on sport but not 
outstanding; he left school in 2003 with a few GCSEs at C grade and below.  He then went 
on to College to study an Advanced Business Programme.  Hussain undertook a Hajj visit to 
Saudi Arabia with his family early in 2002.  While in no way does the Hajj visit imply any hint 
of a direct or indirect cause of radicalisation, the House of Commons report describes how 
it was after this that he began wearing traditional clothing and a prayer cap and would wear 
white on Fridays.  Sometime after this it was noticed that he had written “AQ No Limits” on 
his RE schoolbook.  He was open about his support for AQ in school and said he regarded 
the 9/11 bombers as martyrs.  
 
In 2003, Mohammad Sidique Khan flew to Pakistan and was picked up at Islamabad 
International Airport by Omar Khyam and Mohammad Junaid Babar, a Pakistan-American 
who ran training camps in Pakistan for AQ.  In his account of the London attack, Jones 
(2012) sets out how Khan’s training at the camp was overseen by senior AQ leader Abl al-
Hadi al-Iraqi as well as AQ’s head of external operations, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri.  Upon his 
return to the UK, it is highly likely that Khan’s reputation and sense of confidence would 
have grown, as well as his ability to influence his three other friends and collaborators.  In 
an assessment, McGrory et al (2007) explain, “these young men were no ordinary students. 
They had come to Pakistan to study violent jihad with AQ instructors specialising in 
explosives, firearms and urban terrorism” (McGrory et al, 2007, 1 May).  McGrory et al 
(2007) describe how for six months Khan and Tanweer kept a very low profile until they 
returned to Pakistan in November 2004 and made their way back to the Abl al-Hadi al-Iraqi 
training camps.  In analysing this junction along their route to the attack it could be 
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deduced that Khan and Tanweer had already been inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative 
and totally accepted the use of violence.  The opportunity to train and mix with other like-
minded individuals and AQ fighters was part of their operational preparations.  It was 
during this period that they were groomed to be suicide bombers, encouraged to recruit 
other “martyrs” and taught how to make explosives (McGrory 2007; Jones 2012).  In his 
examination of home-grown terrorism in the United Kingdom. Brandon (2009), who 
explains:  
  
In the United Kingdom, the discovery of new terrorist plots generally follows a 
clear trend. In a blaze of publicity, the would-be terrorists are arrested or, more 
rarely, succeed in carrying out an attack. Soon afterward, their friends and 
family are quoted as saying that the suspects are innocent and that they would 
never be involved in terrorism.  Meanwhile, journalists speculate that these 
men (of whom little is yet known) apparently acted alone and had few if any 
links to known terrorists or extremist groups. This is often accompanied by 
learned speculation that this is a sign that more terrorists are becoming “self-
starters,” operating alone and forming fully independent cells as outlined in Abu 
Mus`ab al-Suri’s The Global Islamic Resistance Call. This in turn often triggers 
further speculation that al-Qa`ida no longer exists as an organization or even as 
a network, an impression that is often only strengthened by the internet ranting 
of apparently isolated figures such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. (Brandon, 2009, p.1)  
 
As Jones (2012) reports, by February 2004 MI5 in the UK had covertly recorded a 
conversation between Khan, Mohammed Qayum Khan and Omar Khyam, who up until their 
arrest in early 2005 were two of the UK’s most wanted terrorists with ties to AQ.    
 
In their radicalisation model, Silber and Bhatt (2007) determine the “jihadisation” phase 
occurs when members of a select group usually appoint themselves as “warriors in a holy 
war” and thus see it as a religious duty to begin planning, preparing and undertaking a 
terrorist attack.  As the House of Commons Report of the Official Account of the Bombings 
in London on 7th July 2005 and Briggs et al (2011) describe, the inspiration to conduct the 
terrorist attack may have coincided with the combination of personal circumstances and a 
network of close friends that bound them together as so-called holy warriors.  The Briggs et 
al (2011) paper also examines the role of having a place where these linked networks can 
interact outside of their family or other friends who are not interested in Salafi-Jihadi 
extremism.  From the Coroner’s Inquest, Briggs et al (2011) reveal how the Iqr Bookshop in 
Leeds provided such a place.  From the available evidence it can be assumed this bookshop 
provided a venue for these groups of males to build a bond around AQ’s extremist Salafi-
Jihadi narrative.   
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The Kirby (2007) case analysis of the London bombing describes how the Iqr bookshop was 
a place where videos of AQ’s graphic violence were sold and watched.  Similarly, Kirby 
(2007) describes a series of paintball sessions that often followed after the group had 
watched these videos.  In critically examining the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism, 
Cone and Harrow (2011) describe cases from Denmark where terrorism emerges from 
heterogeneous communities in which people with a higher degree of belonging mix with 
others of a lower degree of belonging. That is, people may not have been born in the West 
but they were raised there or spent a significant part of their life living there.  This analysis 
is important for understanding how Lindsay became involved through friendships with 
Khan, Hussain and Tanweer and ultimately how they all became inspired and evolved into 
terrorists, culminating in their attack on London.   
 
In addition to the collective viewing of these graphically violent videos, the direct influence 
of AQ in inspiring and training these four young, home-grown terrorists was confirmed 
following release of the Court Transcripts that included recordings made of Khan and 
Khyam’s conversations as they prepared to undertake terrorist training in Pakistan: 
 
Omar Khyam: Take your own passports through the airport. Whoever is your 
Emir he will take all the wealth. If you or your brother need a doctor he will 
arrange for you to see a doctor. He will pay for it. If you need to make a phone 
call home he will arrange for the telephone call. Anything you think needs to be 
done he will do it. But Islam works through the Emir ... everything goes through 
him. 
 
Don't tell your real name to no one, even to your Emir. Just say you are from 
Manchester. 
 
Some of you will be enrolling in the colleges, doing electronic courses, 
computer courses, whatever you want to do. You are British guys who have 
come to study in Pakistan because it's a lot cheaper. 
 
Mohammed Siddique Khan: How long does it take to get to the training camp 
[to be selected in Pakistan] ... the actual camp. 
 
Omar Khyam: You'll be going to the tribal areas, stay with families, you'll be 
with Arab brothers, Chechen brothers.  The only thing I will advise you, yeah, is 
total obedience to whoever your Emir is ... whether he is Sunni, Arab, Chechen, 
Saudi, British - total obedience. I'll tell you up there you can get your head cut 
off. (cited in Jones, 2012, p.202). 
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These recordings were made by MI5 in 2004, after they bugged Flat 4, 56 Hencroft St, 
Slough, the residence of Omar Khyam.  As the House of Commons Report of the Official 
Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 explains, the transformation of Khan, 
Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay from unexceptional UK citizens into suicide bombers was only 
partly clear in the early stages of the investigation; however, this recorded dialogue is 
revealing.  Interestingly, the dialogue from Omar Khyam reveals a strange mix of 
nationalities and even selects those who are Sunni as being equally under threat if they are 
not totally committed to the Salafi-Jihadi cause.  In their examination of home-grown 
terrorism from the context of the US and the UK, Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009), 
explain how as “home-grown terrorists internalise rigid interpretations of Islam, many come 
to view alternative interpretations and practices as not just incorrect theologically, but as 
personal affronts” (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009, p.15).  As the authors go onto 
explain this can result in violence even against other Muslims.  For example, the same 
report describes how Khan and Tanweer visited Pakistan from November 2004 to February 
2005 and then sets out that between April and July 2005 the group was in contact with an 
individual or individuals in Pakistan.  However, the report admitted that, “it is not known 
who this was or the content of the contacts but the methods used, designed to make it 
difficult to identify the individual, make the contacts look suspicious” (House of Commons 
Report, 2006, p. 21). 
 
There is a limit to how far this research or any post-attack investigations can accurately 
delve into the minds of the four suicide bombers.  Certainly, the London case appears to 
reinforce Sageman’s (2008) analysis in the significance of networks and friends to facilitate 
and strengthen the Salafi-Jihadi inspiration.  However, there is nothing in the background, 
upbringing, education or family of the London bombers that points to a propensity or 
susceptibility to be inspired enough by the Salafi-Jihadi movement to the extent that they 
would become suicide bombers.  It is not until further analysis of information and data, 
made available since the two House of Commons reports, that it has been revealed how the 
bombers became drawn into and closely associated with AQ and its network.  For example, 
Hayman (2010), who was Assistant Commissioner, Special Operations at the time of the 7 
July 2005 terrorist attacks, explained it would take two years before it was publically 
revealed that MI5 had covertly filmed Khan fraternising with another group of terrorists 
planning to carry out an attack in London using a fertilizer-based bomb.    
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The House of Commons Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 
2005 explains it is not known when the four suicide bombers first developed the idea of an 
attack in the UK, but a visit by Khan and Tanweer to Pakistan from late 2004 to early 2005 
may have been important for developing the plan to attack London.  However, when 
analysed through Boyd’s conceptual framework, the 7 July 2005 London terrorist attacks 
strongly suggest the use of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorists as an adaptation by 
AQ in the face of growing security challenges and a tactic of asymmetric warfare that 
penetrated the West’s OODA loop.   
 
 
5.3.1 Case Analysis using the OODA Loop 
 
As the strategic framework for this research describes, Boyd’s OODA Loop is essentially an 
evolutionary process and requires the person or entity to adapt and evolve in the face of 
external changes in their environment.  The OODA Loop can also be applied to 
unpredictable events.  When one’s opponent is pressured with time and ambiguity, creating 
a high state of entropy, it is more likely the opponent can be defeated.  Evidence for this is 
contained within Hayman (2010), as he details the confusing and overwhelming demands 
on police, the intelligence services, government and media following the 7 July 2005 
terrorist attacks.  In 2007 the US Army published its revised Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
No. 3-24 in which it states, “In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly – 
the better learning organisation – usually wins” (US Army COIN Field Manual, No.3-24, 
2007, p.ix). In the case of AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorism, this has meant a constant 
adaptation and disruption strategy to carry out home-grown terrorist attacks; an important 
operational requirement for asymmetric warfare.   
 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the call by Abu Hamza al-Masri for all Muslims to conduct 
attacks in their Western country of residence is a good example of this OODA loop 
adaptation to inspire a potentially unlimited number of self-perpetuating producers of AQ’s 
brand of terrorism.  This adaptation is an example of fourth generational warfare described 
by Lind et al (1984) and by van Creveld (1991), who at that time argued future wars would 
shift to being waged by groups of terrorists, driven by ideological fanaticism.  As with T E 
Lawrence’s view of turning the Arab revolt into an intangible movement that was as much 
of a mindset as a physical force, AQ was demonstrating the capacity to continue to flourish 
through its ability to adapt that made it difficult to counter.  Significantly, the moral and 
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mental distorting image of British citizens conducting suicide attacks against their fellow 
civilians generated the kind of internal entropy Boyd (1987) refers to in The Strategic Game 
of ? and ?. These are important areas of analysis when using the OODA Loop as an analytical 
lens.  
 
The moral and mental distorting effect was evident in Khan and Tanweer’s martyr videos 
released by the UK police and intelligence agencies (House of Commons Report of the 
Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005).  Not only did the videos 
further demonstrate the four terrorists had been inspired through their friends and 
associates by AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative, but the fact that they had thick Yorkshire accents 
distorted the mental image the police and public had of who they assumed would be 
terrorists.  In his martyr video, released by the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera news agency, Khan 
said: 
 
“We are at war... I am a soldier… I am going to keep this short and to the point, 
because it's all been said before by far more eloquent people than me. 
 
"But our words have no impact upon you, therefore I'm going to talk to you in a 
language that you understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with 
our blood. 
 
"I'm sure by now the media has painted a suitable picture of me, this 
predictable propaganda machine will naturally try to put a spin on it to suit the 
government and to scare the masses into conforming to their power- and 
wealth-obsessed agendas. 
 
"I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our 
driving motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has 
to offer. Our religion is Islam, obedience to the one true God, Allah and follow 
in the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad. 
 
"This is how our ethical stances are dictated. Your democratically elected 
governments perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of 
them makes you responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting 
and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. 
 
"Until we feel security, you'll be our target. Until you stop the bombing, 
gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we'll not stop this fight. We 
are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this 
situation."  (Mohammad Sidique Khan; 1 September 2005; al Jazeera News) 
 
166 
 
In Patterns of Conflict, Boyd (1986) describes how one needed to manoeuvre an adversary 
beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt so that he can neither divine your 
intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related 
decisive strokes as they penetrate, and even isolate the opponent’s capacity to respond.  
Further, Boyd (1986) argues for the need to Observe-Orient-Decide-Act more 
inconspicuously, more quickly and with more irregularity as a basis to keep or gain initiative 
as well as to shape and shift the main effort.  As AQ demonstrated in the 7 July 2005 
London attacks, to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses 
ties-up, diverts, or drains-away an adversary’s attention elsewhere.   
 
From the period between 11 September 2001 until after the London attacks the scale of 
potential threats, information from the public and leads on persons of interest generated a 
high degree of entropy in the UK Government, police and security agencies, as described by 
Hayman (2010) and Briggs et al (2011).  For example, as listed by Wilner and Bubouloz 
(2010): in December 2001 Muslim convert Richard Reid attempted to ignite a bomb in his 
shoe on American Airlines Flight 93; in 2004 a British-Pakistan terrorist cell was disrupted, 
with all eight members jailed in 2007; the July 2005 failed attempted suicide attack on the 
London transport system; the defeated liquid bomb plot targeting transatlantic flights 
between the UK and North America; the 2007 car-bombing of Glasgow airport, in addition 
to the two attempted car-bombs by four doctors; and in 2008 an internet inspired home-
grown terrorist exploded a bomb at an Exeter restaurant.  This list does not include having 
to pursue the number of connections, associates, friends and family who may or may not 
have been suspected of being involved in planning or supporting other terrorist attacks. 
 
In his critical analysis of the reporting on the London attacks, Kirby (2007) describes how 
the UK security agencies appeared unwilling or unprepared to accept that the attack has 
been planned and perpetrated by a handful of people, all of them whom were British.  
Further, Kirby (2007) explains the home-grown element was so troubling that all the 
international links received nearly all the attention from the security agencies. In the 
context of the OODA Loop, this suggests the distortion that had been created by AQ’s ability 
to inspire home-grown terrorists.  Further, as the introduction to this chapter set out, the 
London attacks reinforce what Crone and Harrow (2011) explain has been a significant 
increase since 2003 in internal (home-grown) terrorism that is not autonomous.   
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While there is no confirmation from open-source data to determine when or how London 
was to be the target, this period of time is relevant in understanding the adaptation of AQ’s 
operational strategy and manoeuvrability tactics through the OODA Loop.  During the 
period Khan had travelled in Pakistan for training in 2003, 2004 and 2005, the US-NATO 
military and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and the border region of Pakistan 
had increased dramatically.  These actions placed significant pressure on AQ and its ability 
to train terrorists.  As Atran (2010) and Sageman (2004) explain, the growth and 
development of terrorist networks became largely a decentralised and evolutionary 
process, based on adaptations to unpredictable events.  In other words, the London 7 July 
2005 bombings reflect AQ penetrating the UK’s counterterrorism strategy because its own 
OODA loop was being penetrated in Afghanistan and Pakistan.    
 
At the same time AQ realised that its narrative that bound violence to its brand of Islam 
could see individual jihad carried out without a perpetrator having to join a traditional 
mujahideen on a conventional battlefield.  Referring again to the speech by Abu Hamza al-
Masri in Kohlmann (2008) - regarding his call to train, prepare and conduct home-grown 
attacks - also provides an account of how AQ changed tack through a strategy that saw the 
battlefield extend to include one’s own backyard, synthesised with the global connectivity 
provided by the internet.  It epitomised the maxim: “think global, act local.”  As Storm 
(2014) recalls, following the 7 July 2005 attacks on London, Omar Bakri Mohammed told 
followers, “Jihad has come to the UK.  You can do whatever you wish” (Storm, 2014, p.86).  
As Kohlmann (2008) explains, this change of strategy was greatly assisted by the internet 
and the ability it gave AQ to inspire a growing number of Western raised or born self-
perpetuating home-grown terrorists who no longer required training in Afghanistan.  Even 
Storm (2014) admits that at the time “intellectually I was already on the battlefield” (Storm, 
2014, p. 82).  This next phase of strategic adaptation is effectively described by Wilner and 
Dubouloz (2010) who explained that AQ inspired home-grown terrorism of unaffiliated 
individuals tapping into AQ’s message of violence against the West and its citizens as a 
relatively new development.  This is exemplified in the next case involving the Boston 
Marathon bombing. 
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5.4 Case Study 3 – 15 April 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing  
On 15 April 2013, Chechen brothers and long-term residents of the United States, Dzhokhar 
and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, carried out a terrorist attack near the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon.  The simultaneous explosions involved two improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
using pressure cookers contained in back-packs carried by the brothers and left on the 
ground near spectators.  The explosions killed three people, wounded 264 others and 
resulted in a massive search, before Tamerlan was killed and Dzhokhar was captured; he 
now awaits trial (Kotz, April 24, 2013; United States District Court of Massachusetts v. 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev).  When analysed through the OODA Loop, the Boston Marathon 
bombing is another illustrative case study demonstrating the regenerative capacity of AQ’s 
Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  The Boston bombing involved unexceptional Western domestic 
individuals with no known links with or funding from any AQ members, being inspired by 
the Salafi-Jihadi narrative to become home-grown terrorists.  
 
Turning consumers of AQ’s brand of terrorism into self-generating producers was an 
evolving phenomenon.  This adaptation, was identified in the Los Angeles Times (2013, April 
20) by US federal counterterrorism and law enforcement investigators who believed the 
crude nature of the bombs and behaviour of the suspects made the Boston Marathon 
attack look less like a plot planned from overseas.  Instead, authorities believed it was an 
example of home-grown terrorism, inspired by “jihadist” propaganda on the internet.  In 
terms of future counter-terrorism strategies, the Boston Marathon case is an example of a 
disconnected, self-generated act of home-grown terrorism that is very difficult to detect 
and defeat.  Alternatively, this phenomenon could also be an example of what Aly (2015) 
describes as AQ regenerative capacity:  
 
The wisdom of employing an orthodox military response against an unorthodox 
enemy whose regenerative capacity relies on its ability to employ 'soft' 
strategies of influence and mobilisation has, rightly, been questioned. The so 
called 'war on terror' was co-opted and reconstructed by AQ and its affiliates as 
a 'war on Islam'- providing a powerful rally cry to potential recruits and 
sympathisers.  
(Aly, 2015, blog, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/anne-
aly/time-to-get-smart-about-c_1_b_8064110.html) 
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Together these case studies highlight how the OODA Loop can be used to explain and 
explore the transformative and adaptive nature of AQ, with a brand of terrorism that 
remains dynamic. 
 
In order to examine the Tsarnaev brother’s trajectory towards conducting the Boston 
Marathon bombing, it is first necessary to examine their background.  Dzhokhar and 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev arrived in the United States with their parents in 2002, from Kyrgyzstan.  
Their mother, Zubeidat Tsarnaev, was from the former Russian Republic of Dagestan.  
Originally, the Tsarnaev family lived in Dagestan, which in the 1990s had indirectly felt the 
effects of the war in Chechnya.  It was from Dagestan that the Tsarnaev family applied for 
asylum to the United States.  While the Tsarnaev parents were followers of Islam, there is 
no available, open-source information to suggest links to any Chechnya-based, Islamic 
terrorist organisation and nothing to suggest an association with AQ or any AQ- affiliated 
groups.  Significantly, for this research, there was nothing extraordinary about the Tsarnaev 
family compared with any other working class, immigrant family as they settled and lived in 
the suburbs of Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev gradually increased his interest and commitment to Islamic extremism 
and became inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative in approximately 2008.  From her 
research, McMahon (2013) explains Tamerlan's religious transformation appeared to come 
as other aspects of his life were falling apart.  Similar to the Roche case, the allure of Islam 
coincided with a change in Tamerlan’s personal circumstances.  For example, Tamerlan 
failed in his goal of being selected for the US Olympic boxing team and around the same 
time was arrested for domestic assault of an ex-girlfriend in 2009.  Then in 2011, his friend, 
Brendan Mess, was murdered along with two other men in an apartment in Waltham, 
Massachusetts.  In her critical analysis, McMahon (2013) reported that Tamerlan’s 
neighbours recalled how he went from wearing tight jeans, flashy shoes and slicked-back 
hair, to growing a beard and wearing more traditional dress.   
 
It was around 2008 that Tamerlan began attending the Islamic Society of Boston mosque 
which along with its sister mosque, the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center, has a 
history of members being arrested and convicted for their direct involvement in Salafi-
Jihadi inspired terrorism.  In a USA Today article, Dorrell (2013) reports that Aafia Siddiqui, 
Tarek Mehanna, Ahmad Abousamra and Jamal Badawi of Canada had all attended the 
Islamic Society of Boston mosque and subsequently had been convicted and sentenced to 
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imprisonment, or are wanted by US law enforcement authorities for their direct or indirect 
involvement in Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorism or terrorist groups.  As with Roche, 
Tamerlan’s connection to Islamic extremism appears to have coincided with his search for a 
personal identity following a series of failures in his life. In relation to the Islamic Society of 
Boston Cultural Centre, the USA Today media report went on to say, it has: 
 
invited guests who have defended terrorism suspects. A former trustee appears 
in a series of videos in which he advocates treating gays as criminals, says 
husbands should sometimes beat their wives and calls on Allah (God) to kill 
Zionists and Jews, according to Americans for Peace and Tolerance, an interfaith 
group that has investigated the mosques. (Dorrell, 2013, p.1) 
 
According to Morales and Otis (2013), it was in 2009 that Tamerlan demonstrated a radical 
change towards Islamic extremism.  However, to date US law enforcement and security 
agencies have been unable to find a link between the Tsarnaev brothers and AQ or any AQ-
networked terrorist organisation.  In addition, and unlike earlier Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-
grown terrorists, the Tsarnaev brothers had not gone to Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen to 
attend an AQ training camp or participate in training from any other AQ-connected terrorist 
organisation.  The only indication or warning came from the Russian Government’s Federal 
Security Service, or FSB, that Tamerlan was a follower of radical Islam.  For example, Shane 
(2013) reported that Russian authorities had informed the FBI in March 2011 that Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev, an ethnic Chechen who had lived in the United States for about a decade, had 
changed dramatically, had adopted extremist views and planned to travel to Russia to meet 
with underground groups.  The FBI sent agents to interview Tamerlan and his parents and 
found no evidence of any crime or links to a terrorist organisation.  The Russian authorities 
passed the same information on to the CIA in September 2011. 
 
It is easy to be critical of law enforcement and intelligence agencies for not taking this 
information more seriously.  However, there are many followers of Islamic extremism, just 
as there are other people who follow extreme, ideological views of the world, who do not 
become terrorists.  For example, Cooper, Schmidt and Schmitt (2013) reported the Russian 
warning in 2011 was viewed by FBI officials mainly as an expression of concern that 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev or his mother, both of whom had become far more religious, might 
carry out an attack on Russian soil.  Both of their names were added to the American TIDE 
database.  The TIDE database is a list of people suspected of some connection to terrorism; 
in 2011 it contained more than 500,000 names.  The scale of maintaining watch on these 
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suspected terrorist sympathisers is enormous.  Further, just because a person’s name 
appears on the TIDE list does not mean they are planning to implement an act of terrorism 
on one’s fellow citizens.  This makes a distorting array of signals and information creating 
what Boyd refers to as a high state of entropy. 
 
As the FSB reported to the FBI, Tamerlan travelled to Dagestan, where he visited the Central 
Dzhuma Mosque in Makhachkala.  It is alleged this occurred during the two times Tamerlan 
travelled to Dagestan in 2011 and for six months in 2012.  As mentioned, it was following 
this period that the FSB began monitoring Tamerlan and notified the FBI.  The Central 
Dzhuma Mosque was known to Russian authorities as being a place preaching Islamic 
extremism and from where a number of members involved in hostile engagements with the 
Russian police had originated.  A Time magazine article reported that: 
 
The FBI said it had received information from an unidentified 
“foreign government” that Tsarnaev was “a follower of radical Islam and 
a strong believer, and that he had changed drastically since 2010 as he prepared 
… to join unspecified underground groups. In response, the FBI said it 
interviewed Tsarnaev and checked its records for relevant information, but “did 
not find any terrorism activity, domestic or foreign. (Shuster, 2013, p. 1) 
 
According to US travel records, Tsarnaev arrived at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport on 12 
January 2012, returning on 17 July.  He spent time in Makhachkala, Dagestan that summer 
(Cornwell & Hosenball, 2013; Roberts & Gabbatt, 2013).  Even so, there are a number of 
equivocal reports as to whether he met and trained with militant Islamic extremists.  
Despite the FBI finding no terrorism activity, the visit to the Central Dzhuma Mosque could 
be a potential point of reference that facilitated the influence of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative 
for Tamerlan.   
 
In Shuster’s 2013 Time magazine article, he describes a long history of Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
acts of terrorism and attacks on Russian military and police, by members of the Central 
Dzhuma Mosque.  Shuster found that interviews with the brothers’ acquaintances point to 
an increase in Tamerlan’s move towards Salafi-Jihadi inspired extremism following time 
spent in Dagestan at the Central Dzhuma Mosque.  However, as Shuster (2013) determines, 
there is no qualitative data to explain how a person such as Tamerlan, in less than three 
years, is drawn into the Salafi-Jihadi narrative and conducts a terrorist attack in his adopted 
country.  There is no evidence that the brothers received any instruction, finance or support 
to carry out the Boston Marathon terrorist attack.  Similarly, there is no evidence that the 
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brothers received any training or instruction in bomb-making or terrorist tactics, techniques 
and procedures while attending the Central Dzhuma Mosque.   
 
Even with Tamerlan’s name on the TIDE database and his trips to Dagestan, his brother 
Dzhokhar was not displaying any indications of being inspired by Salafi-Jihadi terrorism. 
While not everything in his life was easy, upon graduation from his high school in 2011, 
Dzhokhar received a USD2500 education scholarship, after which he enrolled at the 
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth and elected to study nursing (CBS News Profile of 
the Tsarnaev Brothers April 23, 2013).  According to Bump (2013), on 11 September 2012 
Dzhokhar became a US citizen, less than a year before the Tsarnaev brothers carried out 
their terrorist attack on the Boston Marathon.  From what can be ascertained through 
available open-source data, even at this stage there was no indication of a dramatic spiral of 
radicalisation towards Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.   
 
On 27 June 2013, a US Federal Grand Jury released a 30-count indictment against the 
Tsarnaev brothers, in which it alleged that sometime before the bombings, Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev downloaded extremist Islamic propaganda from the internet.  This included online 
content that directed Muslims against giving their allegiance to governments that invaded 
Muslim lands.  Also included was material by Anwar al-Awlaki, the American citizen who 
became a senior operative in AQ’s branch in Yemen and who was killed in a 2011 drone 
strike.  Following forensic investigation of CCTV footage, Boston Police and the FBI were able 
to determine the movements of the brothers up to the time of the explosions and as they 
escaped from the scene. (United States vs. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Case 1:13-mj-02106-MBB, 
United States Department of Justice. April 21, 2013). 
 
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Case 1:13-mj-02106-MBB 
details that on 15 April 2013, two explosions hit spectators situated near the finish line of 
the Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring just over two hundred.  Two 
brothers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, separately detonated backpacks 
comprising of so-called “pressure cooker” bombs, by the use of their mobile phones.  In 
2004, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an official warning 
about pressure cooker bombs: 
 
Typically, these bombs are made by placing TNT or other explosives in a 
pressure cooker and attaching a blasting cap at the top of the pressure cooker. 
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The size of the blast depends on the size of the pressure cooker and the 
amount of explosive placed inside. Pressure cooker bombs are made with 
readily available materials and can be as simple or as complex as the builder 
decides. These types of devices can be initiated using simple electronic 
components including, but not limited to, digital watches, garage door openers, 
cell phones or pagers. As a common cooking utensil, the pressure cooker is 
often overlooked when searching vehicles, residences or merchandise crossing 
the U.S. Borders.   
(United States Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletin on 
pressure cooker bombs: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/PotentialTerrorist.pdf) 
 
From all open-source reporting, it has become evident that the Tsarnaev brothers learned 
how to make pressure-cooker bombs from AQ’s internet published Inspire magazine.  
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev himself admitted to obtaining bomb-making lessons from the June 2010 
issue of AQ’s Inspire magazine.  Before his death in Yemen in 2010, a 24-year old American, 
Samir Khan, was the editor of Inspire magazine and published an article entitled “Make a 
Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”  Through the use of a modern, global inter-connected 
tool such as the internet, one of AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative strategists was able to inspire 
self-generating, home-grown terrorists.  The Tsarnaev brothers were also inspired through 
the internet preaching of Anwar al-Awlaki, who was one of the most influential Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative strategists whose prolific use of the internet motivated many home-grown 
terrorists.   
 
Before he was killed in a US drone strike in Yemen on 30 September 2011, Anwar al-Awlaki 
was the leader of AQ in the Arabian Peninsular.  As Bergen (2014) explains, one year after 
the Boston Marathon bombings and three years after his death, the New Mexican-born 
American cleric continued to be a major influence on violent Salafi-Jihadi extremists in the 
United States.  Individuals or internet-connected ideological communities can still access 
Anwar al-Awlaki’s sermons online.  In a CNN article, Bergen (2014) sets out how in June 
2014 Justin Kaliebe, an 18-year old New Yorker, pleaded guilty to attempting to travel to 
Yemen to join AQ in the Arabian Peninsula.  According to his plea agreement, Kaliebe told 
an undercover officer, "my standard is Sheik Anwar Al-Awlaki and Sheik Osama [bin Laden], 
both who bore witness to the truth."  This example also illustrates that it is easier to 
eliminate the leader than the prophetic narrative that is recreated in the minds of 
individuals and groups around the world. 
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The 27 June 2013 US Federal Grand Jury indictment of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev also disclosed a 
note in which Dzhokhar said he wanted to punish the United States for the “evil” of hurting 
Muslims.  The 30-count indictment alleged that the Tsarnaev brothers had been inspired by 
AQ publications and that Dzokhar left a confession in the boat in a Watertown backyard 
where he was captured four days after the bombings, saying, “I don’t like killing innocent 
people.”  Even though he noted that “it is forbidden” in Islam to kill innocent people, he 
justified his actions as a response to US military involvement in Muslim countries, according 
to the indictment.  “The US government is killing our innocent civilians,” Tsarnaev allegedly 
wrote. “[...] I can’t stand to see such evil go unpunished […] We Muslims are one body; you 
hurt one, you hurt us all. Stop killing our innocent people, we will stop.” (United States vs. 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Case 1:13-mj-02106-MBB, United States Department of Justice. April 
21, 2013).   
 
As already described, while difficult to identify an exact cause or obvious series of events in 
their lives, the Tsarnaev brothers did become motivated and inspired by Salafi-Jihadi 
interpretations of Islam.  Even their seemingly short period of time attending the Boston 
Mosque and Tamerlan’s visits to the Central Dzhuma Mosque in Dagestan may have been 
enough to fulfil and drive their motivation or personal justification to become terrorists.  
While there may have been no direction or assistance from AQ to carry out an attack, these 
small but intense periods of association with other like-minded Salafi-Jihadists may have 
reinforced their own feelings of injustice.  By being directly exposed to the Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative that reinforced a growing feeling of disrespect and injustice, their personal 
identity was infected to such an extent that they decided to conspire, plan and carry out an 
act of home-grown terrorism.    
 
5.4.1 Case Analysis using the OODA Loop 
 
As explained previously, Boyd (1986) placed significant emphasis on the use of the German 
military’s concept of schwerpunkt throughout all levels of the chain of command, so that 
each part of the organic whole can operate at its own natural rhythm.  In other words, there 
is an implicit understanding by those down the chain of command as to the overall strategy.  
The schwerpunkt is the strategic glue that is operationalised throughout the organisation via 
an implicit understanding.  Boyd (1987) accepted that orientation is the schwerpunkt and 
argued that: 
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Expose individuals, with different skills and abilities, against a variety of 
situations—whereby each individual can observe and orient himself 
simultaneously to the others and to the variety of changing situations. 
  
In such an environment, a harmoney, or focus and direction, in operations is 
created by the bonds of implicit communications and trust that evolve as a 
consequence of the similar mental images or impressions each individual 
creates and commits to memory by repeatedly sharing the same variety of 
experiences in the same ways.  (Boyd, 1987, slide 18) 
 
Richards (2008) defines this kind of leadership as that which “implies the art of inspiring 
people to enthusiastically take action toward the achievement of uncommon goal” 
(Richards, 2008, slide 5).  This is particularly relevant and applicable to the analysis of the 
Boston Marathon Bombing.  The Boston Marathon bombing was conducted by two brothers 
with no connection, funding or explicit instructions from AQ and yet they became so 
inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative that they implicitly knew their mission coincided with 
the overall grand strategy.  It is as if they knew unreservedly how their tactical actions, of 
their own OODA loop, sat within the broader OODA loop of the Salafi-Jihadi strategy.  In his 
presentation on the OODA Loop and leadership, Richards (2008) explains actions should 
flow from orientation via the implicit guidance and control link.  In his paper Organic Design 
for Command and Control, Boyd (1987) argued implicit over explicit was essential in order 
to gain a favourable mismatch in friction and time for superiority in shaping and adapting to 
circumstances.  When analysed through the theoretical discourse behind the OODA Loop, 
the Boston Marathon bombing demonstrated the implicit effect of the Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative to shape the tactical application of its asymmetric war against the West.   
 
The Tsarnaev brothers’ transformation from working-class immigrants to terrorists is 
comparable to how King and Taylor (2011) critically analyse the case of Zakaria Amara, who 
was convicted in 2009 of planning to carry out a terrorist attack in Canada.  While their 
research explores psychological models of radicalisation, they identified that the Salafi-
Jihadi narrative is an important ingredient for the inspiration of home-grown jihadists.  As 
Sageman (2008) explained, well before the Boston Marathon bombing, the growing threat 
was from local groups and individuals with no connection to AQ, but inspired by them.  
What is comparable between the research of King and Taylor (2011) and the Boston 
Marathon bombing is how they describe that at some point in his life, between joking in the 
classroom and building a detonator, Amara underwent a transformation with no links to or 
instructions from AQ, and became inspired enough to want to carry out an act of home-
grown terrorism.   
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Similar to Zakaria Amara, the Tsarnaev brothers became inspired to such an extent that they 
were motivated enough to successfully plan and carry out a terrorist attack on the country 
they had adopted as long-term residents and citizens.  Both the case of Zakaria Amara and 
the Boston Marathon bombing case further demonstrate the adaptive capacity of the AQ 
brand to regenerate.  Once again, it is the implicit aspect of this regenerative phenomenon 
that is relevant for this research when using Boyd’s strategic model.  In other words, the 
OODA Loop can be used to explain and explore the transformative nature of AQ because 
both the loop and AQ are not static.  As with the OODA Loop, AQ - and its use of the Salafi-
Jihadi narrative - is dynamic and evolutionary, generating fast-transients and mental images 
that inspire followers and confuse opponents.  When the OODA Loop is used as the 
analytical lens, the Boston Marathon bombing case represents an organic transformation of 
observing and internalising an implicit message or messages that are regenerated into 
personal mental images that drive an action; in this case, to conduct an act of terrorism. 
 
A potential criticism of previous analysis of Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorism is the continued 
search for direct, tangible links to AQ.  For example, the Hoffman (2008 and 2011) AQ 
central leadership argument failed to recognise how AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi direction could have 
evolved to become a self-actualised inspiration.  In his critique of Sageman’s (2008) 
Leaderless Jihad, Hoffman argued AQ’s central leadership is still highly relevant to planning 
and attempting to implement terrorist attacks against the West.  Hoffman (2008) pointed to 
the 7 July 2005 London Underground bombings, the 2006 failed attempts to blow up flights 
over the Atlantic and the September 2009 plan by Najibullah Zazi to blow up the New York 
City subway system as examples of direct AQ involvement.  In fact, both Hoffman and 
Sageman are correct.  As AQ’s direct involvement in the current Syrian civil war (through 
their affiliated group Jabat al Nusra) indicates, even with the death of bin Laden, the core 
AQ leadership should not be ignored or dismissed.  Similarly, ISIS has directly reached out to 
impressionable Muslims in dozens of Western countries to either join them in Syria and 
Iraq, or conduct attacks in the Western country in which they live.    
 
The Tsarnaev brothers’ case study reinforces the Sageman (2008) leaderless jihad theory in 
the application of Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorism, whereby there is no direct planning, 
funding or direction from AQ.  However, Hoffman (2008) completely dismisses the bottom-
up, self-generating reformation of AQ and its ability to build this notion of what the German 
military command described as schwerpunkt.  For example, not long after the death of bin 
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Laden, AQ's online al-Fajr Media Centre issued a statement telling every "mujahid Muslim, 
if there is an opportunity, do not waste it […] Do not consult anyone about killing Americans 
or destroying their economy [..] We also incite you to carry out acts of individual terrorism 
with significant results, which only require basic preparation" (cited by Burke, 2011, May, 
31).  This is an example of AQ adapting, analysing and synthesising the Orientation of its 
followers and opponents, and its global, inter-connected and open-source battlefield.  
Further, it is another example of the tactics of asymmetric warfare which can only be truly 
implemented through continual adaptation, analysis and synthesis of the evolving world 
and operating environment.  It is Boyd’s OODA Loop in action and this case provides strong 
evidence to demonstrate the effects of this dynamic strategic model.  Now anyone could 
become a mujahedeen in their own backyard or re-create their own fantasy in their own 
identity in the application of AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  Through the use of the OODA 
Loop, the Boston Marathon bombing case demonstrated this paradigm shift or evolution 
and dynamic adaptation by AQ. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The three case studies selected for this research demonstrate how the theoretical 
constructs within the OODA Loop can be used to analyse the transformative nature of 
modern terrorism as warfare.  These theoretical constructs include, but are not limited to, 
generating entropy in an opponent, distorted mental images, orientation, implicitly 
comprehending the overriding mission as well as tactical OODA loops working within 
broader strategic OODA loops.  Using the OODA loop as the analytical lens enabled a deeper 
examination of the three case studies to illustrate the adaptation of Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
home-grown terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare - from the case of Jack Roche and 
the use of unexceptional individuals from Western countries to avoid detection, to the 7 
July 2005 London attack where Western groups of friends were used to plan attacks to 
overcome tactical challenges as a way of adapting when AQ had its own OODA loop 
penetrated, and finally, the Boston Marathon bombing case where two brothers with no 
known links were inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative as an example of the regenerative 
adaptability of the AQ brand.  Now anyone could be their own band of AQ terrorists, just 
like those who follow a brand of a sports clothing can imagine themselves being their 
sporting heroes who represent the values and narrative of that brand. 
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According to Richards (2006), the OODA Loop can be considered a grand strategy for vitality 
and growth.  A necessary application of this strategy involves operating inside an 
adversary’s OODA loop in order to distort an opponent’s Orientation.  As Richards (2006) 
explains, one needs to get inside an opponent’s “mind-time-space, to create tangles of 
threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generating 
mismatches between those events/efforts an adversary observes, or imagines, and those 
they must react to, to survive” (Richards, 2006, slide 5).  The three case studies also 
demonstrated the relevance to this fundamental component of the OODA Loop.  For 
example, in terms of the Boston Marathon bombing case, as pointed out earlier, the 
Tsarnaev brothers were two of 500,000 people on the TIDE list.  The sheer scale of this in 
relation to the US and other Western governments monitoring and prioritising this number 
of people, in the words of Boyd (1976) from his paper Destruction and Creation, generates a 
high degree of entropy.   
 
As Bjelopera (2013) recognised, the amateurish nature of home-grown terrorists and their 
lack of connections with Salafi-Jihadi groups present challenges for law enforcement, 
intelligence and security officials.  A vital aspect of operating inside an opponent’s OODA 
loop is to disrupt their operations, overload their system and produce paralysis.  As 
discussed in Hammond (2004), Boyd spent much time studying the Mongols’ application of 
warfare and he saw their ability to combine mobility, communications and leadership with 
propaganda and terror allowed the Mongols to operate inside their opponent’s OODA loop.  
As Fournier (2013) explains, this leadership was developed and communicated with a single 
purpose in mind - that of winning.  The relevance to this research and this case study is that 
AQ had created a similar, overriding narrative through propaganda, communications, 
innovations and adaptability that enabled others to understand implicitly what was required 
to implement the grand strategy. 
 
For Boyd, the OODA Loop in action is about penetrating, isolating, subduing, subverting, re-
orientating and re-harmonising.  These terms can be summarised through the use of the 
concept of manoeuvrability, another important aspect of the OODA Loop.  The concept of 
“energy manoeuvrability”, as developed by Boyd, will form a core aspect of the critical 
discussion in Chapter 6, that will discuss the OODA Loop’s applicability to the current 
terrorism phenomenon.  The comparative difference is that Boyd was interested in “energy 
manoeuvrability”, whereas this thesis will attempt to shift Boyd’s manoeuvrability 
paradigm from energy to the moral component that simultaneously inspires violence while 
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distorting and penetrating the weaknesses in Western moral values in relation to modern 
warfare.  Boyd argued that the moral level of war was also a critical component to 
defeating an enemy.   
 
In Tetlock (2003), he investigates the peculiar character of moral boundaries in relation to 
what the public believes is acceptable in warfare.  Similarly, van Creveld (1991) raised the 
uncomfortable question that the West still believes only Governments are morally allowed 
to conduct war.  In an important contribution to the discourse on military ethics and 
contemporary warfare, Kaurin (2014) reflects on how bombing the Marine barracks in 
Lebanon or the attack against the USS Cole, or dragging dead US military personnel through 
the streets of Mogadishu may have little conventional military value but those actions have 
a tremendous impact on audiences that are not directly involved in the conflict.  Those 
audiences are often the media, politicians and voters who have their own moral boundaries 
challenged and consequently force moral-based decisions, through their government, on 
Generals trying to defeat an unconventional enemy.  As Kaurin (2014) explains, one cannot 
win a war by restricting oneself to what might be considered acceptable military targets.  
This is why Boyd placed great emphasis in his development of the OODA Loop in the 
physical-moral-mental continuum of warfare and it important for the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 - Case Analysis  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter expands on the descriptive analysis from the three case studies by applying the 
OODA Loop to the current terrorism phenomenon.  This includes using the OODA Loop to 
examine how AQ and other proponents of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative have been using what 
this research describes as “moral manoeuvrability” to penetrate deep inside the OODA loop 
of Western countries.  This involves taking one of the fundamental concepts within the 
OODA Loop - energy manoeuvrability - and attempting to present a novel concept.  The 
Chapter then employs the OODA Loop to critically analyse the adaptation or tactical 
asymmetric shift to Do-it-Yourself (DIY), soft target, home-grown terrorist attacks.  Further, 
the OODA Loop is used to critically examine the foreign fighter issue, in relation to Western 
resident Muslims leaving to join ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and Iraq.   
  
For this chapter, and in fact for this research, it is important to look beyond the tactical use 
of home-grown terrorism to the broader Salafi-Jihadi strategy of legitimising its position in 
the wider community.  This involves manipulating the use of Western-based constructs, 
such as the rule of law, protection of human rights, classical liberal principles of freedom 
and democratic systems from within.  It may be an example of what Boyd meant when he 
described the ultimate point of entropy was folding opponents back into themselves.  
Combined with the inspiration of individual, home-grown terrorists, and small scale attacks 
against soft-targets, this would be an example of the Salafi-Jihadi movement demonstrating 
its dynamic capacity to continue to move inside the West’s OODA loop.   
 
6.2 Inside the OODA Loop and the Mindset of Contemporary Terrorism 
 
While the analytical lens used for this case study research is the OODA Loop, the 
intellectual discourse, critical analysis and synthesis Boyd developed behind the OODA Loop 
are equally as relevant as the loop itself and therefore applicable to the current terrorist 
phenomenon.  As Polk (2010) explains, part of the challenge in accepting Boyd’s ideas often 
stems from difficulty in defining what his theory represents.  While Chapter Two provided a 
discussion and literature review of Boyd’s work, this chapter intends to apply his 
epistemological approach to Salafi-Jihadi-inspired home-grown terrorism, particularly as it 
relates to the moral aspect of this tactic of asymmetric warfare.  As Osinga (2005) 
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explained, following the attacks of 9/11, the West had to understand that this new game of 
survival is waged at the cognitive and moral domain.  In his Discourse on Winning and 
Losing, Boyd (1992) said: 
 
People using theories or systems evolved from a variety of information will find 
it increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible to interact with and 
comprehend phenomena or systems that move increasingly beyond and away 
from that variety – that they will become more and more isolated from that 
which they are trying to observe or deal with, unless they exploit the new 
variety to modify their theories/systems or create new theories/systems. 
(Boyd, 1992, slide. 14) 
 
This quote highlights why research into a physically unconstrained, borderless ideology, 
such as that proliferated through AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative, can send academic debate 
down confined paths of inquiry.  These theoretical discourses can quickly become trapped 
when the phenomena evolves away from its original system or path.  For example, Hoffman 
(2008 and 2011) faced this analytical cul-de-sac when continuing to pursue a discourse 
fixed on how AQ fought in the past.  This is the kind of linear analysis that Boyd would not 
have supported and is in contrast to the three case studies illustrating the dynamic and 
regenerative nature of this form of asymmetric warfare.  Hammond (2001) explains that, 
“from these mismatches, discontinuities, things that don’t fit reality or our perceptions of 
it, progress comes” (Hammond 2001, p.172).  Attention to irregularities and change are 
what is required in this field of inquiry that is so dynamic.  Boyd firmly believed this was the 
essence to the creation of innovative mechanisms, systems, process, inventions or 
instruments that are designed, tested and built.     
 
During Boyd’s Discourse on Winning and Losing presentation he explains: 
 
To examine novelty we speak of it in terms of those features that seem to be 
part of that novelty.  In other words, we reduce a novel pattern down to some 
features that make up that pattern.  Different people in examining such a 
pattern may see differing features that make it up. In other words, these are 
different ways by which a pattern can be reduced hence the possibility for 
differing features or parts.  Regardless of how it comes out, we call this process 
of reduction: analysis. 
 
Pushing this process even further we can reduce many different patterns 
(analyses) to parts that make up each patter and use these parts, or variations 
thereof, to make a new pattern.  This is done by finding some common features 
that interconnect some or many of these parts so that a new pattern – whether 
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it be a new concept, new system, new process, new etc – can be created.  We 
call this process of connection: synthesis. 
 
Now if we test the results of this process with the world we’re dealing with, we 
have an analytical/synthetic feedback loop for comprehending, shaping, and 
adapting to that world. (Boyd, 1992, slide 21) 
 
As examined through the three case studies, and by using the OODA Loop as an adaptable 
model of terrorism, it was possible to analyse and synthesise key elements of the three 
case studies to demonstrate how AQ’s regenerative capacity has enabled it to continue to 
simultaneously penetrate the mindset of those who it inspires as well as its opponents. This 
regenerative capacity produces novelty at the individual and group level across the 
physical, mental and moral level of asymmetric warfare.   
 
In warfare the inability of opponents to adapt and evolve through an analytical and 
synthetic process to create novelty means they are less likely to succeed.  However one 
major challenge for Western governments is creating novel strategies to defeat the threat 
from Salafi-Jihadi-inspired home-grown terrorism, when it is primarily not a physical 
contest.  In The Psychology of Military Incompetence, Dixon (1976) describes the contest 
during the Boer War between the British military - locked into frontal assaults and set piece 
battles - and the Boers, who were not wedded to a regimented military doctrine.  The 
British were incredulous to discover that their methods of running the war had not be been 
adopted by the Boers.  Dixon (1976) cites Lord Kitchener, who described how the “Boers 
are not like the Sudanese who stood up to a fair fight.  They are always running away on 
their little ponies […] there are a good many foreigners among the Boers but they are easily 
shot as they do not slink about like the Boers themselves” (Dixon, 1976, p.55).  Lord 
Kitchener was expressing the British military’s contempt for an opponent who changed the 
nature of warfare, constantly moving and adapting; engaging in what could be described as 
energy manoeuvrability on horseback - this tactic penetrated the British military’s OODA 
loop.   
 
At the beginning of WWII, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill launched a clandestine 
war-fighting unit called the Special Operations Executive (SOE).  It was tasked with 
conducting sabotage behind enemy lines, with a particular focus on German and Italian 
forces occupying Greek Islands (Lewis 2014; Foot 1999 and MacKenzie 2000).  Ironically, it 
was Churchill, as a young war correspondent (1899-1900), who reported how the British 
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forces were constantly out-manoeuvred by the Boers.  The SOE disguised themselves as 
local fishermen, goat herders and even German soldiers, blending in with the local 
population; they launched numerous deadly hit-and-run raids.  One of the most audacious 
was stealing three German warships anchored in the Santa Isabel harbour on the island 
nation of Fernando Po, on 14 January 1942 (Lewis, 2014).  The SOE units specialised in 
instigating Boyd mismatches, discontinuities and novelty, and disorientating the enemy’s 
mental image of how an opponent should fight.  Compared to conventional military 
engagements by regular army battalions, the SOE units did not actually kill many German 
and Italian soldiers, but they set fear into those soldiers, undermined their morale and 
diverted enormous German resources away from other Allied campaigns in Europe.  
However, as Lewis (2014) writes, surprisingly, despite their success the SOE were often 
criticised for their un-gentlemanly way of fighting, not only by the German military but also 
by members of the British Parliament.  For example, Conservative Member of Parliament 
Simon Wingfield-Digby (House of Commons) asked Prime Minister Churchill, “is it true, Mr 
Prime Minister, that there is a body of men out in the Aegean Islands, fighting under the 
Union Flag, that are nothing short of being a band of murderous, renegade cutthroats?” 
(Lewis, 2014, p.102). 
 
Boyd would have approved of the Boers’ tactics and the actions of the SOE during WWII, 
both penetrating their opponent’s OODA loop.  They were behaving and thinking like the 
fighter pilots Boyd describes in the Patterns of Conflict.  Boyd argued that a fighter pilot 
needed to pick and choose engagement opportunities and utilise what he referred to as 
“fast-transients”; in other words, characteristics that force an opponent to overshoot an 
attacker or stay inside a hard-turning defender.  The tactics used by AQ are examples of 
“fast-transients”.  As the three case studies illustrated, the use of Western raised or born 
Muslims of converts to Islam shifted conventional defensive posture for Western nations 
from protecting borders to now being attacked from within.  The three case studies also 
describe how AQ went from being directly involved (Jack Roche case) to inspiring 
entrepreneurial home-grown terrorists (Boston Marathon case) who had no tangible 
connection to AQ other than through their minds and the internet. 
 
In Patterns of Conflict, Boyd intended to unveil the character of conflict, survival and 
conquest through a critical inquiry of military history and warfare.  Despite his use of 
science, technology and engineering to describe the need for fast transients and the 
discovery of energy manoeuvrability, fundamentally Boyd believed in the indispensability of 
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the people who control the application of science, technology and engineering.  Boyd 
agreed with the assessment by T.E. Lawrence, who insisted that people fight wars, not 
machines, and they use their minds.  It is through people’s minds that an organisation or 
movement is able to connect with individuals, through an existentially moral and mental 
dimension.  As described in Chapter One, Boyd was heavily influenced by T.E. Lawrence, 
who turned a conventional war against the Turkish army, in Jordan and Syria, into an 
unconventional, asymmetric fight.  Lawrence saw his piece of the conflict as being about a 
state-of-mind as opposed to a contest of physical, military destruction.  In his classic eclectic 
discourse, Lawrence said: 
 
[…] but suppose we were an influence (as we might be), an idea, a thing 
invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies 
were like plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long 
stems to the head, we might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our 
kingdoms lay in each man's mind, as we wanted nothing material to live on, so 
perhaps we offered nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier 
might be helpless without a target. He would own the ground he sat on, and 
what he could poke his rifle at. (Lawrence, 1920, p.5) 
 
This is a powerful eclectic insight that could equally describe how AQ went from directly 
controlling and implementing terrorist attacks to inspiring others, through the creation of 
an intangible, borderless movement, drifting like T.E. Lawrence’s gas - except now hyper-
powered by social media.  As with the Turkish military, tangible, physical targets are only 
part of the challenge when dealing with home-grown terrorism. Ironically, an equally 
powerful observation made by Lawrence was his recognition that the printing press (in 
1917) was the most powerful weapon a commander could have in his arsenal.  Little did 
Lawrence know, the internet would become one of the Salafi-Jihadist’s most influential 
tools for building a global network of aspiring terrorists.  It is equally important as a means 
to infect the moral compass of AQ’s enemy through their graphic videos of beheadings and 
other brutal violence.   
 
It is in the minds of the contemporary producers of Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorism that an 
existential connection is built and sustained to create moral leverage over those it seeks to 
nurture and those it seeks to destroy.  As will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section, Boyd believed it was critical to “use moral leverage to amplify our spirit and 
strength as well as expose the flaws of competing adversary systems, all the while 
influencing the uncommitted potential adversaries and current adversaries so that they are 
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drawn towards our success” (Boyd, 1986, slide 185).  As Khadduri (1984) and Mousalli 
(2009) explains, for Salafism, submission to God is not a personal or public act but the focal 
point that engulfs members of Muslim society in all aspects of their lives.  Consequently, the 
distinction between the personal and the public is replaced by the distinction between the 
religious and the non-religious, beyond a material and physical dimension; between those 
who assume all direction and justification from Allah and not the democratic or other 
human-developed, Hobbesian principles or social contract.  As explained in Chapter Three, 
AQ and ISIS prosecute this through abject violence against those who are takfir, while 
simultaneously penetrating Western notions of democracy, morality and the rule of law.    
 
In reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Osinga (2005) explains that academic discourse 
from the likes of Bobbit (2002), Lynn (2003) and Coker (2002) makes the argument that the 
West needs to re-conceptualise war, for its instrumental view of war is severely challenged 
by a clash with groups who experience war as existential.  Groups such as AQ are stateless 
and more agile in their capacity to manoeuvre their nation-State adversaries beyond their 
moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt.  It is not a static entity where consensus is 
required along a Western-designed, organisational human resource chart.  General Stanley 
McChrystal (retired) recognised this during his time as Commander of the US Special 
Operations Task Force in Iraq from 2000 to 2008.  In his article, It takes a Network to Defeat 
a Network, McChrystal (2013) said, “we desperately wanted AQ in Iraq to be organised like 
we were, so that we could understand it, analyse it, pick it apart and ultimately defeat it” 
(McChrystal, 2013 p.2).  GEN. McChrystal describes how during one discussion with his 
team, he drew the classic Western corporate organisation chart and then drew what 
resembled AQ’s networked organisation; the two were completely different: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 How the US Joint Operations Task Force viewed itself vs. How AQ was organised in Iraq 
(McChrystal, 2013 p.2) 
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Ultimately, GEN. McChrystal adapted his Joint Operations Task Force to be more like AQ, not 
only in its tactical acceptance of change but, most importantly, he continually evaluated the 
organisation’s strategy to defeat AQ in Iraq through what he called, “shared consciousness 
and purpose.”  In addition, GEN. McChrystal dramatically increased the collection, analysis 
and synthesis of intelligence gathered from special force operation raids on AQ.  This 
enabled his Joint Operations Task Force to comprehend the enemy’s orientation.  The US 
Special Operations Joint Task Force evolved to become dynamically more effective at 
disrupting AQ in Iraq and penetrating its OODA loop.  As Clausewitz recommended: 
 
The first supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman 
and commander have to make is to establish by that test [of policy] the kind of 
war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it 
into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic 
questions and the most comprehensive. (Clausewitz, 1989, p.88-89) 
 
Coram (2004) explains that in Destruction and Creation Boyd argued that if our mental 
process becomes locked into our internal dogma and isolated from the unfolding, uncertain 
world then we experience mismatches between our mental images and reality.  That is 
what GEN. McChrystal determined in his own destruction and creation discovery.  It also 
reflects how much of the academic research into home-grown terrorism and the Salafi-
Jihadi terrorist movement is from a Western context of leadership base along a linear 
organisational structure, while the mindset that connects AQ and ISIS to its followers 
connects beyond the Western constructs of physical and organisational structures. 
 
In their critical examination of terrorism in an era of unconventional warfare, Martin and 
Weinberg (2014) describe how these ‘‘new’’ terrorists view themselves as being members 
of a larger community that crosses state boundaries, much as religious beliefs do; further 
they view themselves as being involved in a global war, or jihad, against those who 
threaten their existence.  Through his analysis of Boyd and the OODA Loop, Osinga (2005) 
describes how AQ is engaged in a conflict or war along cognitive and moral parameters:  
 
Boyd’s work offers important insights for understanding the threats of the 
“post-9/11” world. So-called asymmetric responses to western modes of 
warfare too become a natural feature only to be expected from adversaries.  
An adversary is a complex adaptive system attempting to adapt, to survive and 
prosper. The attacks of “9/11” introduced the contours of a new war form, and 
the West has been challenged to understand the nature of this new game of 
survival. In no small measure is it waged in the cognitive and moral domain. 
(Osinga, 2006, p.316). 
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It is important to recognise that while home-grown terrorism is an example of an OODA 
loop cycle of adaptation and regeneration, the home-grown terrorism act itself remains a 
tactic that feeds into a broader strategy.  It would be applicable to consider this broader 
strategy, as Lind et al (1989) explained, that is about attempting to establish a crisis in the 
legitimacy of the state.  As Lind et al (1989) describes, the goal is to focus on the enemy 
internally rather than physically.  In other words, where targets include the population’s 
support for its own Government’s decision to use its military, forcing us to question our own 
culture, causing any questioning of extreme Islamic views that are counter-cultural to 
Western belief systems, to be labelled intolerant, or “Islamophobic” and likely to be socially 
reprimanded.  It is not only the brutality that the likes of AQ and ISIS are using as an 
inspiration factor, it is also their ability to generate disorientation, mismatches and 
discontinuities within Western countries and our capacity to respond.  
 
As Boyd (1976) described in Destruction and Creation, the observer has a measurable effect 
on what they are observing, creating entropy.  For example, this can involve the reaction by 
society to a home-grown terrorist succeeding, a Western Government expanding 
surveillance laws, or the media and legal system lobbying to ensure a home-grown 
terrorists’ legal rights are protected.  It can also involve observing how AQ and other 
proponents of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative can create confusion in Western societies so that 
criticism of Islamic extremism is seen as criticism of the Muslim community.  This feeds 
further into what Boyd highlighted in the Marx and Lenin theories of creating tensions and 
alienation within an internal community.  A strong hypothesis could be that AQ anticipated 
that its attack on the World Trade Centre would cause the US and its Western allies to 
respond by sending military forces to Afghanistan, thereby generating animosity not only 
within the West’s political and public discourse but also within the Western-resident 
Muslim communities.  What they may not have predicted was the decision by the US to 
invade Iraq in 2003, thereby generating even deeper animosity in the Muslim community 
and deep divisions within the Western public and political systems.  
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6.3 OODA Loop and the Current Terrorism Phenomenon 
 
The ability to adapt and remain dynamic has been demonstrated by AQ and ISIS in the 
context of the current terrorism phenomenon.  For example, the shift to individual attacks 
on simple targets and the publicised brutal killing by one person of another using nothing 
more than a knife, have deep psychological and mobilising effects on sympathisers and 
opponents alike.  This adaptation is also potentially harder to detect and defeat.  The shift 
by AQ from recruiting, training and directing terrorist attacks by radicalised Western-based 
Islamic extremists to inspiring independent, self-perpetuating ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) style of 
home-grown terrorism is another example of being able to penetrate the West’s OODA 
loop.  As described by Wilner and Dubouloz (2010), it involves unaffiliated individuals and 
groups cognitively connecting with AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative that justifies violence against 
Western states and citizens in the very country those individuals were born or have become 
long-term residents.  In its 2004 – 2009 Strategic Plan, the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) anticipated lone-wolf terrorism would be the biggest domestic terrorism 
threat over the following five-year period.  The FBI Strategic Plan also said lone-wolf 
terrorists draw ideological inspiration from formal terrorist organisations, but operate on 
the fringes of those movements. The FBI report also states that “despite their ad hoc nature 
and generally limited resources, they can mount high-profile, extremely destructive attacks, 
and their operational planning is often difficult to detect” (FBI 2004, p.17).  This style of 
attack is what this chapter refers to as DIY, home-grown terrorism. 
 
While not a new form of terrorism, so called lone wolf attacks, when analysed through the 
OODA Loop, offer an example of the regenerative capacity of Salafi-jihadi inspired 
terrorism.  By using qualitative case studies from 1968 to 2010, Spaaij (2012) offers one of 
the few analytical studies on lone-wolf terrorism and describes its three main elements.  
Firstly, the perpetrators operate individually; secondly, they do not belong to an organised 
group or network; and thirdly, the modus operandi is conceived without outside assistance.  
Spaaij (2012) excludes small autonomous cells and duos, such as the Boston bombers.  This 
research thesis supports Spaaij’s three key, descriptive, contextual criteria for lone-wolf 
terrorists, but also includes small cells and duos, as does Pantucci (2011) in his paper on the 
typology of lone wolves.  According to the quantitative data used by Spaaij (2012), the 
database includes 198 attacks that have been committed by 88 lone wolves, across 15 
countries.  While this represents only a very small portion of all terrorist attacks during the 
period identified by Spaaij, it is not the point in the context of this research.   
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The relevant attributes of Salafi-Jihadi inspired lone-wolf home-grown terrorism are: 1) the 
simplicity of this style of attack; 2) they penetrate the West’s OODA loop; 3) the attacks 
generate enormous publicity (even if they are not successful) that further inspires others; 
and 4) these attacks generate internal entropy for Western governments and the public.  
These individuals can plan and initiate their own attacks with minimal material, no direction 
and no funding from any group.  The AQ magazine Inspire describes this growing 
phenomenon of lone-wolf or individual style terrorism as open-source jihad.  The English 
version of the 16 January 2011 Inspire magazine includes a to-do list, telling readers to "buy 
handguns", "make a bomb in mom's kitchen", "blow up Times Square", and "pull-off a 
Mumbai attack near the White House till martyrdom."  It also provides practical 
instructions on how to make explosives and shoot guns.  An article entitled "Open Source 
Jihad", which has appeared in different variations in past editions of Inspire, provides step-
by-step instructions on how to destroy buildings with chemical and mechanical explosions 
and how to use an automatic weapon to carry out an attack.   
 
Since 2001 there has been an increase in Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorist attacks 
by individuals, compared with this tactic for other political or ideological reasons.  Notable 
examples include the attack by US-born citizen Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, formerly 
known as Carlos Bledsoe, who on 1 July 2009 opened fire at the Army-Navy recruiting 
centre at Little Rock, Arkansas, killing one person and wounding another.  In his key case-
study analysis of the Little Rock shooting, Gartenstein-Ross (2014) described it as an act of 
lone-wolf Islamic terrorism, one of only two fatal lone-wolf attacks inspired by Salafi-Jihadi 
ideology since 9/11.  Then on 5 November 2009, US soldier MAJ. Nidal Malik Hasan killed 
twelve and wounded thirty-one of his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas.  In Canada on 20 
October 2014, Islamic convert Martin Rouleau (known on his Facebook page as Ahmad the 
Converted) ran over and killed a Canadian solider (Independent Tuesday 21 October 2014).  
In Pantucci (2011), the key cases of Roshonara Choudhry (the British woman who tried to 
kill MP Steven Timms) and Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly (an Iraqi-Swede who blew 
himself up outside a shopping mall in Stockholm around Christmas 2010), are also 
highlighted, illustrating how AQ drew in these individuals through a ‘borderless idea.’  
These are just a few examples of individual attacks and they illustrate how through their 
randomness, simplicity and unconnected planning, they can penetrate the West’s OODA 
loop, as a tactic of asymmetric warfare.  They also demonstrate the power of the Salafi-
Jihadi narrative to inspire and implicitly create schwerpunkt across a movement or 
organisation. 
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The American Islamic convert and AQ-inspired home-grown terrorist, Adam Gadahn, 
appeared in several videos published in 2006 promoting lone-wolf terrorism (Jones, 2012).  
For example, in March 2010 he promoted the Fort Hood attacker, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, 
as a role model for other aspiring lone-wolf terrorists.  In June 2011, as reported in the 
Huffington Post (3 June 2011), Gadahn appeared in another video entitled ‘‘Do Not Rely on 
Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself”, in which he urged Muslims in America to take 
advantage of lenient firearm laws to purchase guns and carry out attacks on their own 
initiative.  As Pantucci (2012) determines, AQ seeks to bridge the gap between the random 
nature of these individual home-grown terrorists and their jihadist global outlook.  
Gartenstein-Ross (2014) argues that lone-wolf attacks have not been the success AQ had 
hoped them to be; however the success or otherwise of the attacks is not the point.  When 
interpreted using the OODA Loop, each attempt, successful or not, creates enormous 
mismatches, discontinuities and fast-transients within Western communities and inspires 
other would-be home-grown terrorists.  Even failed attempts create discontinuities, fear 
and confusion. 
 
The current terrorism phenomenon is also witnessing strong competition between different 
organisations seeking to out-bid each other in owning the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  For 
example, ISIS and AQ are now competing to inspire potential home-grown terrorists and 
claim credit for their actions – crudely put, a battle of the global Salafi-Jihadi brands for the 
hearts and minds of the home-grown producers of terrorism.  For example, on 10 January 
2015, ISIS released a promotional video on YouTube, calling on lone-wolf attackers to kill US 
police officers, soldiers and others.  In the footage, the ISIS spokesman Abu Mohamad Al-
Adnani appears and says: “Do not let the battle pass you by wherever you may be. Strike 
their police, security and intelligence members, as well as their treacherous agents.”  Al-
Adnani then calls on supporters to smash a target’s head with a rock “or slaughter him with 
a knife, or run him over with your car.”  A similar video was released by AQ in the Arabian 
Peninsular (AQIP) leader, Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, calling for lone-wolf attacks in Canada.  
However, what is of particular interest is how Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi recognised the 
distorting impact lone-wolf attacks have on the Western countries in which they occur or 
are attempted.  In the AQ video, he said: 
 
If he is capable to wage individual jihad in the Western countries that fight 
Islam, such as America, Britain, France, Canada, and others of the countries 
that represent the head of disbelief in waging war against Islam, and 
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participate in this Crusader campaign — if he is capable of that then that is 
better and more harmful. (Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, 2015, January 20) 
 
In June 2014, ISIS defeated the Iraqi forces across much of northwest and central Iraq.  It 
has also held ground against Syrian government forces and in doing so declared it had 
established a Caliphate.  This provided ISIS with a symbolic beachhead from which to 
inspire a new wave of home-grown terrorism.  Success on the battlefield is being combined 
with graphic beheadings of Western hostages published on YouTube, and the execution by 
ISIS of thousands of unarmed civilians, including women, children and the elderly, who are 
members of the Yazidi, Christian or Shia communities.  Masked by the image of the Salafi-
Jihadi warrior ethos, the battlefield success and extermination of all those deemed kafir are 
being synthesised to inspire both affiliated and un-connected DIY, home-grown terrorists in 
Western countries.  A June 2014 report by the Soufan Group compared data from a range 
of primary and secondary sources, estimating that ISIS and the AQ-associated Jabat al-
Nusra have attracted an estimated 12,000 foreign fighters.  The Soufan Group, a US-based 
security and intelligence consulting company, reported this is significantly more than the 
number of foreign fighters who went to Afghanistan to join the Taliban and AQ’s fight 
against the US-NATO forces between 2001 and 2014.   
 
In the context of this research, the point of highlighting the issue of foreign fighters is that 
when a Western born or raised individual joins ISIS as a foreign fighter it penetrates our 
OODA loop by eliciting the same mental distorting image as generated by home-grown 
terrorism; in other words, a sense of moral betrayal and confusion.  Those inspired by the 
Salafi-Jihadi narrative of ISIS and AQ become soldiers on the battlefield and that battlefield 
can be in Iraq and Syria or in their home town.  For example, on 2 October 2015, teenager 
Farhad Jabar shot dead an employee of the New South Wales (NSW) Police Force in broad 
daylight in a Salafi-Jihadi inspired attack (Benny-Morrison, Ralston, Olding, & Aubuson, 
2015; ABC Online, 2015, October 19).  While Farhad Jabar did not join the fight in Iraq and 
Syria this unexceptional, Australian-born teenager become inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative and conducted a single act of brutality.  Significantly, in the context of the current 
terrorist phenomenon, whether it is inspiring foreign fighters or home-grown terrorists, ISIS 
has cast the use of violence as almost a priori to being a good Muslim.  In other words being 
prepared to conduct barbaric violence is interpreted as a pre-requisite to being affiliated to 
ISIS and, as such, a true Muslim, willing to submit to the highest form of self-sacrifice. 
. 
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The brutal level of violence, graphic beheadings and military prowess on the battlefield in 
Syria and Iraq form the basis of this globalised, borderless mindset, promoted on the 
internet.  While the common thread is Islam, it appears that the barbaric violence, justified 
through a powerful narrative that creates the image of a warrior fraternity, is deeply 
inspiring to many converts and Western born or raised Muslims.  In a comprehensive study 
on violent Islamic extremism in the Netherlands, the authors note that, “it is alarming that 
certain youth groups among the younger generation of Muslims in the Netherlands not only 
appear receptive to radicalisation, but perceive violent jihad as positive and ‘cool’” (Violent 
Jihad in the Netherlands, 2006, p8).  The report, notes that this fascination with violence 
may be analogous to the culture of violence among apolitical youth gangs in the major 
cities.  When these acts of violence are committed by lone individuals, they generate moral, 
physical and operational discomfort and uncertainty within the West.  These dynamics 
suggest a by-product of the current terrorism phenomenon. 
 
Even when an act of brutality against Westerners does not happen in a Western country, it 
has the equivalent level of moral distortion, because of the use of the internet and how the 
acts are broadcast into our homes.  The publishing on social media the beheadings of 
journalists - James Foley on 19 August 2014 and Steven Sotloff on 2 September 2014 - as 
well as humanitarian aid workers - David Haines on 12 September 2014 and Alan Henning 
on 3 October 2014 - had a powerful moral and mental disturbing impact on Western 
audiences.  In the case study of a disrupted UK-based beheading plot of Muslim British 
soldiers who had served in Afghanistan or Iraq, Lentini and Bakashmar (2007) describe the 
use of beheadings by Islamic terrorist groups as a contemporary, evolving tactic.  Publicised 
beheadings are used to dissuade opponents and recruit fighters by demonstrating the 
power of ISIS in the face of materially far superior Western nations.  Western media outlets 
also inadvertently assist in this process, increasing the publicity and infamy of the terrorists 
by showing images in the lead up to the beheadings and other incidents of brutality.  
Significantly for this research is the power of a single act by an unexceptional individual or 
individuals born or raised in the West, against soft targets that are almost impossible to 
protect.  In the current terrorism phenomenon, this is another evolving tactic of 
asymmetric warfare incited through the Salafi-Jihadi narrative that penetrated the West’s 
OODA loop along the moral, mental and physical continuum of conflict.   
 
The next section will discuss how these evolving tactics of asymmetric warfare could be 
uniquely described as moral manoeuvrability.  This is the power to penetrate Western 
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society’s mental and moral weaknesses, while simultaneously inspiring a new generation of 
self-perpetuating producers of home-grown terrorism.  The chapter will then use examples 
of single-acts of brutality and DIY style terrorism as illustrations of moral manoeuvrability in 
the current terrorism phenomenon, using the OODA Loop. 
 
6.4 Boyd’s Law and the Concept of Moral Manoeuvrability 
 
Manoeuvrability and the moral aspect of war are two critical components contained within 
the OODA Loop and Boyd’s law on survival and conflict.  They are also both relevant and 
applicable to analysing the current terrorism phenomenon inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative.  As described in Chapter Two, one of Boyd’s most important discoveries, which, it 
could be argued, is the fundamental genome of the OODA Loop, was energy 
manoeuvrability, or EM theory as it is known.  As Hammond (2001) explains, “EM was truly 
revolutionary, not only as an assessment tool but also as a design parameter in the 
development of tactics and doctrine for combat engagements” (Hammond, 2001, p.60).  
While Boyd had discovered a mathematically quantifiable method of defining 
manoeuvrability, using physics, that gave the US Air Force a defined process for comparing 
one aircraft against another, it is applicable to competitive organisms or entities in other 
environments or contests.  In any conflict, competition or conquest situation, 
manoeuvrability is important for success, which in the case of AQ or ISIS also means the 
capacity to regenerate in the face of its own OODA loop being penetrated.   
 
In the context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, it is evident that AQ and ISIS 
recognise and apply what this research describes as moral manoeuvrability, in its war 
against the West.  The idea of moral manoeuvrability is a tactic of asymmetric warfare that 
describes the ability to manoeuvre inside an opponent’s moral constructs causing internal, 
public and government entropy while simultaneously inspiring followers whose novel 
actions regenerate the terrorists organisation’s capacity to survive.  Essentially, it is about 
the penetration of moral principles as a tactic of asymmetric conflict between opponents 
and their ability to morally re-engineer the justification for their actions.  This simultaneous 
nature of the moral component of conflict is described in Richards (2006) and summarises 
the military and strategic thinking of Boyd, Lind et al, van Creveld and General Hermann 
Balck.  Moral manoeuvrability does not fit with Western-based principles of law and the 
application of state-sponsored force, either by the police or the military.  It could be argued 
that the lack of moral manoeuvrability constrains how Western Governments can respond, 
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through their police, intelligence or armed forces, even in defence of the very ideals that 
are under direct and lethal challenge by an opponent.  This is not to suggest the West 
abandons these principles but rather to make the point about an asymmetric weakness 
that has been identified and penetrated by opponents.   
 
Three years before the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre, two senior serving Officers 
from the Chinese military, COL. Qiao Liang and COL. Wang Xangsui (2002), wrote 
Unrestricted Warfare.  A major component of this piece of work, developed for Chinese 
military strategists, advocates manipulating the West’s commitment to international rules 
and conventions, such as the Laws of Armed Combat.  Qiao Liang and Wang Xangsui (2002) 
believed in fully exploiting how the West imposes political and moral restraints on how its 
military can fight.  Perversely, the authors describe a potential attack on the World Trade 
Centre or a bombing attack by bin Laden.  In his work on terrorism and moral constraints, 
Gross (2010) describes another example of a Western-imposed moral dilemma in how to 
define terrorists as combatants or criminals.  If they are combatants then certain 
international rules of war apply, as described above, or in the four treaties and three 
Protocols that comprise the Geneva Convention.  If they are criminals then the rule of law 
applies and Gross (2010) explains that this presents an uncomfortable problem in that 
terrorists treated as combatants will be afforded equal rights as uniformed soldiers if 
caught as prisoners of war; and terrorists defined and apprehended as criminals must be 
treated innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.   
 
As Dew (2008) argues, imposing costs for non-compliance with moral boundaries and rules 
of war is difficult when the actor is a non-state entity, especially when states must continue 
to abide by these norms.  Howard, Andreopoulos and Shulman (1994) explore the 
limitations Western society has placed on itself in how it fights wars, not only in legislation 
and international conventions but also the cultural acceptance of what the public and 
elected representatives believe is tolerable.  Similarly, Barnett (2003) discusses the legal 
and moral constraints on the ability of the US to use military force and describes how 
asymmetric warfare includes an opponent exploiting these constraints with the knowledge 
of how the US is unable to respond.  While ISIS and AQ can behead its civilian prisoners on 
YouTube, massacre civilians from other religious and ethnic groups and execute soldiers it 
captures from the Iraqi, Kurdistan and Syrian government forces, Western governments 
would be morally and politically forced to treat all captured ISIS fighters humanely and in 
accordance with Western rules of law.  As Lind et al (1984) explain, if we treat terrorists 
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within the Western rule of law, they gain protection; if we shoot them, they can be 
described by the media, academics and opinion leaders as victims.  According to Lind et al 
(1984), “terrorists can effectively wage their form of warfare while being protected by the 
society they are attacking” (Lind et al 1984, pp.25-26).   
 
In The Strategic Game of ? and ? Boyd (1987) argued that “with respect to adversaries we 
should reveal those harsh statements that adversaries make about us – particularly those 
that denigrate our culture, our achievements, our fitness to exist, etc. – as the basis to show 
that our survival and place in the scheme of things is not necessarily a birthright, but is 
always at risk” (Boyd, 1987, slide 56).  In an interview with mainstream media in 1998, bin 
Laden said to the BBC, “the truth is the whole Muslim world is the victim of international 
terrorism, engineered by America and the United Nations. We are a nation whose sacred 
symbols have been looted and whose wealth and resources have been plundered.  It is 
normal for us to react against the forces that invade our land.”  Work by Pregulam and 
Burke (2012), as well as Sageman (2004), Hoffman (2008), Pape (2006), O’Duffy (2008) and 
Atran (2010), all describe how AQ’s use of Salafi-Jihadi narrative in relation to the US-led 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan played a substantial role in shaping the narrative and 
justification of home-grown terrorists.  The US invasion of Iraq (2003 – 2011), the US-NATO 
war in Afghanistan (2001 – 2014) and unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) missile strikes 
against terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen have been portrayed by AQ as direct attacks against 
all Muslims.  Following the 7 July 2005 London transport terrorist attack, a Guardian (2005) 
ICM poll was conducted asking members of the United Kingdom’s Muslim community if 
they thought any further attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK were justified or 
unjustified.  Of the 500 people questioned, five percent said that further attacks were 
justified.  This is an example of moral manoeuvrability by the Salafi-Jihadi movement within 
its own globalised constituency. 
 
A descriptive and illustrative example of the moral manoeuvrability phenomenon is how 
the Taliban in Afghanistan forced the US and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan to stop the use 
of night-raids by Special Operation Forces during the war in Afghanistan 2001 - 2014.  In 
Afghanistan night raids were manipulated into being declared a highly insensitive attack on 
the conservative values within the patriarchal Afghan society, where the mere act of male 
strangers entering a home and seeing another man’s wife or wives is considered a grave 
offense.  US Special Operations Forces also targeted individuals who were suspected of 
supporting or knowing senior Taliban leaders.  These individuals were often not 
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combatants; however, in an insurgency war where the insurgents rely on the support of the 
community, targeting this support is a logical, operational tactic.  Night raids involved 
Special Operations Forces launching a surprise attack on a Taliban militant’s house, in the 
middle of the night, with concentrated amounts of aggression that overwhelmed a stunned 
and surprised adversary - in what could be described as a classic OODA Loop tactic.  Sun Tzu 
wrote, “if the enemy is superior in strength, evade him.  If his forces are united, separate 
them. Attack him where he is unprepared.  Appear where you are not expected.”  At that 
time in 2011, U.S. Army LTGEN. Curtis Scaparrotti, who headed the Coalition's Joint 
Command Special Operations Forces, determined that night raids allowed US-NATO forces 
to put constant pressure across the entire insurgent network.  The Taliban then applied 
tremendous moral and cultural pressure on the US-NATO Commanders through the 
Afghanistan district and provincial leaders.  Further, in 2010 the Afghan Analyst Network, a 
non-government organisation (NGO), conducted a study of night raids in Nangarhar 
Province and reported that from October to November 2010, all night raids were targeting 
people who had met with a local religious cleric who was believed to be the Taliban shadow 
provincial governor.   
 
The Afghan Analyst Network concluded that deliberately targeting and rounding up civilians 
who are not suspected of being insurgents, merely to exploit possible intelligence value, 
“may constitute an arbitrary deprivation of liberty” and thus “inhumane treatment” in 
violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.  A US-based NGO and think tank founded 
by George Soros, the Open Society Foundation, published a separate report on 19 
September 2011, The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan 
Civilians, and concluded - with respect to night-raids - that human rights concerns remain, 
particularly in relation to detention for intelligence value and a failure to consider less 
harmful alternatives.  The Taliban not only used a Western cultural and political framework 
of human rights to lobby for the night raids to be stopped, but they also succeeded in 
indirectly securing support from NGOs, US think tanks and Western journalists, all citing 
Western rules of war and civil liberties.  However, the Taliban wanted the night raids 
stopped not because of any offense to women or because they infringed civilians’ human 
rights, but because the night raids were successful at capturing or killing senior Taliban 
leaders, those who manufactured improvised explosive devices and the Taliban’s 
community intelligence and support network.  Before they were stopped, night raids had 
successfully got inside the Taliban’s OODA loop and were undermining the moral fibre of 
the Taliban and anyone who thought of joining or supporting them.  Instead of fighting back 
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physically, the Taliban revolved through its own OODA loop to engage in moral 
manoeuvrability, in an attempt to undermine its opponent.   
 
As Gross (2010) argues, when it comes to conflict, a commander, person, tribe or nation 
has to be placed into a position to ask whether it still has the stomach for the fight when 
the opponent has generated moral and mental torment.  An applicable example of this 
notion comes from an Ismaili poem, retold in Belfield (2005), that says, “by one single 
warrior on foot, a king may be stricken with terror, though he own more than a hundred 
thousand horsemen” (Belfield, 2005, p.57).  This was the fear and terror unleashed by 
Ismailia Nizari in the 13th Century, more popularly known as the Hashshashin (Assassins), 
founded by Hasan ibn el-Sabah.  The Hashshashin’s tactic was a simple but effective act 
that psychologically undermined a more powerful opponent at little cost.  The 
Hashshashin’s reputation for tactically discrete violence and killing generated moral and 
mental internal friction within their opponents, dislocating and frustrating their decision-
making.  Boyd (1987) explained that, “friction is generated and magnified by menace, 
ambiguity, deception, rapidity, uncertainty, mistrust, etc” (Boyd 1987, slide 8).  As with AQ 
and ISIS, the Hashshashin often planted or cultivated assassins within the ranks of the 
political leaders or commanders they were planning to eliminate.  This created a high state 
of entropy within the leader’s camp and great suspicion within the general population.  
Belfield (2005) explains how following a direct threat from the former Sultan of Egypt and 
Syria, Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb (1138 – 1193) the Assassins responded to him in a letter 
that said: 
 
The common proverb says “do you threaten a duck with the river?  Prepare 
means for disaster and don a garment against catastrophe, for I will defeat you 
from within your own ranks and take vengeance against you at your place and you 
will be as one who encompasses his own destruction.  (Belfield, 2005, p. 66) 
 
Belfield (2005) goes onto explain how Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb initially prepared to 
engage the Assassins in battle but with no explanation suddenly withdraw.  Essentially, the 
Hashshashin penetrated their opponent’s OODA loop physically, mentally and morally. 
 
In Essence of Winning and Losing, Boyd argued that as well as the tactical, operational and 
strategic levels of war, it was also important to understand the application of the physical, 
mental and moral levels of war.  As described through the use of the OODA Loop, one of 
the most effective ways of doing this is to analyse an opponent’s Orientation.  In a USAF 
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Academy Harmon Memorial Lecture, Hammond (2012) explains that Boyd was concerned 
about better understanding the orientation of the adversary.  This means establishing what 
our opponents value, what they fear, and how they have acted in the past; it means 
establishing their cultural anthropology and ethnography.  Hammond (2012) says Boyd 
wanted to develop a ‘psychological order of battle’.  This means knowing an opponent’s 
intentions as well as capabilities, so as to devise a strategy that creates moral and 
psychological leverage, as well as the physical capability to defeat an opponent. 
 
Chapter One discussed how Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict was an historical analysis of survival 
and conquest in war, as seen through military strategists such as Napoleon, Sun Tzu, Liddell 
Hart, Jomini, Clausewitz and T E Lawrence.  In it Boyd also assessed the principles of 
warfare as applied by the German military during the Blitzkrieg and deduced they employed 
a nebenpunkte/schwerpunkt manoeuvre philosophy to generate ambiguity, realise 
deception, exploit superior mobility, and focus violence.  As Richards (2006) succinctly 
explains, Boyd provides a summation of the German blitzkrieg fundamental tenets of 
warfare as a basis to: 
 Create many opportunities to penetrate weaknesses in the form of any moral or 
mental inadequacies as well as any gaps or exposed flanks that open into an 
adversary’s vulnerable rear and interior, hence -  
 
 Create and exploit opportunities to repeatedly penetrate an adversary’s organism, 
at all levels (tactical, grand tactical, and strategic) and in many ways, in order to 
splinter, envelop and roll-up/wipe-out isolated remnants, thereby generating 
confusion and disorder, hence -  
 
 Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt an adversary’s system for 
communication, command, and support, as well as undermine or seize those 
connections or centers that it depends upon, thus shake its will or capacity to 
decisively commit its back-up echelons, operational reserves, and/or strategic 
reserves, thereby magnifying an adversary’s confusion and disorder and convince it 
to give up.  (Richards, 2006, slide 87). 
 
As Richards (2006) explains, the implication of “Blitzers”, are those elements being able to 
infiltrate or penetrate an adversary’s system, generating many moral-mental-physical non-
cooperative (or isolated) centres of gravity.  It then involves undermining or seizing those 
centres of gravity an adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, produce 
paralysis and bring about adversary collapse.  Boyd referred to these concepts as the 
application of Cheng and the Ch’i manoeuvres in warfare.  As explained in Chapter One, 
Boyd learnt about the importance of cheng and ch’i from the works of Sun Tzu. 
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In the examination of the moral imperatives of war, Atran and Ginges (2011) argue that 
judgements about the use of war are bound by rules of deontological reasoning and 
parochial commitment.  Their study has implications for understanding the trajectory of 
violent political conflicts, including Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorism.  Essentially, Atran and 
Ginges apply Boyd’s propensity to pull things apart, in search of their opposites, or trade-
offs.  In the context of this thesis, Atran and Ginges’ study reinforces the significance of 
pulling apart the components of war and synthesising them into the concept of moral 
manoeuvrability.  Individuals and networks of friends being inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative have strong social and moral bonds.  These moral bonds are juxtaposed against 
the Western construct of war where soldiers fight for their sovereign country.  In relation to 
group-level moral and social obligations, Rappaport (1999) explained that religious beliefs 
and prescriptions reinforce cooperative norms by associating them with “sacredness”.  The 
use by AQ of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative takes any transgression against sacredness as 
justification for extreme violence.  Sacredness is without boundaries and connects through 
a global community of minds where groups or individuals can be inspired and enraged 
through moral manoeuvrability.  As Ginges and Atran (2010) argues, these sacred 
assumptions are ineffable, “they cannot be fully expressed and analysed—unlike secular 
social contracts—because they include a logic of moral appropriateness that is, at least in 
part, immune to instrumental calculations. To be effective, ‘sacred propositions’ must be 
immune to instrumental calculations, otherwise they would be undermined by free-riders.” 
(Ginges and Atran, 2010, p.2930).   
 
In The State, War and the State of War, Holsti (1996) argues that wars or fighting are often 
beyond the nation-state framework and more about the “clash over different conceptions 
of community and how these conceptions should be reflected in political arrangements and 
organisations,” (Holsti, 1996, p.17).   Boyd considered Orientation to be the window into the 
moral bonds of an opponent and could include what Rappaport (1999) describes as 
instrumental calculations and scared propositions.  These are powerful human factors that 
cannot be manufactured through the conventional Clausewitzian way of war.  As Hammond 
(2001) and Coram (2002) explain, Boyd believed that in relation to conflict it was people 
first, then ideas and equipment or physical terrain.  When it comes to applying Boyd’s 
propositions behind the OODA Loop to the current Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorist 
phenomenon and Western governments, it is almost as if the two OODA Loops are at times 
rotating on completely different deontological planes; and this is why moral 
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manoeuvrability is potentially a significant concept when attempting to understand this 
kind of asymmetric warfare.   
 
In Destruction and Creation, Boyd (1976) explored the second law of thermodynamics and 
explained there is a tendency for entropy to increase within a closed system.  This 
suffocates the capacity for the system to process and communicate with the external 
environment.  Boyd’s (1976) analysis could also describe the challenge faced by two 
cultures, akin to two closed systems of thinking with completely different ideological 
foundations, in conflict with one another.  Boyd (1976) believed that over time, as entropy 
increases, energy dissipates, efficiency decreases, and confusion and disorder increase.  
Therefore, the character of a system, its consistency, does not remain constant and is 
unpredictable.  Thus, the use of unexceptional, Western born or raised, young males who 
live in our own neighbourhoods and who carry out home-grown terrorism, increases 
entropy, creating a high degree of confusion and disorientation.  It is a tactic that does not 
fit neatly into Western conventional constructs of war.  This is because it creates too many 
potential threats to cross-reference, as the perception is being created that the enemy is 
among us.    Applied through the tactics of asymmetric warfare, moral manoeuvrability is an 
example of increasing entropy, disorder and creates unpredictable and uncomfortable 
cultural, political and moral challenges for the West.  In the context of the current terrorism 
phenomenon, examples of these evolving tactics of asymmetric warfare that involve the use 
of moral manoeuvrability, are the use of the single act of brutal violence and DIY-style 
home-grown terrorism against soft targets.  These dynamic terrorist actions that penetrate 
the West’s OODA loop will be discussed in the following section. 
 
6.5 The Performative Power of the Single Act of Violence  
 
In the context of the current terrorism phenomenon AQ and ISIS have used the Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative to inspire small-scale acts of brutal violence that simultaneously have an 
exponentially powerful effect on followers and enemies alike.  Most notably this can be 
perpetrated by a single individual, inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  An immediate 
criticism of introducing this observation as an example of further adaptation of the 
dynamism of this kind of Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorism, is that many of these single acts of 
violence are not carried out in Western countries.  However, as will be explained in this 
section, AQ and ISIS penetrate our OODA loop by using Westerners with British accents to 
carry out these single acts of brutality.  This is on top of the home-grown terrorism acts 
201 
 
committed in Western countries that appear to have transformed from large attacks to 
single acts of violence.  Hyper-driving the profound effect of the communicative and 
psychological value of both these tactics, is that these acts can be broadcast almost 
instantaneously to a globalised audience.  It is an example of the regenerative capacity of 
AQ and ISIS to create a new wave of fast transients, discontinuities and mismatches, which 
also generate moral manoeuvrability.   
 
In his empirical study of violence in civil war, Kalyvas (2006) describes how violence 
becomes a resource requiring a distinction between victims and targets.  For example, if a 
Westerner is threatened with beheading by ISIS, in order to stop that person from 
continuing to implement their function (e.g. humanitarian work) on behalf of their 
government, then the person is simultaneously a victim and a target.  If, on the other hand, 
the person is threatened with beheading to stop their country from continued intervention 
and to intimidate their population, then the target is the Western government and the 
victim is the Westerner who is beheaded.  Effectively, the violence is intended to shape the 
behaviour of the targeted audience.  In order to reinforce the powerful effect of the single 
act of violence, Kalyvas (2006) cites a number of historical revolutionaries.  Trotsky (1961) 
said, “the revolution […] kills individuals and intimidates thousands,” while he cites the 
lessons of a British agent in German-occupied Greece in 1944 who described how the 
partisans were masters of the psychology of the “exemplary atrocity”.  The powerful 
psychological and moralistic effect of single acts of brutality is also true for the reverse 
scenario; in other words, saving one person compared to thousands.  For example, Slovic 
(2007) uses a quote by Mother Teresa who said, “if I look at the mass I will never act.  If I 
look at the one I will.”  As Slovic explains, Mother Teresa’s statement captures the powerful 
and deeply unsettling insight into human nature, in that society will spare nothing to save 
one person but will remain indifferent to the plight of many in equal peril. 
 
An example of the communicative and psychological power of a single act of brutality is the 
way ISIS, through the use of the internet, managed the beheading of the two Japanese 
citizens caught in Syria, Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa (RT.com, 2015, January 31).  On 20 
January 2015, ISIS published a video on several jihadist websites, showing the two Asian 
men wearing orange fatigues and kneeling, while a masked man in black holds a knife.  In 
the video, ISIS demands a USD200 million ransom to be paid for the hostages' lives within 
72 hours.  Consequently, ISIS published footage of the beheading of both men on various 
social media forums.  As is the nature of the repetitive mainstream 24-hour news cycle, the 
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Japanese media indirectly served the interests of ISIS by replaying footage on the enormous 
TV screens around Tokyo.  This further amplified the psychological, moral and 
communicative impact on the Japanese public and other nations.  On behalf of ISIS, the act 
of one man with nothing more than a knife as the executioner, could terrorise an entire 
nation.  It was as if Japan itself had been attacked. 
 
As exemplified by the beheading of the two Japanese hostages, the single act does not even 
need to take place in one’s country, especially when perpetrated by a Westerner.  For 
example, the British citizen, so-called “Jihadi John”, who is alleged to have conducted the 
beheadings of James Foley and Steven Sotloff, generated enormous shock and confusion 
(De Graff & Boyle 2014).  It is believed Jihadi John is a former musician and rapper, Abdel-
Majed Abdel-Bary, born and raised in the UK.  This tactic deeply penetrates the West’s 
OODA loop and, in the context of this research, creates the sensation of home-grown 
terrorism.  In September 2014, the FBI director, James Comey, revealed that intelligence 
services had identified the man, but Mr Comey could not confirm whether the FBI believes 
the man talking actually carries out the murders himself or if that is done by someone else 
when the camera is turned off (The Telegraph, 20 January 2015).  This is a very clever and 
manipulative tactic by ISIS.  To create the image that a Western-born individual with a thick 
British accent carries out these single acts of brutality is a demonstration of what Boyd 
described as penetrating the OODA Loop.  This is a tactic of contemporary asymmetric 
warfare, by setting the scene of one Westerner beheading another to generate cognitive 
and social repulsion in the enemy while inspiring followers, is also an example of the use of 
moral manoeuvrability against an adversary.   
 
As mentioned, these single acts of brutality, broadcast globally through mainstream and 
social media, also provide an inspiration to followers.  For example, in late 2014, Khaled 
Sharrouf, an Australian citizen who joined ISIS, received international coverage and 
condemnation following the photo he posted on social media of his seven-year-old son 
holding the decapitated head of a Syrian soldier.  While this single act resulted in public, 
political and moral outrage in the West, and especially Australia, it turned this individual 
into a Salafi-Jihadi celebrity in the minds of other aspiring Western resident Salafi-Jihadi 
friends and followers.  The more it was publicised by mainstream media, and the more the 
individual was condemned by the very people he and his network of Salafi-Jihadists hate, 
the more his act of brutality became an act of inspiration and notoriety.  While this is not 
intended as a research topic on lone-wolf terrorism, in the context of single acts of brutality 
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by lone individuals, Kaplan, Lööw and Malkki (2014) make an astute observation in that 
whether they are doing good or bad, individuals can have a disproportionate influence in a 
highly globalised world.  As summarised by Richards (2006), the aim is to: 
 
Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation in 
order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert 
those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral bonds that permit 
adversary to exist as an organic whole.  Simultaneously; build-up and play 
counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as 
surface courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human 
interactions needed to create moral bonds that permit us, as an organic whole, 
to shape and adapt to change.  (Richards, 2006, slide 122) 
 
The beheadings of Western journalists and aid workers by ISIS, published on social media, 
illustrate the powerful moral dissonance these single acts of brutality can have on Western 
society.  As will be discussed in the next section, when these single acts of brutality are 
synthesised with the DIY nature of these attacks against soft-targets, this combines to 
demonstrate the applicability of the OODA Loop to the current, evolving future of the 
Salafi-Jihadi terrorist phenomenon. 
 
6.6 DIY Home-grown Terrorism and Soft-Targets 
 
Acts of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism do not need to be successful or result in 
a large number of casualties to penetrate the West’s OODA loop.  Following analysis and 
synthesis of the available literature on home-grown terrorism and its effects, the current 
terrorism phenomenon appears to be about DIY-style, home-grown attacks that generate 
an inverse ratio between the simplicity of the attack and the global publicity, fear, 
confusion and moral repulsion as a consequence.  Here we are referring to the impact of 
simple, unsophisticated acts of violence carried out by unexceptional, Salafi-Jihadi inspired, 
home-grown terrorists.  They are difficult to detect, deter and defeat when the perpetrator 
is one among a plethora of potentially inspiring or inspired home-grown terrorists who can 
acquire their weapon of choice from a hardware store or their own house with no explicit 
connection or direction from any group.  As described in Chapter Three, it is a 
demonstration of the dynamic application of abu Musab al Suri’s strategy that creates an 
omnipresent, implicit and simple understanding of what is required by these globally 
dispersed “foot-soldiers”.  This section presents a number of examples to illustrate the 
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penetrating effect of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown, DIY terrorism on Western 
countries. 
 
The murder of off-duty British soldier, Lee Rigby, in broad daylight in Woolwich, London, by 
Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale on 22 May 2013 is an illustrative case of a 
simple, DIY-style home-grown terrorist attack that generated global horror and moral 
bewilderment.  The incident did not involve a sophisticated network, nor did it require 
training or funds to plan and implement.  Further, the attack killed one person and was not 
spectacular or complex in the way that preparing and planting an explosive device would 
be.  As described in The Daily Telegraph, the two men ran Lee Rigby down with a car, then 
used knives and a cleaver to stab and hack him to death in broad daylight (Duffin, 23 May 
2013).  In Sydney on 19 September 2014, the New South Wales Police arrested and charged 
Omarjan Azari for conspiring to abduct a member of the public and publish his or her 
beheading on the internet.  As the Commonwealth prosecutor, Michael Allnutt, alleged, the 
plan to commit the act was designed to “shock, horrify, and terrify the community” (Levy, 
2014, September, 19).  Simultaneously, these attacks also inspire others while manoeuvring 
between the Salafi-Jihadi narrative that provides moral justification and Western moral 
repugnance for such brutal, public acts of violence. 
 
The attack and killing of a Canadian armed forces reservist on the grounds of the Canadian 
War Memorial, by Muslim convert Michael Zehaf-Bibeau on 22 October 2014, and the 
machete attack on two police officers in New York on 23 October 2014 by Salafi-Jihadi 
inspired, Muslim convert Zale Thompson, did not result in mass casualties and were 
confined to very specific locations in two major Western cities.  That is to say, there was no 
mass attack across either city and yet the horror and impact tactically, morally and 
cognitively penetrated the enemy’s OODA loop.  As in the case of Lee Rigby, the attackers 
were armed with simple instruments.  In a comparative review of lone-wolf terrorism, 
Feldman (2013) explains that lone wolves have tended to see their acts as symbolic strikes 
in an asymmetrical war against parts of their own society.  This self-directed terrorism is 
personally constructed and undertaken in terms of motivation, targets, and justification.  In 
the context of AQ it maintains the dynamic and regenerative capacity to evolve and 
disperse.  The global reaction to each DIY, unsophisticated act generated enormous 
publicity, confusion and distortion of how Western governments should respond, while 
simultaneously generating a moral esprit de corps with other aspiring Salafi-Jihadists. 
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These DIY-style attacks against soft targets could become more prevalent and epitomise 
the current terrorism phenomenon, when it comes to home-grown terrorism, especially as 
more self-generating Salafi-Jihadists realise that only very basic resources are required and 
any attempt on a low profile, soft target will illicit enormous publicity and potential terror 
across a community.  In addition, they are incredibly difficult to detect by materially and 
technologically superior police and government intelligence and security services, further 
illustrating their asymmetric effect.  The Pantucci (2012) case study analysis of the effect of 
lone-wolf attacks, or terrorism conducted by individuals, describes how Roshonara 
Choudhry’s attempted murder of British MP Stephen Timms was illustrative of the 
undetectable dimension of DIY lone-wolf terrorist attacks.  The paper does not use the term 
“DIY terrorism”, but explains how, seemingly in complete isolation, Choudhry became 
inspired, obtained her weapon and selected her target.  That the weapon she chose was a 
knife available at any number of shops meant security services would have had no way of 
detecting her through this purchase; further, she had no explicit connect to any terrorist 
organisation, such as AQ. 
 
Through the application of the OODA Loop, it is evident how this DIY-style of attack 
perpetrated against soft targets is potentially the new and unfolding Salafi-Jihadi home-
grown terrorist phenomenon.  A descriptive key case reinforcing this paradigm shift is the 
2014 Sydney siege, in which Man Haron Monis held eighteen people hostage at the Martin 
Place Lindt Café on 15 December 2014.  Available open-source data describe how Monis, an 
individual with a number of serious criminal charges, including being an accessory to 
murder, had pledged his allegiance to "the caliph of the Muslims", believed to be referring 
to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and had denounced moderate Islam (Safi, 2014, 
December 21).  In all the analysis following the siege, what has been overlooked is that 
Monis demonstrated that, with few resources, an ordinary, unexceptional individual can 
become a globally-recognised, Salafi-Jihadi terrorist by attacking a soft-target in a major 
international city.   
 
While operational security protocols would prevent a descriptive analysis of the exact 
security measures at places such as the Sydney Opera House, the Federal Houses of 
Parliament in Canberra and all international airports, Monis demonstrated that these highly 
secure locations are no longer the only targets to consider.  It would be impossible to 
secure all cafés, supermarkets, fast-food outlets and other innocuous locations in Australia, 
New York, Paris or London.  The Monis attack penetrated his enemy’s OODA loop.  In his 
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analysis and proposition of leaderless resistance, Michael (2012) explains how jihadists 
operating in the United States do not need to attempt “spectacular” attacks like 9/11 to be 
effective.  As with the examples provided in this section, any kind of random assassinations 
and bombings can be equally psychologically devastating to the public they intend to 
influence. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the applicability of the OODA Loop to the current terrorism 
phenomenon.  The analysis required a deeper exploration of the mental and moral fabric of 
the OODA Loop.  As Chapter One explained, the essay Destruction and Creation synthesised 
the concepts and theories of Gödel’s Proof, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle and the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics.  Boyd (1976) described how Heisenberg argued it was 
impossible to measure the velocity and position of a particle at the same time, while 
Gödel’s Proof ascertained that certain aspects of a system could not be determined while 
observing them from within that system.  To illustrate Boyd’s synthesis contained within 
Destruction and Creation, this chapter described how GEN. Stanley McChrystal and his US 
Special Operations Joint Task Force struggled to understand and defeat AQ in Iraq, while 
they persisted in viewing AQ as a mirror image of their own system.  The Second Law of 
Thermodynamics is a principle that determines the effect two systems have on each other, 
or what is described as entropy, while Boyd used Gödel’s Proof to show that in order to 
understand a new system it was necessary to unveil another system beyond it.  The 
powerful effect a single barbaric act, such as the beheading of a Western journalist 
published on social media, can have on the Western moral level of conflict is a good 
example of entropy and the effect two systems can have on each other. 
 
The dynamics of the OODA Loop were then applied to the mindset of contemporary Salafi-
Jihadi inspired terrorism.  This was important because as well as Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
home-grown terrorism being a tactic of asymmetrical warfare, it is connected through the 
minds of people and the impact each can have on the other.  In relation to AQ, it has been 
their dynamic ability to inspire home-grown terrorism that creates discontinuities and 
mismatches, producing entropy within Western society in the form of how to respond, 
even to the extent that Western public debate can begin to contemplate actions that 
counter the very freedoms the West upholds.  As explained by Pantucci (2012), the evasive 
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and oppressive surveillance required to detect and defeat an attack like that would not be 
tolerated by the electorate.  Similarly, moral and social entropy is generated within 
Western governments and communities when they are labelled Islamophobic in reaction to 
any public policy response to Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.  The decision by 
the Australian media, many politicians and commentators to support the #illridewithyou 
hashtag on Twitter is an illustrative example.  While the victims were those held hostage by 
Monis this social and mainstream media movement implied that the Muslim community 
may become victims of a public backlash.  The #illridewithyou hashtag had the consequence 
of confusing criticism of Salafi-Jihadi inspired terrorism with criticism of the Muslim 
community, or the Ummah.  Any response to the siege as an act of terrorism now had the 
potential to further alienate the Muslim community in Australia.  This notion of entropy is 
also an important component of what this chapter describes as moral manoeuvrability.   
 
The analysis and synthesis conducted in this research took one of Boyd’s most important 
contributions to the design of fighter jets, energy manoeuvrability, and, in the context of 
the current terrorist phenomenon, recast Boyd’s theorem into moral manoeuvrability.  
Developing the concept of moral manoeuvrability is an example of the synthesis Boyd 
encouraged when creating novelty.  In the context of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism, manoeuvrability and the moral continuum of war are two critical components for 
penetrating an opponent’s OODA loop.  Moral manoeuvrability is not explicit nor would it 
be recognised as a doctrine of conflict within AQ’s approach to war.  However, its implicit 
application leads the dynamic adaptations of tactics such as single acts of brutal violence 
that have powerful communicative and moral impact.  The moral, manoeuvrable impact 
from these single acts of violence is further amplified further when carried out in a DIY-style 
attack against a soft target within the urban life of Western society.  In summary, this 
chapter has made a strong case for the applicability of the OODA Loop as an adaptable, 
strategic model that can be applied to examine and analyse the dynamic and evolving 
nature of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare.  
Not only must one operate inside an opponent’s time scale, one must also operate within 
its moral scale of warfare.   
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary of Research & Discussion 
 
Through the use of case study research methodology, this research tested the theory that 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare used by AQ 
and other proponents of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  The research aimed to establish that 
home-grown terrorism is an effective tool of warfare, implicitly inspired by AQ’s Salafi-Jihadi 
narrative that penetrates the West’s OODA loop.  As Lind et al (1989) explained, “the fourth 
generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy's society.”  In other words, 
those applying the tactics of asymmetric warfare in this modern era will use their enemy’s 
moral and social constructs against them.  For AQ, and others who shape and apply the 
violence justified through the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, the enemy is Western society and its 
global hegemony of democracy, human rights and the Hobbesian liberal principles or social 
contract.  These values and principles, seen as strengths and even pillars of Western society, 
are seen by AQ as weaknesses to be exploited.  These principles are also an antithesis to the 
uncompromising worldview that through his Prophet Mohammed, Allah and the hadiths are 
a priori to all human-devised principles.  In other words, the Islamic doctrine (as with other 
religious doctrine) necessitates that revelation from one God, who Muslims believe created 
everything, must supersede reason.  In this existential kind of conflict or war, as van Creveld 
(1991) argued, the side with the more rational interests will lose. 
 
Three case studies were used to test this theory, through descriptive and evaluative critical 
inquiry, using John Boyd’s OODA Loop as the analytical lens.  As described in Chapter Three, 
case study research methodology is applicable to the study of home-grown terrorism 
because it is a well-established research discipline within social science.  The use of 
qualitative research practices to conduct exploratory analysis, using real-life examples 
within a conceptual framework, was also demonstrated to be applicable to this field of 
inquiry.  While there will continue to be a tautological debate around definitions of 
terrorism and home-grown terrorism, research of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism is essentially a study of people, events, decisions, periods of time and institutions, 
as well as belief systems that are appropriate for a theoretical course of inquiry.  The 
objectives of this research were to make a unique contribution to academic inquiry by: 
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a) using the OODA Loop as the strategic model of terrorism to evaluate and describe 
Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism, and 
 
b) proposing the concept of moral manoeuvrability, through an examination of the 
role of Western moral and humanistic values, identified as asymmetrical weakness 
to be exploited by proponents of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative while simultaneously 
inspiring more followers when Western governments and citizens contradict those 
principles through their actions towards the Muslim community. 
 
This research has also attempted to further develop this field of inquiry by expanding the 
understanding of how AQ created and exploited its own brand of Salafi-Jihadism to inspire 
home-grown terrorism.  This has the potential to inform the development of adaptable 
counterterrorism strategies that are better at anticipating the least expected tactics of this 
form of asymmetric warfare, as opposed to only the most likely.   
 
While the thesis elected to use two key conceptual selection criteria - Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
and home-grown terrorism - it did not intend to expand, redefine or contribute to the 
current discourse on the definitions of terrorism and home-grown terrorism.  The academic 
literature is already well served by analysis into the definitions of home-grown terrorism as 
it is with the definition of terrorism itself.  This thesis accepted the definition of home-
grown terrorism given in the US Congress under its legislation, Violent Radicalization and 
Home-grown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, as described in Chapter Three.  In summary, 
the key elements of home-grown terrorism are that the violence was planned, carried out 
or threatened by groups or individuals who were born or raised in the Western country 
where they planned to or succeeded in carrying out a terrorist attack.  Home-grown 
terrorism was succinctly described by Precht (2007) as violence against Western countries 
perpetrated by individuals in the country in which they were born or raised.   
 
A key selection criterion related to home-grown terrorists was that the individuals or 
members of a group were unexceptional.  That is, they were not specially trained guerrilla 
fighters, hardened terrorists or highly trained assassins; there was nothing about them that 
made them stand out from any other member of the community.  They may have gone to 
Afghanistan or elsewhere to receive training by AQ, but this did not turn them into special 
force operatives.  The individuals were unexceptional in their education, up-bringing, 
friends, sports and hobbies.  This criterion is in fact a crucial aspect of AQ’s ability to 
penetrate the OODA loop of Western government counterterrorism and security measures.  
There are undoubtedly hundreds of unexceptional, young Muslim males living in Western 
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countries who would not register on the radar of police and security agencies.  While AQ 
may or may not have explicitly realised, the ability to inspire unexceptional young males to 
plan and attempt to carry out a terrorist act in their Western country of residence is an 
example of a tactic of asymmetric warfare.  Similarly, the manipulation of Western moral 
constraints on the use of force and the protection of human rights, including those of 
terrorists, is another example of a tactic of asymmetric warfare.  As Arreguin-Toft (2001) 
described, asymmetric warfare is how a weak actor's strategy can make a strong actor's 
power irrelevant.   
 
Chapter Two described how the OODA Loop was devised as a strategic framework for 
combat operations by US fighter pilot COL. John Boyd (1927-1997).  According to Boyd, an 
entity that can process through this cycle of observing, orienting and reacting to unfolding 
events more rapidly than an opponent can "get inside" the opponent's decision cycle and 
gain the advantage.  As explained in Chapter Four, one of the most disorientating aspects of 
the 7 July 2005 London transport network attack was the broad Yorkshire accent of the 
terrorists in their YouTube videos published after the attack.  This was not what the public 
or the UK government expected and it demonstrated the effect of penetrating the UK’s 
OODA Loop, in response to AQ previously having its own OODA Loop penetrated by 
Western intelligence and security forces.   
 
As AQ observed it was not necessary to send outsiders into Western countries to carry out 
a terrorist attack when young Muslim males and converts to Islam who had become 
consumers of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative could be turned into producers of home-grown 
terrorism.  This process is also an example of the synthesis of various components of 
systems Boyd identified as being important for developing the kind of novelty that is least 
expected by one’s adversary.  As described in Chapter Two, the creation of the OODA Loop 
was the culmination of Boyd prising apart theories of mathematics, physics and energy as 
well as exploring an extensive number of wars in history.  Boyd then synthesised the core 
elements of their strategic successes to combine their elements to form a novel construct.  
An example of this synthesis is Boyd’s presentation entitled the Strategic Game of ? and ?, 
where he takes the audience through a mental game to design a snowmobile from a 
random list of mechanical components.  Boyd synthesised these theories to develop what is 
often mistaken to be a simple, conceptual framework on strategy.   
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An important aim of this research was to examine Boyd’s own eclectic, theoretical and 
critical inquiry.  While this is not a thesis on Boyd, (Osinga, 2005, does a rare and 
comprehensive study on Boyd’s strategic thinking), it was essential to the integrity of the 
research to evaluate Boyd’s most important works - including Destruction and Creation, 
Patterns of Conflict, The Essence of Winning and Losing and the embodiment of his work, A 
Discourse on Winning and Losing.  As discussed in Chapter Two, in 1986 Boyd also wrote 
and presented Organic Design for Command and Control otherwise referred to as C2.  
Without this examination it would not have been possible to appreciate and understand 
how to apply the OODA Loop as an adaptable strategic model for the study of Salafi-Jihadi 
inspired home-grown terrorism.  It would be analogous to turning on a light switch and 
claiming to understand electricity.  Anyone can draw the OODA Loop and describe the four 
components, but this does not qualify as an understanding and the application of the OODA 
Loop.   
 
It was through his multidimensional process of analysis and synthesis that Boyd determined 
that the key to beating an opponent was the ability to get inside the mental core of their 
decision processes.  The OODA Loop was the conceptual framework Boyd developed to 
explain this process.  As Hammond (2001), Coram (2002) and Polk (2010) explain, the result 
of penetrating an adversary’s OODA Loop means the adversary is dealing with distorting 
mental images and mis-information, leading to confusion and disorientation.  This has 
direct applicability to analysing and synthesising the components of Salafi-Jihadi inspired 
home-grown terrorism and its ability to penetrate the moral, physical and cognitive levels 
of war against Western society.  While Osinga (2005) provides one of the few detailed and 
thorough academic works on the OODA Loop, and discusses asymmetric warfare and 
terrorism since 9/11, he does not use the OODA Loop to evaluate AQ’s use of the Salafi-
Jihadi narrative to inspire home-grown terrorism.  By using the OODA Loop as an adaptable 
strategic model, this research offers a novel approach to the study of how AQ has exploited 
and cultivated the Salafi-Jihadi narrative to inspire home-grown terrorism as a tactic of 
asymmetric warfare. 
 
As Boyd explained, Orientation is the most important element within the OODA loop (Lind 
et al 1989, Hammond 2001, Coram 2002, Osinga 2005, Polk 2010).  Understanding the 
Orientation of an opponent means determining its culture, previous experiences, genetic 
heritage and moral compass, which is a non-linear feedback system in itself.  The principles 
of Western society and moral constructs such as the sanctity of human rights would be 
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examples of elements contained within a Western framed view of Orientation; while the 
unilateral truths - as prescribed by the Prophet Muhammad or the Hadiths - would form 
elements of an Islamic based view of Orientation.  Applying the concept of Orientation, 
Chapter Three described the predominant strategic models of terrorism and offered a new 
adaptable model, more applicable to accommodating the dynamic, regenerative nature of 
the current terrorism phenomenon.  Chapter Three also analysed the core elements of AQ’s 
manipulative use of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative to inspire followers and converts of Islam.  
Conclusions drawn from current academic research into home-grown terrorism and Islamic 
extremism continue to be framed by Western constructs of organisations, managerial 
structures and decision making.  Further, there is more to Orientation than simply being 
able to rapidly list the elements that might form the Orientation of an adversary; 
fundamentally it is about being able to do this implicitly.   
 
Using the term “leaderless” in academic research, to describe a shift in home-grown 
terrorist attacks where there appears to be no direct and explicit connection to AQ 
(Sageman 2008, Michael 2012, and Gray 2013), overlooks the implicit nature of this Salafi-
Jihadi inspired asymmetric warfare that is being waged in a way that T.E. Lawrence 
described as “arranging the minds”.  Boyd’s interpretation of implicit comes from his 
epistemological inquiry into historical military strategy, through examining German 
battlefield tactics and their use of the expression fingerspitzengefuhl, or “finger-tip feel”.  
German military doctrine described fingerspitzengefuhl as a Commander’s instinct or 
intuition, on the battlefield, to make decisions when confronted by a dynamic and changing 
environment.  As Coram (2001) explains, Boyd believed that when one developed 
fingerspitzengefuhl one was able to bypass the explicit “Orientation” and “Decision” part of 
the OODA Loop to “Observe” and “Act” almost simultaneously.   
 
Polk (2010) describes how Boyd was concerned that the explosion of technology in the 
information revolution risked overshadowing the human dimensions of C2 in favour of 
hardware solutions.  His organic notion of C2 was how he recast fingerspitzengefuhl, or the 
freedom to seamlessly apply both variety and initiative.  While Gladwell (2005) may not 
have mentioned Boyd or fingerspitzengefuhl when he developed his blink theory, he 
described it as “thinking without thinking.”  While it is an important contribution, the focus 
on “leaderless” only identifies that which is explicit about Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism; it does not grasp the possibility of implicit or existential adaptation.  This could 
explain why US law enforcement and security agencies initially dismissed the threat posed 
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by the Tsarnaev brothers in the lead up to the Boston Marathon bombing.  Alternatively, 
the law enforcement agencies could have been overwhelmed with the sheer number of 
unexceptional, young males being inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative that identifying the 
Tsarnaev brothers was a disorientating task. 
 
This approach to the research and the use of Boyd’s OODA Loop has resulted in several 
findings that make a contribution to this field of inquiry. 
 
7.2 Key Findings and Contributions 
 
7.2.1 The OODA Loop as an Adaptable Strategic Model of Terrorism 
 
The generally accepted strategic models of terrorism have come from important academics 
such as Thornton (1964), who proposed five strategic constructs, Crenshaw (1981) who 
developed strategic models of control and outbidding, as well as Pape (2006) who finds 
political ends to be the overriding, strategic objective of terrorist organisations.  While Kydd 
and Walter (2006) argue terrorist violence is a form of costly signalling, Abrahms (2008) 
offers a strategic theory based on organisational behaviour or social networks (a sense of 
belonging), which compliments the theoretical work of Sageman (2004).  In unique contrast 
to these models, the OODA Loop provides a strategic model that is more suited to the 
adaptive, dynamic and evolving nature of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism.  
Significantly, since it was developed by Boyd, the OODA Loop has not been used as a 
strategic model of terrorism.  The dominant strategic models present as restrictive and 
static frameworks, particularly when analysed through important works such as Destruction 
and Creation, which can be considered the DNA of the OODA Loop. 
As with other fields of theoretical inquiry involving social and behavioural phenomena, a 
strategic model or typology is considered useful for a rational frame of reference from 
which to conduct empirical and epistemological research.  This is also the case for the study 
of terrorism and home-grown terrorism.  A strategic model provides a logical construct to 
understand why and how a particular form of behaviour or action is occurring.  In his 
presentation The Strategic Game of ? and ?, Boyd (1987) states: 
What is strategy? A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonising and 
focusing our efforts as a basis for realising some aim or purpose in an unfolding 
and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending 
interests. (Boyd, 1987, slide 59) 
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In his essay Destruction and Creation, Boyd (1976) says, “any inward-oriented and 
continued effort to improve the match-up of concept with observed reality will only 
increase the degree of mismatch” (Boyd 1976, p.6).  In order to ensure academic research 
into the field of terrorism and home-grown terrorism does not become locked into a closed 
system of analysis, Chapter One explained that the first requirement is to shatter the rigid 
conceptual pattern, or patterns.  The second requirement is to constantly seek to thread 
together common qualities, isolated facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions, 
and observations, as they take shape and change how our actions or the actions of others 
represent the real world.  Finally, Boyd (1976) argued it is necessary to repeat this un-
structuring and restructuring until a concept is developed that begins to match-up with 
reality.  However, this concept will also need to be evaluated and reconstructed, as it too 
may become incomplete following changes in the external environment.  In Destruction and 
Creation, Boyd (1976) said,  
by doing this in accordance with Gödel, Heisenberg and the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics—we find that the uncertainty and disorder generated by an 
inward-oriented system to talking to itself can be offset by going outside and 
creating a new system. Simply stated, uncertainty and related disorder can be 
diminished by the direct artifice of creating a higher and broader more general 
concept to represent reality. (Boyd, 1976, p. 6) 
 
This research has emphasised the importance of understanding that the OODA Loop is not 
merely a simplistic, linear conceptual framework.  Instead, it is comprised of a complex 
synthesis of scientific, engineering, mathematical and biological principles as well as an 
epistemological evaluation of strategic theories of warfare throughout history.  From this 
dialectic approach to constructing an adaptable, general strategic model used for a study of 
terrorism, it is possible to determine that the prevailing models are too restrictive and 
static.  Home-grown terrorism is essentially an aspect of conflict witnessed through the 
tactical and strategic application of violence.  The OODA Loop is a general theory of conflict 
that can be applied at the tactical and strategic level to understand this evolving and 
dynamic phenomenon of asymmetric warfare as it applies to the contemporary 
phenomenon of home-grown terrorism. 
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7.2.2 Current Terrorist Phenomenon – A Different View on War 
 
While there is a plethora of academic literature debating the definition of terrorism, this 
thesis finds that AQ’s use of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is a tactic of 
asymmetric warfare against Western society.  That is, the implicit and dynamic adaptations 
in the application of home-grown terrorism should simultaneously be seen as part of the 
current terrorist phenomenon and as acts of war.  In Patterns of Conflict, Boyd (1986) 
argues that modern manoeuvre warfare, as expressed through the OODA Loop cycle, 
magnifies friction and induces paralysis by dislocating enemy forces.  Success in 
competition depends on simultaneously sustaining tempo while “abruptly adapting to 
changing circumstance without losing cohesion or coherency of the overall effort”.  This 
description by Boyd (1986) is central to understanding how Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-
grown terrorism, when viewed through the lens of the OODA Loop, can be described as a 
tactic of asymmetric warfare.   
 
It is a war not aimed at the physical destruction of Western armed forces or key aspects of 
our critical infrastructure in order to win.  Instead, it is a war aimed at disembowelling and 
confusing the legal, moral, social and democratic constructs of Western society.  This 
conflicts with Western strategies on war and may therefore distort potential counter-
terrorism measures.  The Western strategy of war has been dominated by von Clausewitz’s 
On War (1832). The “Clausewitzian” principles were devised for inter-state war between 
conventional armed forces: the physical domination and destruction of one sovereign state 
by another through the authority of large and increasingly more sophisticated weapons.  
However, this attachment to Clausewitz has not benefitted Western strategic approaches to 
war against adversaries who are weaker in terms of technology and capital in the 
application of force.  As Osinga (2005) explains, even though Clausewitz may be significant 
for his contribution to shaping the nature of war and strategy, his theories may also limit 
understandings of other constructs or paradigms of war and conflict.  Osinga (2005) goes 
even further and argues that, “the current Western mode of thinking and waging war, which 
is founded on Clausewitzian principles, is giving rise to non-Clausewitzian styles of warfare, 
with obvious consequences for the state of strategic theory” (Osinga, 2005, p.28).  This 
research determined that even after over a decade since the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon on 9/11 and the rise of ISIS, there continues to be a juxtaposition 
between the Salafi-Jihadi narrative of conflict as promoted by AQ and that of Western 
governments.   
216 
 
This thesis argued that through the use of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, AQ is engaged in a 
stateless war.  Home-grown terrorism is a tactic in the application of that war.  The 
description of state versus non-state actors is widely discussed in the literature, especially in 
the areas of terrorism, counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare, and it is a particular theme 
in what is referred to as fourth-generation warfare, as described by Lind et al (1989).  The 
stateless war, engaged by powerful narrative strategists within AQ and ISIS, is socialised by 
what could be described as cognitive-connectivity, built through deep faith-based, 
fundamentalist moral guides to life.  Victory is securing the mindset of the borderless, 
interconnected community where Western citizens and their Governments fear the 
unpredictable, fast transient and morally irreconcilable nature of potential home-grown 
terrorists living within their society.  While this thesis is not a critical inquiry on how warfare 
has evolved, it is evident that AQ is unequivocal in its belief and through its actions that it is 
indeed engaged in war against the West and all those who it accuses of being against Islam.  
The OODA Loop is directly applicable to understanding not only the mindset of the current 
terrorist phenomenon but also the strategic nature of how AQ plans and implements its 
stateless war.  The OODA Loop can also assist in exploring the question of how to penetrate, 
isolate and neutralise this non-state threat, as Lind said: 
 
Col John Boyd, USAF, America’s greatest military theorist, defined grand 
strategy as the art of connecting to—while isolating the enemy from—as many 
independent power centers as possible. The grand strategic question facing the 
US is how to do that in a 21st century that will increasingly be dominated by 
non-state, Fourth Generation forces.  (Lind 2004, November 22). 
 
In asymmetric conflicts, conventional battles with large armies are normally avoided, and if 
required, are only in the form of tactical activity, that must not be at the expense of the 
broader, strategic objective.  Deliberately destroying the distinction between conventional 
opponents and civilians is, as Osinga (2005) explains, an explicit part of the strategy of these 
conflicts.  In the context of this research, this simply describes the kind of stateless war 
waged by AQ and other proponents of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative. 
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7.2.3 Bypassing OODA Loops 
 
An important finding from this research is that AQ’s OODA Loop and that of Western 
governments and their counterterrorism policies are bypassing each other.  In other words, 
the two OODA Loops have been operating, and in some cases continue to operate, on 
different cultural dimensions of time, as well as moral and mental boundaries.   
 
Surviving in combat requires rapidly and implicitly understanding the Orientation of an 
opponent.  That can be difficult or misleading when done from a closed system, as Boyd 
argued, or when one is analysing an opponent’s Orientation as a mirror image of one’s own 
OODA Loop.  This research provided the example of retired GEN. Stanley McChrystal’s 
comparison between how the US military viewed AQ in Iraq and how AQ actually operated 
as a network.  The research also discussed the cognitive dissonance this can generate and 
used Dixon (1994) and his insightful analysis of historic instances of military incompetence 
to illustrate this notion.  Multiple case study analysis is used by Dixon (1994) to highlight 
such traits as the ignoring of intelligence reports which did not fit with preconceived ideas, 
a delusional underestimation of the enemy (a “magical” attempt to minimise the external 
threat), the fear of failure and an implacable resistance to the “uncertainties” of innovation.  
 
The academic debate between Sageman (2008) and Hoffman (2008) over “leaderless” jihad 
or the continued involvement of the AQ core is an example of analysing Salafi-Jihadi 
inspired terrorism from a Western construct of Orientation, or a closed-system.  It 
demonstrates an inability to construct Boyd’s snowmobile metaphor.  As Richards (2006) 
explained, mentally we interact by selecting information from a variety of sources or 
channels in order to generate mental images or impressions that match-up with the world 
of events or happenings that we are trying to understand and cope with.  Often these 
mental images are reflections of our own perspective, what we feel comfortable with, 
reinforced by our own Orientation.  This can cause a great deal of cognitive dissonance, 
when in fact if the West wants to deter or defeat AQ’s use of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-
grown terrorism, cognitive dissonance is exactly what needs to be created within the minds 
of individuals residing in Western countries.  
 
An alternative explanation is that conventionally-minded, Western-based academic 
research overlooks nuances such as implicit decision-making, fingerspitzengefuhl, or the 
creative, dynamic freedom of action inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, or schwerpunkt.  
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As discussed in Chapter Two, this meant not only developing a fingertip sense of the 
Orientation of an adversary, but also creating a unifying medium that flows into the 
freedom of action, initiative, independent creativity and a sense of duty.  This notion of 
schwerpunkt ties the initiative of many subordinate actions with superior intent in order to 
generate a mismatch, preventing the ability of an opponent to shape and adapt to 
unfolding circumstances.  As Lind et al (1989) describe, it is the conceptual focus.  It could 
explain the freedom of action that home-grown terrorists initiate in the application of 
existential will implied by AQ through the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.  
 
T E Lawrence described it as the use of the smallest force in the quickest time and the 
farthest place, giving the impression of a threat everywhere.  This is a clear and 
demonstrable tactic of asymmetric warfare by AQ in the inspiration of home-grown 
terrorists.   
 
 
7.2.4 Moral Manoeuvrability 
 
This research has developed the concept of moral manoeuvrability in relation to Salafi-
Jihadi inspired terrorism, although the concept can be applied to any conflict or competitive 
system.  The theoretical design of moral manoeuvrability resulted from employing the 
OODA Loop to conceptualise the premise that warfare has mental and moral dimensions to 
be exploited to instil fear and confusion, or result in an overreaction by an opponent, or 
even in an opponent acquiescing to the adversary’s demands, while simultaneously 
inspiring followers who regenerate the Salafi-Jihadi narrative in their own application 
violence.  The overreaction or compliance with the adversary’s demands forces the 
opponent to compromise on its own moral values and principles.  The notion that there is a 
moral level of war is not new.  This idea has been widely discussed by a range of military 
historians and leaders in the strategy of warfare and conflict - such as Sun Tzu, Napoleon, T. 
E. Lawrence, Liddell Hart and Colin Gray - all of whom Boyd analysed in his epistemological 
development of the OODA Loop.   
 
The novelty of this research has been to re-synthesise the notion of the moral level of war 
using the OODA Loop and Boyd’s theory on energy to develop the concept of moral 
manoeuvrability.  The use by AQ of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism to 
penetrate the West’s moral constraints and fundamental principles of human rights to instil 
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terror, while simultaneously inspiring followers, describes the use of moral manoeuvrability.  
For example, any reaction by Western governments, media, police or the general 
population is closely monitored by proponents of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative, such as Hizb-ut-
Tahrir in Australia, in the hope it magnifies any distrust and suspicion the Muslim 
community may hold about the Australian government.   
 
Boyd strongly argued that demonstrating an opponent’s moral contradiction between its 
stated value system and how it actually carries out these values is fundamental to inspiring 
a vanguard of revolutionary change.  For example, in the Strategic Game of ? and ?, Boyd, 
uses an extract from Alexander Atkinson’s Social Order and The Theory of Strategy that 
argues: 
 
“Moral fibre is “the great dam that denies the flood of social relations their 
natural route of decline towards violence and anarchy”…In this sense, “moral 
order at the center of social life literally saves society from itself.” “Strategists 
must grasp this fact that social order is, at once, a moral order …If the moral order 
on which rests a fabric of social and power relation is compromised, then the 
fabric (of social order) it upholds goes with it.” (cited in Boyd, 1987, Strategic 
Game of ? and ?,  slide 21) 
 
Any reaction, even to an act of home-grown terrorism, can be re-cast and labelled 
“Islamophobic”, causing moral discomfort in the governments, media and public 
commentary.  The application of moral manoeuvrability can be a highly corrosive strategy in 
asymmetric warfare against an opponent.  This is a classic illustration of what Boyd referred 
to as folding an adversary back inside itself.  In the end, the public, political and social elite 
prevent the government from pursuing the courses of action required to win.   
 
This research discussed and analysed Mack (1975) and his astute observation that the 
greater the gap in relative power, the less resolute and more politically vulnerable strong 
actors are; similarly the more resolute and less politically vulnerable are weak actors.  Big 
nations lose small wars because frustrated publics force a withdrawal short of victory.  This 
is one of the consequences of moral manoeuvrability. 
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7.2.5 Dynamic Evolving Tactics – The Power of the Single Act 
 
Through the use of the OODA Loop as the analytical lens, this thesis determined that AQ 
and ISIS have understood the power of the single act of brutality to simultaneously inspire 
home-grown terrorists to regenerate AQ’s application of asymmetric warfare and create 
disharmony, confusion and fear within the West.  The single acts of brutality are also 
demonstrations of the power of moral manoeuvrability.  For example, the kidnapping and 
beheading of Western aid workers and journalists, and the burning alive of a Jordanian 
fighter pilot, simultaneously penetrate our moral values while inspiring and building 
cognitive bridges into the minds of aspiring home-grown terrorists.  In the context of the 
OODA Loop, these single acts of brutality are further examples of the asymmetric 
adaptability of AQ and its exploitation of the Salafi-Jihadi narrative.   
 
The synthesis of a single act of brutality (in this case beheading) with the use of a Westerner 
to kill a Westerner (in the case of James Foley) generated moral repulsion and a sense of 
betrayal akin to home-grown terrorism.  As a tactic of asymmetric warfare, the act of 
kidnapping and denigration of Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa was continually replayed by 
the Japanese mainstream media, terrifying a nation, while the beheadings of both men 
forced Japan to change its foreign policy direction.  While this research did not have scope 
to explore the direct or indirect connection between single acts of brutality and the 
inspiration value for aspiring home-grown terrorists, this could be one area for further 
research.   
 
The applicants of the current terrorist phenomenon have recognised the tremendous power 
of the single barbaric act to penetrate the West’s OODA Loop.  The disharmony is amplified 
and the penetration even deeper when the single act is simple and carried out by an 
unexceptional person born or raised from within our own society.  This does not mean AQ 
explicitly designed single acts of brutality as a powerful inspirational tool for home-grown 
terrorists.  Truly novel adaptations are rarely contrived and constructed in a mechanical 
process.  Further, it is not even as if these kidnappings or beheadings are a new tactic.  
Kidnapping for ransom has been a lucrative business for many criminal and terrorist 
organisations - such as Somali pirates, the FARC rebels in Colombia, drug and criminal 
cartels in Mexico, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Sunni extremists during the second US-led 
war in Iraq.  The beheading of Daniel Pearl (on 1 February 2002) was a single act of brutality 
and perhaps an early example of AQ’s use of this as a tactic of asymmetric warfare.  
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Finally, while each shift in the application of home-grown terrorism may not have been 
explicitly designed, AQ observed the disharmony this tactic caused and the subsequent 
counterterrorism reaction.  The three case studies selected for this research demonstrated 
how the OODA Loop analysis can be used to explain the transformative nature of modern 
terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare - from (i) the case of Jack Roche and the use of 
unexceptional individuals from Western countries to avoid detection, to (ii) the 7 July 2005 
London attack where Western groups of friends were used to plan attacks to overcome 
tactical challenges as a way of adapting when AQ had its own OODA Loop penetrated, and, 
finally, to (iii) the Boston Marathon case where two brothers with no known links to 
terrorism were inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative as an example of the regenerative 
adaptability of the AQ brand.   
 
The OODA Loop offers a different view of this kind of warfare further evolving in the context 
of the current terrorism phenomenon through single acts of brutality, hyper-powered by 
social media, which implicitly provide a further inspirational dividend for potential Salafi-
Jihadi home-grown terrorists.  Using the OODA Loop has provided a lens through which we 
can analyse and synthesise these components, as this phenomenon continues to remain 
dynamic and evolve.   
 
7.3 Application of the Research 
 
The OODA Loop and the findings from this research could be used to determine how the 
West develops more effective counters to moral manoeuvrability and AQ’s dynamic 
regenerative capacity.  How do we undermine this powerful arranging of the minds taking 
place on a global scale?  The message in this research and its applicability is to ask 
governments, academics and the security sector to develop tactics, techniques and 
procedures that detect the least expected adaptation by AQ, and not just the most effective 
or most likely. 
 
The anxiety that comes with the possibility of having made a bad decision can lead to 
rationalisation, the tendency to create additional reasons or justifications to support one's 
choices.  The most famous case in the early study of cognitive dissonance was described by 
Leon Festinger in the book When Prophecy Fails (1964).  While this thesis did not explore 
how Boyd challenged the entire collective thinking and practice of the US Air Force, his own 
destruction and creation approach to thinking is informative.  Perhaps one of the most 
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important potential applications of this research is to use the OODA Loop as the conceptual 
framework in any and all facets of academic research.  In other words, it could applied to 
historical and epistemological research, case study research methodology, raw data 
collection, or analysis of empirical research of AQ’s use of Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown 
terrorism, to avoid the trap of cognitive dissonance.  Further, it would be logical to 
recommend that the adaptable, strategic model and the concept of moral manoeuvrability 
could be used to explore how a grand strategic policy could be developed to penetrate the 
OODA loop of Salafi-Jihadi terrorist organisations.  The objective would be to engineer a 
high degree of entropy and confusion, while suffocating their capacity to inspire followers 
who may be considering conducting home-grown terrorism. 
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